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I. INTRODUCTION 
1UDICIAL supremacy posits that (i) the Supreme Court has ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution's meaning; 1 ) the Court's constitutional decisions should be taken as bind-
ing on, and by, all other governmental actors2-including Con-
gress3 and the President;4 and (iii) only by amending 
constitutional text can the electorate supersede the Court's decla-
rations of constitutional law.5 Judicial supremacy has motivated 
political and scholafly concern about the "countermajoritarian" 
nature of judicial review. It has inflated the stakes in selecting 
I. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[I]t is the responsi-
bility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."); Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("[T]his Court [is the] ultimate interpreter of 
the Constitution."). 
2. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . . It follows that the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the 
Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes 
it of binding effect on the States. . . . Every state legislator and executive and 
judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath . . . 'to support this 
Constitution.' "). 
3. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (Congress 
lacks power "to enact statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due 
process decisions of this Court."). 
4. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) ("[l]t is the province 
and the duty of this Court to 'say what the law is' with respect to the claim of 
[executive] privilege presented in this case.") (citing Marbuy v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(l Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
5. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) 
(plurality opinion of Rehquist, CJ.) ("Stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal 
system, but it has less power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitu-
tional amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed changes."). 
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Supreme Court Justices. And it is nowhere to be found in the 
Constitution's text. 
This article evaluates judicial supremacy from the perspective 
of ordinary voters-individual members of the contemporary 
electorate otherwise empowered to enact legislation through its 
presidential and congressional representatives. I take this per-
spective because the individual voter is the ultimate and authori-
tative decisionmaker for two foundational events of constitutional 
policymaking. First, when the President, the Congress, and state 
legislatures join to create constitutional texts-the formal sub-
jects of judicial review-they are accountable to voters through-
out the national electorate.6 Second, when the President and the 
Senate select Supreme Court Justices-the individuals who exer-
cise the powers of judicial review-they are accountable to voters 
throughout the national electorate.7 Thus, the individual voter's 
perspective should be a critical focus for anyone concerned about 
the proper relationship between judicial review and 
majoritarianism. s 
I begin with an issue of basic political self-interest. Judicial 
supremacy does not deny the right of American voters to super-
sede Supreme Court decisions by amending the Constitution's 
text. But why should the electorate have to change constitutional 
text, and satisfy the tortuous processes of article V, to override a 
6. While not formally involved in article V amendment processes, the Presi-
dent is a major participant in the politics of constitutional amendment. See infra 
notes 306-09 and accompanying text (discussing President Bush's political initi-
ative for "constitutional amendment to protect the Hag"). Bruce Ackerman has 
proposed new procedures for formal constitutional amendment in which the 
President would play a crucial role. See Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1182 (1988). 
7. Cf M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 
( 1982) [hereinafter PERRY I] (judicial review is in tension with axiom of 
"electorally accountable policymaking"). But see M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, 
AND LAw 164 (1988) [hereinafter PERRY II] (suggesting earlier view of axiomatic 
electorally accountable policymaking was mistaken). I do not take an external 
perspective that evaluates majoritarianism and accountability as a moral princi-
ple. Instead, I take an internal perspective that evaluates accountability as a 
practical good for political competitors in a largely given majoritarian structure. 
For further examination of this starting point, see infra notes 44-58 and accom-
panying text. 
8. Those traditionally concerned with the countermajoritarian difficulties of 
judicial review focus on the majoritarian roots of the policies that courts deem 
"unconstitutional." See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 
(l 962). In this article, I begin with the foundations of constitutionalism that are 
themselves majoritarian. Cf Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Consti-
tution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013, 1045-49 (1984). 
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constitutional decision of the Court with which they disagree?9 
Why not, for example, a system in which Congress and the Presi-
dent together may "correct" the Supreme Court's interpretations 
of constitutional meaning by statute-a regime of congressional 
supremacy? 10 
From the voters' perspective, the relative merits of judicial 
supremacy and congressional supremacy for interpreting consti-
tutional texts depend on evaluating differences in results and 
political processes under each regime. Judicial supremacy, con-
gressional supremacy, or some alternative regime, makes sense 
only as a mechanism for maximizing the likelihood that whatever 
function voters might want judicial review to serve will, in fact, be 
served. Because judicial supremacy applies only to the Court's 
interpretation of constitutional texts, goals for judicial review-
and, therefore, reasons for judicial supremacy-should depend 
on justifications for constitutional supremacy .11 
9. U.S. CONST. art. V (prescribing arduous process for amending 
Constitution). 
10. This is the essential question even when courts invalidate state policies. 
When the Supreme Court decides that states may not prohibit abortion or adopt 
affirmative action plans, for example, it establishes national standards that restrict 
congressional discretion as well as state discretion. Given prevailing practices 
and premises about judicial review, Congress may not repeal or dilute limits on 
state discretion as defined by the Supreme Court in the name of the Constitu-
tion. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851) ("If 
the Constitution excluded the states from making any law regulating commerce, 
certainly Congress cannot re-grant, or in any manner reconvey to the states that 
power."); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) 
("[C]ongress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the 
guarantees of the [Fourteenth] Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to 
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.");]. CHOPER,jUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 199 (1980) ("When the Supreme Court invali-
dates state (or private) action under the initial sections of the thirteenth, four-
teenth, or fifteenth amendments, ... these decisions may not be overturned by 
ordinary federal legislation."); Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 
72 IowA L. REV. 753, 778 n.81 (1987). Thus, given my starting point-a focus 
on the national electorate's authority to create constitutional provisions, enact 
federal legislation, and select Supreme Court Justices-as well as uncontested 
notions of federal supremacy, I accept that state legislatures should not have 
interpretive supremacy over federal courts. Indeed, as Dean Brest has noted, 
given federal supremacy, "[w]hatever the scope of Congress' constitutional deci-
sionmaking authority, ... it is implausible that a state legislature could properly 
contradict a federal decision." Brest, Congress as a Constitutional Decisionmaker and 
Its Power to Counter judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 68 n.28 (1986). Further-
more, I do not question the need for a single body with supreme authority to 
interpret constitutional provisions and, therefore, whether the President may 
properly refuse to execute a law because he believes it unconstitutional. Cf Lee, 
The Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TuL. L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1987) 
(presidential refusal to execute law based on perception of unconstitutionality is 
inconsistent with separated powers and represents prescription for anarchy). 
11. One might, however, posit that justifications for constitutional 
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The principles of constitutional supremacy posit that 
(i) constitutional text may not be enacted, repealed, or amended 
by Congress; 12 and (ii) constitutional provisions supersede con-
flicting national legislation. 18 The second element of constitu-
tional supremacy requires some process for determining whether 
national legislation does conflict with the requirements of consti-
tutional text. Either judicial supremacy or congressional 
supremacy could provide such a process. Thus, the second ele-
ment of constitutional supremacy restates the question: Why ju-
dicial supremacy? 
The first element of constitutional supremacy imposes limits 
on the discretion of the national electorate's representatives be-
yond those imposed by judicial supremacy: The national electo-
rate may not change or create constitutional text by ordinary 
article I legislative processes, but may do so only by extraordinary 
article V amendment processes. 14 Thus, again from the voters' 
perspective, a more fundamental question: Rather than a regime 
of constitutional supremacy, why not statutory supremacy-a regime 
in which "constitutional" text has the same status as statutory text 
enacted by Congress? Why not a regime in which Congress and 
the President together may enact whatever legal texts they want, 
including, for example, amendments to the text of the first 
amendment, or even amendments to the legislative processes and 
structures prescribed in article 1?15 In short, toward determining 
supremacy should depend on justifications for judicial supremacy. See infra note 
366. Yet, such an argument would run against American history, as principles of 
constitutional supremacy were employed (through the distinctions between arti-
cle I and article V) before notions of judicial review, let alone judicial 
supremacy, were developed and accepted. 
12. See U.S. CONST. art. V; infra notes 14, 15 & 43. 
13. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; infra note 44. These two principles of constitu-
tional supremacy distinguish constitutional provisions from congressional legis-
lation, because Congress does have discretion to enact, repeal and amend 
statutes. 
14. The national electorate both creates constitutional provisions that limit 
congressional and local discretion, U.S. CoNST. art. V., and selects the Supreme 
Court Justices who will "interpret" and enforce those provisions that limit legis-
lative discretion, U.S. CONST. art. I. I am not now interested in distinctions be-
tween article V policymaking and article I policymaking beyond the greater 
difficulty of acting under the former than the latter. For a discussion of other 
significant differences between article I and article V policymaking, see infra note 
202; note 248 and accompanying text. 
15. Under congressional supremacy, Congress would have authority, for 
example, to enact a statute "correcting" the Supreme Court's "interpretation" 
of the due process clause in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But because of 
constitutional supremacy, Congress would not be able to repeal the due process 
clause itself. Furthermore, congressional supremacy as I consider it would not 
have Congress reversing the results of a particular case, but changing legal prin-
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the merits of judicial supremacy in interpreting constitutional 
texts, voters might ask: Other than to overturn Supreme Court 
decisions, why make public policy with "constitutional" texts, im-
mune from legislative revision, rather than with ordinary legisla-
tive texts? 
Although the national electorate might choose to circum-
scribe ordinary legislation by creating new constitutional provi-
sions, the political system today uses the principles of 
constitutional supremacy primarily by applying them to aging 
constitutional texts created by people generations ago. Toward 
understanding how this "intertemporal difficulty" 16 affects the 
relative merits of constitutional supremacy and statutory 
supremacy from the perspective of voters today, one must begin 
with otherwise analogous circumstances in which the passage of 
time is irrelevant. 
Thus, Part II of this article will bypass the complexities of 
intergenerational decisionmaking by considering the merits of 
constitutional supremacy from the perspective of those who actu-
ally create constitutional texts. Why might political competitors 
wish to make national policy by creating constitutional provisions 
rather than by enacting ordinary congressional legislation? By 
answering this question, I can consider how people who have cre-
ated new constitutional provisions would define ideal goals for 
judicial review 17-their preferred brand of constitutional "inter-
pretation." By identifying ideal definitions of "interpretation," I 
can then consider whether judicial supremacy or congressional 
supremacy is a better mechanism for inducing government offi-
cials to fulfill each ideal. 
In Part III, the article will return to contemporary political 
practice. I reintroduce intertemporal issues by asking whether 
and why it makes sense for members of the national electorate 
ciples applicable to future cases. Abraham Lincoln made this distinction when 
discussing his opposition to Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Lin-
coln said, "in so far as it is decided in favor of Dred Scott's master and against 
Dred Scott and his family, I do not propose to disturb or resist the decision." 2 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (speech 
of July 17, 1858). Yet Lincoln also said, "we nevertheless do oppose that deci-
sion as a political rule . . . . We propose so resisting it if we can, and a new 
judicial rule established upon this subject." Id. at 494 (speech of July 10, 1858). 
16. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1046. 
17. I introduce the idea of constitutional representation-that Justices, in "in-
terpreting" constitutional provisions, should endeavor to make the same deci-
sions the electorate would make if it were engaged in extraordinary constitutional 
politics toward creating constitutional texts. See infra text accompanying notes 
63-66, 90-94 & 106-08. 
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today to apply the principles of constitutional supremacy to aging 
texts, rather than either (i) to create new supreme texts or (ii) to 
establish a regime of statutory supremacy. By answering this 
question, I can consider ideal definitions of constitutional "inter-
pretation" for the national electorate today. 18 I can then consider 
whether an "interpretive" regime of judicial supremacy or con-
gressional supremacy can better achieve these ideal definitions of 
"interpretation" and, therefore, better serve the electorate's rea-
sons for applying principles of constitutional supremacy to the 
Constitution's aging texts.19 
This article reaches a conclusion to which many might react 
with discomfort: While voters have good reason to exploit the 
principles of constitutional supremacy to define a category of 
supreme legal text that cannot be modified by ordinary political 
processes, an ethic of judicial supremacy in interpreting those 
supreme texts is surprisingly problematic. 20 I suggest that from 
18. I suggest the same "interpretive" ideal for the electorate today as for 
those who actually create their own constitutional provisions-constitutional 
representation: identifying the choices voters would make if engaged in ex-
traordinary constitutional politics. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; in-
fra text accompanying notes 144-48, 175-82, 193-94 & 207-18. This approach 
provides a method for understanding and resolving the "intertemporal diffi-
culty" involved in applying aging constitutional provisions to contemporary so-
cial conflict. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1045-49; Chang, supra note 10, 
at 784-94; Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE 
LJ. 449, 451, 517 (1989) (originalism is phase in constitutional development 
that ultimately denies real (present) popular sovereignty). Thus, the "interpre-
tive" goals generated by this analysis might supplant (or, more likely, exacer-
bate) the "interpretivism" versus "noninterpretivism" dilemma. See generally, 
e.g., PERRY I, supra note 7, at 11. For a comparison of constitutional representa-
tion with other theories of interpretation, see infra notes 149-74 and accompany-
ing text. 
19. Cf Gavison, The Implications of jurisprudential Theories for Judicial Election, 
Selection, and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1622 (1988) ("[B]oth selec-
tion and accountability presuppose that we know what judging entails, and what 
constitutes performing well as a judge."); Shapiro.Judicial Selection and the Design 
of Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1557-58 (1988) (theories for select-
ing adjudicators must be linked to theories of adjudication). 
20. Cf P. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE 
OF PROVISIONAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 11-20 ( 1989) (advocating judicial final-
ity for issues of political process and representation reinforcement; congres-
sional override for other issues); Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and the 
Problem of judicial Finality, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 9, 9-23 (1985) (advocating 
judicial finality for "originalist" decisions and power of Congress to override 
"nonoriginalist" decisions for "human rights" issues); Dimond, Provisional Re-
view: An Exploratory Essay on an Alternative Form of judicial Review, 12 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q 201, 201-02, 229-38 (1985) (same as P. DIMOND, supra); Sandalow, 
judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1188 (1977) (advocating 
judicial deference to congressional choices that reflect a deliberate and broadly 
based political judgment). I question judicial supremacy for all issues of consti-
tutional interpretation and, indeed, suggest that it is equally problematic, if not 
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the perspective of the national electorate, judicial review supple-
mented by congressional supremacy-an ethic that Congress has au-
thority to supersede the Court's constitutional interpretations by 
statute21-might well better secure the benefits that constitutional 
supremacy can provide.22 
more so, with respect to originalist decisions. For further evaluation of the rela-
tionship between originalism and judicial supremacy, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 149-53 & 234-35. 
21. At the same time, however, I argue that an ethic of congressional 
supremacy should not necessarily induce congressional eagerness to exercise 
that authority. Indeed, that so many probably will be.so uncomfortable with the 
idea of congressional supremacy suggests that the power, even if recognized, 
would be cautiously employed. Nevertheless, I suggest that the electorate might 
well benefit from a reallocation of institutional responsibility for making consti-
tutional law. See infra text accompanying notes 219-20; notes 240 & 244; cf. R. 
NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 3 (1989) (courts should do less, thereby in-
vigorating political resolution of constitutional issues). Professor Nagel's argu-
ment suffers the flaws of all arguments for judicial deference-the benefits of 
judicial decisionmaking are silenced. See infra text accompanying notes 266-68, 
277-92 (losses from judicial deference); notes 250 & 348 (same); note 362 
(losses from Michael Perry's option of withdrawing federal jurisdiction). Con-
gressional supremacy, in contrast, retains judicial review as a good, while serving 
Professor Nagel's goal of public responsibility for constitutional law through in-
teraction between the Court and Congress. 
22. I will consider judicial "life-tenure" in passing, but the subject will not 
be of central concern. A recent symposium has addressed this issue at length. 
See Bell, Principles and Methods of judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757 
( 1988) (process of judicial selection should be tailored to needs of varying judi-
cial functions); Gavison, supra note 19; Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Con-
straint: A judge's Perspective of judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969 
( 1988) (discussing the dangers of eliminating judicial elections); Schauer.judging 
in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 71 7 (1988) (society may want some 
political decisions made by people with life-tenure position and other political 
decisions made by representatives elected every few years); Shapiro, supra note 
19; Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to judicial Selection, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988) (concluding that merit selection of appellate 
judges should be based on judicial intelligence, integrity, and wisdom); Thomp-
son, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California 
Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988) (advocating retention of Califor-
nia's judicial election process if campaigning can be controlled); Tushnet, Consti-
tutional lnterpretation and judicial Selection: A View from The Federalist Papers, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1669 ( 1988) (problems associated with elected legislative branch 
serving extended terms not present in judicial branch since judges must offer 
rational justification for decisions); see also Ross, The Hazards of Proposals to Limit 
the Tenure of Federal Judges and to Permit Judicial Removal Without lmpeachment, 35 
VILL. L. REV. 1063 (1990) (comprehensive history of efforts to abrogate life-
tenure and analysis of Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disa-
bility Act of 1980). I ultimately suggest, however, that life-tenure is not as prob-
lematic as judicial supremacy and, indeed, in conjunction with congressional 
supremacy, can promote the benefits that voters might want constitutional 
supremacy to provide. See infra note 359; see also Seidman, Ambivalence and Ac-
countability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1575 (1988) (legislative power to correct 
judicial decisions does not necessarily imply propriety of electing judges). 
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR PEOPLE WHO CREATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS 
A. Why Constitutional Supremacy? 
1. To Perpetuate an Extraordinary Political Advantage 
During Reconstruction, while the defeated Southern states 
remained unrepresented in Congress,23 the Northern electorate's 
"Congress" passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 toward ensuring 
that its own notions of racial justice governed the entire nation.24 
With Southern participation, the legislation probably could not 
have been passed.25 In enacting the bill without the participation 
of the Southern states, a majority among the Northern electorate 
determined that their values of racial justice were more important 
than was their white Southern neighbors' right to shape public 
policy. 
But the North's Republican majority faced a problem. With 
the prospect of Southern readmission to Congress, many 
Northerners feared that they would lose their status as an unchal-
lenged congressional majority governing issues ofracial morality. 
Racial justice would again become a matter for open conflict and 
accommodation with the South, as it had been before the Civil 
War.26 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 might be eroded.27 Addi-
23. The 11 rebel states regained representation in Congress only after rati-
fication of the fourteenth amendment in 1868. See W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 93-94 (1988). 
Even then, representation was shaped by the North's military reconstruction of 
the Southern electorate. It was not until the mid-1870s that the Southern elec-
torate reverted to its antebellum nature. See infra text accompanying notes 79-
87. 
24. The Act protected blacks from discrimination in making contracts, own-
ing and transferring property, and enjoying the protection of a state's criminal 
laws. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill, in part on the ground that such 
policies could not be made by a "Congress" in which 11 states were not repre-
sented. See]. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 70 (1902). 
25. See id. at 63 (discussing Northern Republican perception that Southern 
state governments reconstructed by President Johnson "were consciously devel-
oping freedmen's codes which would not differ greatly from their old slave 
codes"). 
26. Charles Fairman has suggested that President Andrew Johnson's plan 
for reconstruction would have left the Southern states "subject to no additional 
restraints beyond the abolition of slavery," and, indeed, able to join with North-
ern Democrats to press Southern concerns in Congress. "For a people defeated 
in their rebellion, what more could be asked?" 7 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COM-
MISSION 3 (Supp. 1988); see also]. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 31-41 (describing 
Johnson's reconstruction plan). 
27. Some apparent supporters of racial equality were less fearful that Con-
gress might repeal civil rights legislation, even after the antebellum Southern 
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tional legislation toward enforcing its provisions against inevita-
ble Southern recalc;itrance might be blocked. 
The fourteenth amendment is widely viewed as an effort by 
the North's Republican majority to frame as constitutional man-
dates the policies underlying the Civil Rights Act of 1866.28 
Strengthened by the principles of constitutional supremacy, these 
policies theoretically would be immune from erosion by Con-
gress. Thus, even after the wrong-headed Southern electorate 
regained representation in Congress, Northern policies of racial 
justice would persist and supersede any conflicting legislation 
that the Congress endeavored to enact. 29 
electorate regained its political strength. Oregon Senator George H. Williams, 
for example, later nominated by President Grant to succeed Chief Justice Chase, 
offered a substitute for the fifteenth amendment that simply would have given 
Congress discretion to create voting rights by statute. See H.R. 402, 40th Cong., 
3d Sess. (1869). In favor of such a measure, in his view, was greater flexibility in 
meeting unforeseen intrusions on the right to vote. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 3d Sess. 900 (1869). 
28. As one historian has noted, 
It is certainly not strange that the Republicans should have feared that 
the Democrats of the North ... would soon be found fraternizing with 
the Senators and Representatives from the reconstructed "States," and 
that it was their duty to secure "perpetual ascendancy of the party of the 
Union," before admitting the Senators and Representatives from these 
"States" to participate in public power. 
J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 54 (emphasis added); see also c. BLACK, THE PEOPLE 
AND THE COURT 131-32 (1960) ("The debates on the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
express the thought that the Amendment was being adopted, in part, because of 
a desire to put its guarantees out of the reach of future Congresses.");]. BUR-
GESS, supra, at 74 ("[T]here was but one thing to do, and that was to enact, and 
secure the adoption of, another amendment to the Constitution covering these 
points, while the power to do so still existed."); P. DIMOND, supra note 20, at 41 
(Republicans wished to insulate policies of 1866 Act from erosion by future 
Congresses); W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 3 (differing views about fourteenth 
amendment converge on Northern electorate's desire to secure certain policies 
against future erosion); id. at 47 (fourteenth amendment a means to undermine 
"political power of disloyal groups that had brought the war about"); id. at 55 
(framers wished rights protected by Constitution rather than Congress to ensure 
judicial enforcement "even if Congress fell under Democratic control"); id. at 61 
("The Fourteenth Amendment must be understood as the Republican party's 
plan for securing the fruits both of the war and of the three decades of antislav-
ery agitation preceding it."); id. at 95 (quoting Arkansas newspaper charging 
Republicans with attempt to perpetuate power "of the temporary majority of a 
section of the Union"). 
29. Another means toward perpetuating the Republicans' notions of racial 
justice was the loyalty oath. One early such measure, prescribed by President 
Lincoln, required oaths to 
faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States ... and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the 
existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not 
repealed, modified, or held void, by Congress or by decision of the 
Supreme Court .... 
J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at IO. The two provisos concerning repeal by Con-
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Under article V of the Constitution, however, amendment re-
quired ratification by three-fourths of the states.so As Southern 
values were the very reason that the Northern Republicans 
needed a constitutional amendment, so Southern participation in 
the amendment process could have blocked its ratification.s1 The 
North's Republican majority was able to secure ratification, how-
ever, by placing the Southern governments under military rule 
and making ratification the price for readmission to Congress. s2 
This analysis of the fourteenth amendment suggests that one 
portion of the electorate might seek to exploit the principles of 
constitutional supremacy by creating constitutional provisions to 
perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage over another portion of the 
electorate. Implicit in this motive for creating supreme constitu-
tional provisions are three necessary components. First, those 
seeking to create such a constitutional provision must care more 
about achieving certain policy results than about their weakened 
opponents' "right" to shape public policy.ss Second, that portion 
gress and invalidation by the Supreme Court revealed the Northern electorate's 
problems: How to ensure that a Congress in which the South was readmitted 
did not repeal or otherwise undermine protection for the newly freed slaves, and 
how to ensure that the Supreme Court did not invalidate such measures as 
unconstitutional. 
30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
31. Other than Tennessee, all the Southern state governments recon-
structed under President Johnson's plan rejected the fourteenth amendment 
shortly after the elections of 1866. See J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 106. 
32. After 10 of the 11 rebel states had rejected the amendment by early 
1867, Congress replaced President Johnson's reconstructed governments with 
its own regime of military rule. See J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 112. Congress 
then passed measures that made ratification of the fourteenth amendment by 
each Southern state, and by three-fourths of the United States, a condition for 
readmission to Congress. Id. at 121-22; see also M. MANTELL, JOHNSON, GRANT, 
AND THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 101 (1973). 
33. Professor Nelson reports one Republican's claim of willingness "to sac-
rifice almost anything to keep the democratic party out of power" and unwilling-
ness "to see it in power again while I live." W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 46. If 
members of the Northern electorate were willing to deny their Southern oppo-
nents a right to shape public policy, how did they feel about each other? Some, 
like Thaddeus Stevens, were far more committed to racial equality than others, 
like Representative James Wilson of Iowa, who did not believe that the amend-
ment should proscribe racial segregation. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY 118-19 (1977). But both Stevens and Wilson lacked the political clout 
to deny each other's right to shape public policy. Thus, with respect to the pre-
cise content of the Civil War amendments, Stevens and Wilson were opponents; 
with respect to the question of whether some version of Northern values regard-
ing racial justice should be framed in the Constitution to exploit an extraordi-
nary political advantage over the South, Stevens and Wilson were valued allies 
without conflict. It is possible, but not necessarily true, that Stevens would have 
chosen to deny even his Northern allies the right to shape public policy, toward 
more precisely achieving his own notions of racial justice, if he had enjoyed the 
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of the electorate must be sufficiently powerful to enact its prefer-
ences as a constitutional mandate by preventing its opponents' 
participation. A desire to perpetuate an extraordinary political 
advantage is mere fantasy without a political advantage to exploit. 
Third, the political advantage must be temporary. If a group will 
enjoy tomorrow the same political advantage in ordinary legisla-
tive politics that it enjoys today in both legislative and constitu-
tional politics, it need not resort to constitutional supremacy to 
serve its interests. It need not endure the trouble and risks of 
constitutional politics,34 because its political power in the legisla-
ture serves just fine.35 
2. To Secure the Benefits of Political Self-Constraint 
Toward generating a second reason for creating supreme 
constitutional texts, put aside the foregoing motive by assuming 
that a majority of voters either (i) believe that all voters have an 
equal right to shape public policy; or (ii) acknowledge each 
other's undeniable power to shape public policy-whether by en-
acting statutes or creating constitutional texts. Now consider two 
additional assumptions. 
First, political competitors believe that during times of ex-
traordinarily thoughtful dedsionmaking, they would be better 
able to identify moral ideals or practical concerns that are criti-
power to do so. Yet any increment toward his own racial ideals that he could 
have achieved by denying Wilson's right to shape public policy might not have 
been worth compromising a concern-if he had one-that people should have 
an equal right to shape policy. Cf R. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 18-19 
(1963) (discussing relationships between conflict and consensus in government). 
Stevens never faced this problem, however, because he never enjoyed such 
power-he had to compromise. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
34. See Chang, supra note IO, at 775-82 (analyzing risks of creating constitu-
tional provisions and of judicial review for those provisions when electoral ma-
jority's concerns can be achieved with ordinary legislation). 
35. Theories of interest group politics view constitutional provisions "as 
designed to protect groups sufficiently powerful to obtain constitutional protec-
tion for their interests." Landes & Posner, The Independent judiciary in an lnterest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875, 893 (l 975). In arguing that courts should 
interpret statutes according to their original meaning, Landes and Posner view 
as mere "detail" whether the interest group is a majority of the voting popula-
tion. Id. For my purposes, however, this variable is fundamental. It seems un-
likely that a minority, however interested and active, could prevail against 
majoritarian sentiments in the high stakes, high visibility politics of constitu-
tional ratification, see infra note 48--except under extraordinary circumstances 
such as those following the Civil War. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying 
text. Furthermore, whether the "interest group" is a minority or majority is crit-
ical for determining whether, and why, it is sensible to make policy by creating a 
constitutional provision or statute. See infra text accompanying notes 183-91. 
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cally important in general and over time.36 Such values might in-
volve allowing someone to speak his mind, even though his 
message is offensive;37 or treating convicted felons as human be-
ings, even though their crimes are disgusting;38 or requiring the 
federal government to balance the budget, even though each 
voter would like more spent on his own preferences. 39 
Second, most members of the electorate are unwilling and 
unable to commit themselves to such political thoughtfulness on 
an everyday basis. In Bruce Ackerman's terms, they are private 
citizens: private to the extent that they wish to be apart from soci-
ety, to go to work, to raise a family, to watch "The Honeymoon-
ers," and citizens to the extent that they wish to be a part of 
society, to influence the lives of others, or to convince others not 
to influence their own.40 Thus, values identified during times of 
extraordinarily thoughtful decisionmaking might seem less press-
ing on an everyday basis and are, therefore, vulnerable.41 
Given these assumptions, voters might choose to create 
supreme constitutional texts to constrain their own careless ex-
36. See R. DAHL, supra note 33, at 66 (discussing Hobbesian view of dichoto-
mous human nature encompassing both passion and reason); THE FEDERALIST 
No. 55, at 346 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (human nature comprised of 
both depravity and virtue). 
37. Cf Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (state may not punish flag 
burning because of disagreement with ideas expressed). The flag burning issue 
has been the subject of a proposed response by both constitutional amendment 
and congressional legislation. See infra text accompanying notes 306-21. 
38. Cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty may be im-
posed if administered in nonarbitrary way); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972) (arbitrary administration of death penalty cruel and unusual). 
39. See generally Barker, A Status Report on the "Balanced Budget" Constitutional 
Convention, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29 (1986). 
40. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at I 033-34; see also R. DAHL, supra note 33, at 
57 (people have different degrees of dedication to politics). 
41. One can draw analogies from everyday life. For example, a person 
might have conflicting desires to eat rich foods and to lose weight. He might 
decide to favor the goal of losing weight, but generally can do so only after 
extraordinary reflection and ritual-whether in the form of a New Year's resolu-
tion, purchasing a diet book, or joining (and paying for) a weight loss program. 
Without such efforts, the more pressing desire to eat overwhelms the vulnerable 
(yet preferred) desire to lose weight. See Chang, supra note 10, at 771-74. Cer-
tain reasons for attending church provide another example a bit closer to the 
text's analysis of reasons for creating constitutional provisions. Even a person 
who embraces her religion's precepts about how to live, how to think, and how 
to treat others, might fail to live up to them because of competing preferences 
and impulses. Toward reinforcing her higher concerns, she goes to church and 
listens to a sermon that reminds her of ideal behavioral norms and goads her to 
conform. It is through this extraordinary effort that one's higher ideals are iden-
tified. Because competing concerns are expressed and felt more impulsively and 
reflexively, the higher ideals are vulnerable to the pressures of everyday living. 
Id. 
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cesses, errors, or omissions in everyday legislative politics. If so, 
the electorate would want to make "constitutional" policy im-
mune from legislative erosion to enforce a greater commitment to cer-
tain values, identified during episodes of extraordinarily thoughtful politics, 
than they can trust themselves, and their legislative representatives, to respect 
in the relative carelessness of everyday political competition.42 I have else-
where characterized this motive for creating supreme constitu-
tional provisions as the desire for political self-constraint.43 
3. To Ensure optimal Legislative Accountability 
The most fundamental issue for evaluating the relative merits 
of constitutional supremacy and statutory supremacy is whether 
42. Speaking of the revolutionary period, Gordon Wood suggested that 
"fear of themselves actually underlay all of the Americans' foolish contriv-
ances-their perpetual constitutions, their special conventions, and their use of 
instructions-and was involving them in all sorts of tangled contradictions." G. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1786, at 378 (1969). 
Indeed, constitutionalism as extraordinarily thoughtful politics is an element of 
the general rise of republicanism in constitutional scholarship. See, e.g., Acker-
man, supra note 8; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988); Michelman, Foreward: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman I]; Michelman, 
Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); [hereinafter Michelman II]; Sunstein, 
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 ( 1988). This type of constitution-
alism comports with another word in vogu~hronesis, or practical wisdom. See, 
e.g., PERRY II, supra note 7, at 181; Solum, supra note 22, at 1752 ("Practical 
wisdom is the virtue that enables one to make good choices in particular circum-
stances."). Both republicanism and phronesis can be viewed from an elitist per-
spective, as does Michelman, or a populist perspective, as do Ackerman and 
Amar. As my focus is on ordinary voters-the electorate ultimately responsible 
for creating constitutional provisions, enacting legislation, and selecting 
Supreme Court justices-I am now r~sting with the populist camp. See infra text 
accompanying notes 169-73, 34 7-50 (relating liberal republicanism and judicial 
review toward political self-constraint). 
43. See Chang, supra note 10, at 767-74. A notion of political self-constraint 
is implicit in Alexander Hamilton's justification for the supremacy of constitu-
tional choices over legislative choices: 
Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never con-
cur with its enemies in questioning that fundamental principle of re-
publican government which admits the right of the people to alter or 
abolish the established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent 
with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this principle that 
the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens 
to lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in 
the existing Constitution would, on that account, be justifiable in a viola-
tion of those provisions .... 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (footnote 
omitted and emphasis added); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432 (A. Hamil-
ton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("When ... the interests of the people are at variance 
with their inclinations, . . . the persons whom they have appointed to be the 
guardians of those interests [should] withstand the temporary delusion in order 
to give them more time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection."). 
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an established legislative process should be free to restructure it-
self.44 Thus, in fully analyzing why a majority of the national elec-
torate might choose to make policy in supreme constitutional 
texts rather than in ordinary legislation, one must consider fac-
tors that voters might weigh in structuring their mechanisms for 
making public policy.45 
Although voters might decide to compete in a direct democ-
racy, most would reject such an intensely participatory process for 
at least two reasons. First, such political combat would occupy a 
44. Statutory supremacy eliminates a distinction between "constitutional" 
text, immune from revision by ordinary legislative processes, and ordinary legis-
lative texts. It supposes that the established legislative process may enact, 
amend, or repeal any legal text, including one that changes the legislative pro-
cess itself. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. 
45. Just as voters disagree about good policy, they will disagree about the 
best structures for legislative and constitutional politics. Thus, political compet-
itors must somehow establish a rule by which they determine the rules under 
which they create their Congress and any supreme constitutional provisions pur-
porting to limit congressional discretion. Both historically and theoretically, 
identifying an ultimate rule of recognition is a matter of improvisation in re-
sponse to prevailing social and political forces. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 
1057-65 (historical approach); Greenawalt, The Ru/,e of Recognition and the Constitu-
tion, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621 (1987) (theoretical approach); see also H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAw 98-99 (1961) (rules of recognition often not stated but 
shown in the way in which other rules are identified); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 338-43 (1983) (Kelsen's doctrine presupposed 
norm underlying legal system's perceived validity); H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF 
LAw 193-204 (M. Knight trans. 1967) (legal norms are valid because they are 
created in manner determined by presupposed "basic norm"). 
I make the following assumptions about the prior, improvised, informal rule 
of recognition. First, a prior and informal rule of recognition will reflect both 
the respective power that political competitors possess to vindicate their con-
cerns and their views about the rights of others to shape public policy. Second, 
people believing that each has an equal right to shape public policy will view 
each other as comprising an authoritative electorate. A primary, informal rule of 
recognition within such a group will likely reflect a one-person, one-vote mecha-
nism coupled with a principle of majority rule. Under such a rule, the majority 
might choose anything from a majoritarian legislative mechanism to a monarchy. 
Third, even people who deny each other's equal moral right to shape public pol-
icy, yet who possess approximately equal power, and whose differences are not 
so great as to undermine the cohesiveness of community, will view each other as 
an authoritative electorate. A primary, informal rule of recognition within such 
a group also will likely reflect a one-person, one-vote mechanism coupled with a 
principle of majority rule. Fourth, and critically important, the choice for statu-
tory supremacy or constitutional supremacy will be made under the same pri-
mary, informal rule of recognition. In other words, even if not all people are 
equally influential in shaping public policy, the same power relationships govern 
when creating the legislative mechanism and when creating the legislature"s re-
lationship, if any, to principles of constitutional supremacy. Indeed, this was the 
case with the founding of 1787, as article I (congressional discretion) and article 
V (procedures for amendment) and article VI (requirement that statutes be made 
"in pursuance of" the Constitution) all were created by the prior, improvised 
rule of recognition reflected in article VII (ratification procedures). 
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great amount of their time. Some people might view a publicly-
oriented life as ideal, but most-the private citizens-seem more 
concerned with insular and personal pursuits.46 
Representative government can provide an efficient substi-
tute for direct democracy. By relying on accountable representa-
tives to make public policy, voters need not devote so much 
attention to achieving their public objectives. To ensure account-
ability, however, voters must be concerned about competitive 
political power: not only each other's influence over the govern-
ment,47 but also the extraordinary power given to their represent-
atives.48 Thus, the electorate might endeavor to define voting 
rights, specify limited terms of office and procedures for elec-
tions, 49 and create rights to information about governmental per-
46. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1033-34 (discussing private citizenship); 
see also R. DAHL, supra note 33, at 60 ("An individual is unlikely to get involved in 
politics if he places a low valuation on the rewards to be gained from political 
involvement relative to the rewards to be expected from other kinds of human 
activity."). 
4 7. One can return to the political dynamics underlying formation of the 
original, pre-formal rule of recognition. See supra note 45. If a voter believes 
that each individual has an equal right to shape public policy, he will want no 
more influence over representatives than his opponents have. If, however, a 
voter is less concerned about his opponents' right to shape public policy than 
about achieving his own notions of justice, he might hope to have extra control 
over representatives-perhaps by denying opponents a right to vote. This de-
sire is meaningful only to the extent that one has the power to succeed. If all 
voters press equally for as much influence as possible over the creation of public 
policy, they will create a legislative machine that acts as if each believed in de-
mocracy as a matter of morality. These bases for both a moral commitment to 
majoritarianism and a resigned acceptance of majoritarianism in the legislative 
structure parallel later analysis of one's ideal "interpretive" behavior for judges 
in giving meaning to legal provisions. See infra note 143 (distinguishing between 
individual's community-oriented "interpretive" goal and selfishly-oriented "in-
terpretive" goal). 
48. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) 
("It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the 
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice 
of the other part."); cf. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mo~l. 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 223, 242-43 (1986) 
(constitutions designed to inhibit active minorities from transforming prefer-
ences into law at expense of passive majorities). During constitutional creation, 
more people who otherwise would be politically passive might vigilantly address 
themselves to public policy, thus preventing more politically obsessed people 
from disproportionately shaping law. Id. at 246-47 (high stakes of constitutional 
creation provide incentives for free riders to become active participants); cf. Sun-
stein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1690 (1984) 
(original constitutional concern to prevent capture of government by factions). 
Ronald Dworkin refers to competitive relationships among members of the elec-
torate as "horizontal" issues of power and to the relationship between the elec-
torate and officials as "vertical" issues of power. See Dworkin, What is Equality~ 
Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. l, 9 (1987). 
49. See, e.g., G. Wooo, supra note 42, at 273 (expressing profound distrust 
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formance50 and rights of access to governmental decisionmakers. 
Although no legislative structure can ensure equal accounta-
bility to each voter,51 many could approximate this goal. For ex-
ample, both a unicameral legislature subject to annual elections, 
and a bicameral legislature subject to elections every decade, can 
reflect a one vote per person principle. Thus, the sort of legisla-
tive structure that political competitors choose must be a function 
of concerns other than their competitive relationship to each 
other. In other words, in determining their preferred legislative 
structure, voters must decide not simply that the legislature 
should be equally accountable to each citizen's values and prefer-
ences, but also what kind of accountability each wants the legisla-
ture to have.52 
Recognizing different types of accountability suggests a sec-
ond reason for rejecting direct democracy. Even if voters other-
wise had the energy and inclination to participate so intimately in 
shaping public policy, they might choose a representative legisla-
ture if they distrust their own anticipated behavior in everyday 
politics. 53 Voters might be concerned that they will not make 
in the legislature, James Iredell suggested in 1776 that "there can be no check 
on the Representatives of the people in a democracy, but the people themselves 
... by having their elections very frequent, at /,east, once in a year") (emphasis 
added). 
50. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT 93-95 (1988); Bork, Neutral Principks and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. LJ. 1, 20 (1971) ("Constitutional protection should be accorded only to 
speech that is explicitly political."). 
51. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 48, at 8-17 (discussing unattainable factors 
necessary for all citizens to have equal influence in making public policy). Public 
choice theory rests on the inevitability that different people will have unequal 
influence on governmental policy. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, The jurisprudence of 
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (discussing disproportionate impact of 
special interests upon legislative process); Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in 
the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. EcoN. REV. 279 (1984); Landes & Posner, 
supra note 35, at 876 (economic analyses used to reconcile "a conception of the 
political-governmental process that emphasizes the importance of interest 
groups in the formulation of public policy" with notion of independent judici-
ary); see also infra note 243 (further discussion of public choice theory). 
52. Cf Gavison, supra note 19, at 1620 ("Two senses of accountability may 
be distinguished: accountability to, identifying those to whom the judge is an-
swerable, and accountability for, identifying the norms governing the judge's 
conduct."). 
53. James Madison made this point. He recognized that "the people are 
the only legitimate fountain of power." THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 (J. 
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Yet he also suggested that in a government too 
closely connected with the people, "[t]he passions, ... not the reason, of the public 
would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to 
control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and 
regulated by the government." Id. at 317 (emphasis in original). 
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well-considered judgments about public policy on an everyday 
basis-that they will give excessive attention to short-term per-
sonal interests and inadequate attention to long-term and general 
interests.54 Voters might be concerned that their reflexive judg-
ments about public policy made as private citizens will not reflect 
the careful judgment by which important questions should be re-
solved. Thus, a majority among the national electorate would 
wish to provide its congress with a structure that itself serves 
political self-constraint. 55 
54. Cf Amar, supra note 42, at 1085 (republican representation can improve 
quality of public deliberation); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 29, 34 (1985) ("The structural mechanisms would insulate repre-
sentatives, to a greater or lesser degree, from constituent pressures, in the hope 
that they will deliberate more effectively on the public good."). Sunstein sug-
gests that this view rejects pluralist premises-for example, that there is no 
meaningful concept of public good. Corporate decisions for political self-con-
straint are not necessarily any less consistent with an agnostic view about the 
public good than is any other public decision. Pluralists do not deny that any 
given individual can have a personal view of the public good. Thus, rather than 
some externally conceived and defined notion of public good, choices for polit-
ical self-constraint might reflect compromise among each individual's view that 
the public good will be better served by making policy in a supreme constitu-
tional provision rather than a statute. Cf supra notes 42-43 (self-constraint as 
imperfect linking of republicanism and pluralism). 
55. Madison expressed a concern for political self-constraint in suggesting 
that people might respond to the problem of majority faction through choices 
they make in structuring their representative government. In The Federalist No. 
10, Madison defined "faction" as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some com-
mon impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or 
to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST 
No. 10, at 78 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Madison suggested that far 
better than direct democracy, a principle of republican representation can pro-
vide a safeguard against majority faction while preserving majority rule. He 
noted that the effect of representative government would be to "enlarge the 
public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, 
whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of their country and whose 
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations." Id. at 82. Thus, Madison would have the voter, each 
otherwise empowered in a direct democracy, choose a system of representative 
government to improve the chances of achieving public policy that each, in the 
long run, will view as good. This is political self-constraint through the legislative 
structure. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350-51 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 
196 l) ("The aim of every political institution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for 
rulers men who posses most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the 
common good of the society . . . . The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the 
characteristic policy of republican government."); THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 
432 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (when "interests of the people are at 
variance with their inclinations," the executive should "withstand the temporary 
delusion in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate 
reflection"); Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1025 (structure of government can hin-
der ill-considered and temporary efforts to "endanger the principles of the 
American Revolution"). Madison then noted that even these potentially wise 
legislators might stray from their mission of carefully making public policy con-
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The foregoing suggests that voters might choose to structure 
their legislature toward achieving a goal of optimal legislative ac-
countability. The concern for accountability suggests a fear that the 
representatives a voter has fought to elect might not do what he 
wants them to do. The representatives might fail the voter by giv-
ing more weight to his opponents' concerns than to his own, or 
by not caring about the voter's concerns at all. The concern for 
optimal accountability suggests a concern for political self-con-
straint: legislators should not respond too closely to the electo-
rate's latest whims. 
Both concerns support a decision to define legislative struc-
tures and processes in supreme constitutional texts. Doing so 
promotes accountability by undermining the legislature's discretion 
to change its structure in a way that removes itself from popular 
control. Similarly, to the extent that protecting a right to criticize 
governmental performance can prevent representatives from en-
trenching themselves in power, voters would do well to frame this 
right in supreme constitutional texts, immune from legislative 
rev1s1on. 
To the extent that the legislative structure is designed to se-
cure the benefits of political self-constraint-to ensure optimal ac-
countability-voters also would do well to define the legislative 
mechanism in supreme constitutional texts. Doing so could deter 
changes in the legislative structure that do respond to present (but 
ill-considered) electoral preferences. Voters might fear, for ex-
ample, that they someday could impulsively decide to transform 
their bicameral legislature into a unicameral one, or to shorten 
their representatives' terms from six years to one, or to limit the 
number of terms their representatives can serve. Thus, the elec-
sistent with the electorate's values and interests. He suggested, therefore, that 
voters must have mechanisms for keeping their representatives accountable to 
electoral concerns. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 CT· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961). Thus, the desire for political self-constraint through the legislative structure 
does not eliminate a voter's desire to keep the legislature accountable. It merely 
establishes the kind of accountability she views as ideal. See also G. Wooo, supra 
note 42, at 209 (nearly all states adopted bicameral legislature; upper houses 
"were to be the repositories of classical republican honor and wisdom, whose 
superior talent and devotion to the common good would be recognized and re-
warded by the people"); id. at 409-10 (sense that problems of 1780s existed 
because legislatures were too representative); id. at 556 (senate justified as body 
of "weight and wisdom" to "check the inconsiderate and hasty proceedings of 
the first branch"); Dougan & Munger, The Rationality of Ideology, 32 J.L. & EcoN. 
119, 124 (1989) (length of term in office inversely proportional to legislator's 
ability to stray from constituent preferences). 
1991] A CRITIQ,UE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 301 
torate might choose to prevent their future legislatures from vin-
dicating these anticipated whims by strengthening present, 
(presumably) more reflective, and (presumably) better public 
judgments with the principles of constitutional supremacy, by 
framing their deliberate choices in supreme constitutional texts.56 
Indeed, the notion of optimal legislative accountability pro-
vides further insight about constitutional supremacy (versus stat-
utory supremacy) as a route to political self-constraint. A voter 
who supports framing the legislative structure as a constitutional 
mandate because he doubts not only his representatives' integ-
rity, but also his own judgment, supposes that the legislative 
structure might provide an inadequate measure of political self-
constraint toward its own preservation. Similarly, a choice to pro-
tect other policies in supreme constitutional texts-whether 
about religion, or racial discrimination, or criminal justice-sup-
poses a desire to achieve more political self-constraint than the 
legislative structure itself can provide.57 Choices for political self-
constraint, therefore, can be made along a continuum between 
the competing concerns of self-distrust and self-determination. 58 
4. To Overturn Supreme Court Decisions 
Voters also might seek to create supreme constitutional texts 
to overturn Supreme Court "interpretations" with which they dis-
agree.59 This motive for creating constitutional provisions, how-
ever, presumes judicial supremacy-that the electorate can 
overturn the Court's views about constitutional mandates only by 
constitutional amendment, and not by legislative action. This 
56. Cass Sunstein's characterization of the federalists' view of representa-
tion suggests that the motive of political self-constraint can shape the form of 
legislative accountability that the electorate chooses. "For the federalists, poli-
tics was to be deliberative in a special sense .... The result was a hybrid concep-
tion of representation, in which legislators were neither to respond blindly to 
constituent pressures nor to undertake their deliberations in a vacuum." Sun-
stein, supra note 54, at 46-4 7. 
57. Cf Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1680 ("If Congress could not act unjustly 
because it was paralyzed, there would be no need for judicial review."). Yet 
there would be need for some affirmative policymaker. 
58. This continuum of political self-constraint is represented by the rela-
tionship between The Federalist No. 10 (discussed supra note 55) and The Federalist 
No. 78 (discussed supra note 43). 
59. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (overturning Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112 (1970), where Court invalidated congressional statute granting 
right to vote to citizens eighteen years and older); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397 (1989) (state may not punish flag burning because of disagreement 
with ideas expressed). A movement for a constitutional amendment developed 
in response to this decision. See infra text accompanying notes 308-l l. 
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motive for making policy by creating supreme constitutional texts 
rather than ordinary statutes should be put aside as question-beg-
ging, because the task at hand is to derive justifications for judi-
cial supremacy from reasons for constitutional supremacy. 
B. Why judicial Supremacy? 
Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any 
written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, 
to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first 
wrote or spoke them.60 
This section will derive ideal conceptions of constitutional 
"interpretation" from the perspective of political competitors 
who have just created constitutional texts and who must choose 
judges to enforce them. It will show that each of the three mo-
tives for creating constitutional provisions-(i) perpetuating an 
extraordinary political advantage; (ii) securing the benefits of 
political self-constraint; and (iii) ensuring optimal legislative ac-
countability-implies a distinctive definition of ideal "interpreta-
tion." Finally, it will consider whether judicial supremacy or 
congressional supremacy might better ensure that judges achieve 
each "interpretive" ideal.61 
1. Selecting justices to "Interpret" Constitutional Texts Intended to 
Perpetuate an Extraordinary Political Advantage 
a. The "Interpretive" Ideal: Constitutional Representation 
In creating the fourteenth amendment, the Northern electo-
rate sought to perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage 
over the South. 62 By framing their values as supreme constitu-
tional texts without meaningful Southern participation, repre-
sentatives of Northern voters hoped to prevent white Southern 
60. This remark was made by Bishop Hoadly in 1717 in a sermon for the 
King. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 152 (1893). Charles Evans Hughes made a similar point 
when he said, "We are under the Constitution, but the Constitution is what the 
judges say it is." L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 5 (1988). So did Frank-
lin Roosevelt, when he said, "[An] amendment like the rest of the Constitution is 
what the Justices say it is rather than what its framers or you might hope it is." 
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 130 (l lth ed. 1985) (quoting radio address 
by President Roosevelt, Mar. 9, 1937). 
61. Cf Gavison, supra note 19, at 1619 ("Our criteria for [judicial] choice 
and accountability will reflect our answers to some normative questions (e.g., 
what are 'good' judicial decisions) .... "). 
62. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text. 
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voters from affecting national policies of racial justice once the 
Southern electorate regained formal representation in Congress. 
This motive suggests, at least from the perspective of the 
Northern majority, an ideal definition of "interpretation": In giv-
ing meaning to the amendment, the Supreme Court should have 
acted as if it were the Congress in which the Northern electorate 
reigned supreme. This "interpretive" ideal takes the underlying 
motive for creating supreme constitutional text to its logical con-
clusion, for it asks judges to make the same decisions that the 
once extraordinarily powerful electorate would make if it still had 
the power to deny its opponents the right to shape public pol-
icy. 63 So viewed, the "interpretive" task is no less creative-and 
no less subservient to a self-proclaimed authoritative electorate-
than is the legislative.64 Indeed, so viewed, the judicial task of 
63. Public response to President Grant's nomination of Caleb Cushing to 
replace Chief Justice Chase in 1874 is illuminating. Cushing was known to have 
had sympathies for the Confederacy. According to the New York Times, he had 
supported the Dred Scott decision and had advocated slavery. It concluded: 
"When we get a Chief Justice of secessionist proclivities ... the entire proceed-
ings of Congress since the war may be called in question .... We can only 
regard the present game of blindman's bluff ... with surprise and mortifica-
tion." 7 c. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART Two 63-64 (1987) (citing New 
York Times, Jan. 10, 1874). Fairman reports similar editorials from other Repub-
lican newspapers: for example, from the Boston Transcript, "does the Govern-
ment feel quite sure ... that Mr. Cushing is entirely sound on the question of 
civil rights, which will be carried to the Supreme Court?"; from the New York 
Evening Post, "for the past ten years he has not been at all in sympathy with the 
pronounced policy of the republic"; from the Cl.eveland Herald, "not a safe man." 
Id. at 65. In a letter to his brother-in-law, Justice Miller suggested a political 
consciousness within the Court that should have pleased those with the senti-
ments that these newspapers expressed: Cushing's "appointment was consid-
ered an insult to the Bench by every man on it except [Nathan] Clifford, who is 
himself ... a life-long bitter Democrat." Id. at 72. Clifford had been appointed 
by President Buchanan in 1858. 
64. Abraham Lincoln expressed such a view: "we wish for a Chief Justice 
who will sustain what has been done in regard to emancipation and the legal 
tenders .... [W]e must take a man whose opinions are known." See Friedman, 
Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees (Review Essay), 
95 YALE LJ. 1283, 1297 (1986). Though never explicitly articulated, this crea-
tive notion of constitutional representation fairly describes Senator Charles 
Sumner's approach to issues arising under the Civil War amendments. In de-
bate over the Civil Rights Act of 1875 with the more legalistic Senator Carpenter 
of Wisconsin, Sumner suggested that the Declaration of Independence was 
"'loftier, more majestic, and more sublime' than the Constitution," and "of 
greater dignity and force than the Constitution." C. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 
162, 163. Sumner's measure to prohibit racial discrimination in churches was 
"simply setting up the Declaration of Independence in its primal truths, and 
applying them to churches as to other institutions." Id. at 163; see CoNG. GLOBE, 
42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 821-28 (1871); CONG. GLOBE, 4lst Cong., 2d Sess. 2422-
30, 2746-53 ( 1870). Congressional efforts to curtail the Supreme Court's juris-
diction to determine the constitutionality of Reconstruction measures also sug-
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"interpretation" is much the same task that each voter would like 
his legislators to perform in creating statutes: to represent his 
preferences. 
This ideal of judicial behavior may be referred to as constitu-
tional representation.65 Here, constitutional representation would 
have differed from congressional representation to the extent that 
the Court endeavored to represent only the Northern electorate's 
preferences, after Congress once again represented the national 
electorate, including white Southern voters.66 
gest this "interpretive" ideal. See, e.g .. U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 
(1872) (invalidating congressional effort to withdraw jurisdiction when Court of 
Claims determines that property claimant had accepted presidential pardon); Ex 
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (upholding congressional repeal of 
statute authorizing Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over circuit court deni-
als of habeas corpus petitions). 
65. Professor Nelson's characterization of the framers' views underlying the 
fourteenth amendment is consistent with the idea of a fluid, constitutional repre-
sentation. The framers, he suggests, "continued to make ... use of the old 
antebellum ideas, in part, perhaps, because the old imprecision . . . enabled 
them to retain the support of political coalitions whose individual members 
shared an agreement only about vague ideas, not about specific programs." W. 
NELSON, supra note 23, at 38-39; see also id. at 47 (Republican desire not so much 
to perpetuate personal rule as to perpetuate progressive policies); id. at 55 
(framers wished rights protected by Constitution rather than Congress to ensure 
judicial enforcement "even if Congress fell under Democratic control"). Thus, 
this ideal of constitutional representation can explain the vague language of sec-
tion one. The vague language gave a judge with the Northern electorate's orien-
tation sufficient latitude to declare Northern preferences as constitutional law. 
Cf id. at 61-62 (explaining amendment's vague language as reflecting an exhor-
tive rather than regulatory purpose). 
66. Thus, from the perspective of those who voted for the fourteenth 
amendment, a Justice ideally would have acted as if he were representing their 
preferences-not as of 1868, but at the moment of judicial decision. In Bruce 
Ackerman's terms, this "interpretive" ideal would have the Supreme Court act 
as if it were a continuous "rump 'Congress.' " See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 
1066; Chang, supra note 10, at 832 n.266 (viewing fourteenth amendment as 
serving desire to disable Southern electorate rather than promote political self-
constraint establishes ideal judicial behavior as acting like "continuing rump 
Congress."). As those who created the fourteenth amendment died and were 
replaced by their progeny, however, justifying some definition for ideal judicial 
behavior must have become problematic indeed. See infra text at notes 172-89 
("interpretive" options for aging constitutional provisions originally intended to 
perpetuate a temporary political advantage); cf Chang, supra note 10, at 843 
n.306 (who are "the people" of 1872?); id. at 846 n.318 ("the people" of 1896?); 
id. at 850 n.325 ("the people" of 1954?); id. at 863 n.370 ("the people" of 
1987?); id. at 865 n.376 (same). 
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b. Judicial Supremacy as a Mechanism for Ensuring 
Accountability to the Ideal of Constitutional 
Representation 
1. The Case for Judicial Supremacy: Toward Limiting the 
Authority of Reinvigorated Opponents 
305 
Even if the Supreme Court had acted as if it were represent-
ing those who comprised the Northern electorate in 1868, the 
Radical Republicans truly could have perpetuated their extraordi-
nary political advantage over the South only to the extent that the 
Court's interpretation of supreme constitutional meaning could 
not have been violated by Congress. Under congressional 
supremacy, judicial "interpretations" of the Civil War amend-
ments would have been subject to congressional correction, and 
Southern voters would have gained a measure of control over na-
tional racial policy.67 Thus, a majority of Northern voters would 
have had some reason to prefer judicial supremacy. Indeed, with-
out judicial supremacy in this context, Northern voters could have 
expected to gain little beyond what they had achieved by enacting 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 68 
n. The Case Against Judicial Supremacy: Reinvigorated 
Opponents, Fallible Judges, and Undeniable Power 
Judicial supremacy could have served a Northern voter's goal 
of perpetuating his extraordinary political advantage only to the 
extent thatJustices in fact identified the choices that the Northern 
electorate would have made if it still governed without Southern 
participation. Yet like any other unaccountabl.e. governmental 
servant, aJustice wielding the·powers of judicial supremacy might 
commit two transgressions.69 First, a Justice might make a good 
faith error even while endeavoring to serve the Northern electo-
67. Indeed, the Radical Republicans tried to forestall the reinvigoration of 
white Southern power as long as possible by placing conditions on the franchise. 
Despite these best efforts, however, the antebellum Southern power structure 
could not have been forever forestalled. The Southern electorate degenerated 
through the 1870s from its reconstructed state to one far more resembling that 
of 1860. See J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 198-99. 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 23-32. While Professor Nelson sug-
gests that the framers thought that Congress, not the courts, would be the main 
enforcer of the fourteenth amendment, he acknowledges that § 1 of the amend-
ment was aimed at judicial enforcement in anticipation of congressional failure. 
See W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 122 •. 145. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50; note 49. 
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rate's preferences.70 Second, a Justice might reject the role of 
serving altogether. A Justice might have rejected the "interpre-
tive" goal of identifying the Northern electorate's preferences 
and instead have chosen to exploit the extraordinary ability to 
shape public policy that the judge's public office offers. 
It could not have been an easy task to make the decisions that 
a majority of Northern voters would have made if they still enjoyed 
an extraordinary political advantage over the South.71 Such spec-
ulative decisionmaking essentially would have asked Justices to 
act like common law courts with respect to the Northern electorate. But 
unlike the ordinary relationship between community and com-
mon law court, the Northern electorate lacked a formal mecha-
nism to express itself toward legislatively correcting undesirable 
"common law" judgments.72 
Furthermore, even in the short term, when the Northern 
electorate's extraordinary political advantage enabled it to stack 
the Court with hand-picked Justices, 711 Northern voters hardly 
could have ensured that their Justices would choose the "inter-
70. Cf supra note 55 (discussing Madison's concern for optimal governmen-
tal accountability). 
71. At best, Justices who wanted to act like common law courts with respect 
to the Northern electorate, to the exclusion of the Southern electorate, might 
have referred to congressional debate and votes, to determine how the repre-
sentatives from the Northern states voted. This would have provided at least 
some evidence of the Northern electorate's preferences. 
72. Because judges are, in general, less effective gauges ofmajoritarian sen-
timent than legislatures, the common law is subordinate to statutes. Cf G. CALA-
BRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that 
contemporary statutory law should supersede contemporary common law, but 
that courts should supersede aging, "out of phase" statutes with contemporary 
common law). Yet even legislators can make mistakes while trying to serve the 
electorate's preferences. See, e.g., Dougan & Munger, supra note 55, at 128-32. 
73. Indeed, because the white Southern electorate was, actually or in effect, 
absent from Congress between 1861 and 1875, the Northern electorate had the 
opportunity to install their preferred Justices, without having to bow to obnox-. 
ious Southern notions ofracialjustice. To a Supreme Court that then consisted 
of 10 members, President Lincoln made five appointments: Noah H. Swayne, 
Samuel F. Miller, and David Davis in 1862, StephenJ. Field in 1863, and Salmon 
P. Chase in 1864. President Johnson made no appointments to the Court, 
largely because Congress passed legislation reducing the number of Justices in 
order to prevent him from making any appointments. See 4 THE SUPREME COURT 
IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE RECONSTRUCTION COURT 1864-1888, at xi, 12 (R. 
Fridlington ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE RECONSTRUCTION COURT]. This action 
itself can be viewed as reflecting Congress's ideal of constitutional representa-
tion. Toward the end of Reconstruction, President Grant made four appoint-
ments to the Court: William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley in 1870, Ward Hunt 
in 1872, and Morrison Waite in 1874 (replacing Chase as Chief Justice). Thus, 
during the South's exclusion from Congress, the Northern electorate had the 
opportunity to install eight of the 10 sitting Supreme Court Justices without 
meaningful participation by the antebellum Southern electorate. 
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pretive" ideal of constitutional representation. 74 Protected by 
life-tenure and the powers of judicial supremacy, a Supreme 
Court Justice has extraordinary access to public power-more 
than even Thaddeus Stevens had. Thus, for aJustice to have cho-
sen the "interpretive" goal of constitutional representation on 
behalf of the Northern electorate, two conditions must have been 
satisfied. First, the Justice must have accepted that Southern 
weakness was properly exploited in order to vindicate some vision 
ofracialjustice shaped in the image of the Northern electorate-at-
large. At the same time, the Justice must have believed that the 
Northern electorate's weakness with respect to the Justice's own 
extraordinary power was not properly exploited. 75 
Some people might think this way. Yet to acknowledge that 
democracy can be subordinated to other personal values and 
preferences when one has the power to do so-as did the Radical 
Republicans by creating the fourteenth amendment-is to beg the 
question: Why ever respect a choice of some electorate that claims 
to be authoritative, when that choice differs from the concerns of 
74. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). In Reese the Court 
invalidated crucial portions of the Enforcement Act of 1870, which would have 
punished people for obstructing any citizen from voting, or acting to qualify to 
vote, on the ground that Congress purported to reach all wrongful obstructions 
of voting rights-rather than simply obstructions "on account of race," to which 
Congress's discretion under the fifteenth amendment apparently was limited. 
Id. at 217-21. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Waite rather clearly 
rejected any notion of helping the bygone Republican electorate vindicate its 
preferences. Waite said, "we must take these sections of the statute as they are 
.... To limit this statute in the manner now asked for would be to make a new 
law, not to enforce an old one. This is no part of our duty." Id. at 221 (emphasis 
added). Thus, Waite's reasoning not only led him to fail to reach "wrongful 
denials" other than those motivated by race; by invalidating the relevant provi-
sions, the Court-the supposed mechanism by which the Republicans might 
have perpetuated their extraordinary political advantage-thwarted the Republi-
can desire to prohibit racial discrimination in voting. Indeed, in dissent, Justice 
Hunt suggested that the invalidated provisions were intended to address only 
racial denials, and that any ambiguity was the result of bad drafting. Id. at 241-
45 (Hunt,]., dissenting); see also C. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 278 (agreeing with 
Justice Hunt). 
75. CJ Solum, supra note 22, at 1751-52 ("One of the virtues of judging is 
suppressing one's political or moral preferences and deciding on the basis of the 
law .... [A]ppellatejudges should have a special fidelity to the law."). This begs 
the question of what "the law" is. Especially for constitutional provisions cre-
ated by one portion of the electorate to perpetuate an extraordinary political 
advantage over another portion, any notion of judicial fidelity requires a judge's 
choice to serve a minority of the electorate who could not have enacted their 
"law" in question without the benefits of military victory .. Indeed, to recognize 
any "law" requires a judge to apply her own rule of recognition reflecting her 
own notion of an authoritative master. CJ Dworkin, The Forum of Principk, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 474-75 (1981) (any theory of interpretation implies an un-
derlying rule of recognition). 
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an individual who has the power to vindicate his own concerns? 
The Northern electorate played a dangerous game by acknowl-
edging that it is sometimes justifiable to subordinate democracy 
to particular policy ends, while giving judges the power, if not the 
"right," to subordinate Northern values to the judges' own policy 
ends.76 
Beyond this, whether hand-picked by Northern voters or not, 
the Reconstruction Justices could not have lived forever. Once 
the South regained its place in Congress, it was inevitable that the 
Court would be reformed withjustices chosen by a national elec-
torate in which the South, with all of its obnoxious views, would 
have been as much a participant as it was to be in enacting na-
tional legislation. 17 Thus, however well judicial supremacy might 
(or might not) have served the Northern electorate's interests 
76. See, e.g., Freund, Appointment of justices: Some Historical Perspectives, IOI 
HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1156 (1988) (hazards in judicial selection as means to make 
public policy include unforeseen issues, changes in nominee's views); Friedman, 
supra note 64, at 1291-302 (judicial performance over time difficult to predict). 
But see L. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 76 (1985) (judicial perform-
ance generally predictable). Professor Friedman cites the legal tender issue as 
an example of unpredictability. Two of five Lincoln appointees voted to invali-
date the Legal Tender Act, even though Lincoln had selected Justices with the 
legal tender issue specifically in mind. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 
Wall.) 603 (1869). 
77. After Chief Justice Chase died in 1873, for example, many advised Pres-
ident Grant to elevate an Associate Justice, and fill that vacancy with a South-
erner. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 10-23. Although there were indications 
of a Democratic resurgence, as the New York elections of 1873 suggested, the 
Republicans still dominated the Senate. See N. ORNSTEIN, T. MANN & M. MAL· 
BIN, ViTAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1889-1910 table 1-18 (1990) (43d Congress, 
1873-1875, comprised of 19 Democrats and 54 Republicans; 42nd Congress, 
1870-1873, corµprised of 17 Democrats and 57 Republicans). Thus, Grant was 
able to nominate, and the Senate to confirm, Morrison Waite of Ohio. Waite 
had been "a thoroughgoing Radical" as early as 1862. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 
63, at 78. By 1877, however, Reconstruction had ended. The Hayes-Tilden 
election of 1876 signalled the resurgence of the antebellum Southern power 
structure. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 33, at 84. Thus, when President Hayes 
faced a vacancy created by the resignation of David Davis (a Lincoln appointee), 
and three years later, another vacancy by William Strong (a Grant appointee), he 
turned to the Souih. Two primary candidates were Benjamin Bristow and John 
Harlan-both Republicans, to be sure, but both also of Kentucky. See C. FAIR· 
MAN, supra note 63, at 504. Harlan was chosen. Of the two, he was far more the 
reluctant Republican, having opposed both the Emancipation Proclamation, as 
"a direct interference, by a portion of the States with the local concerns of other 
States," and the thirteenth amendment, as based on a "dangerous" principle 
that "may eventuate in the destruction of our present form of government," and 
because it would "destroy the peace and security of the white man in Kentucky." 
Id. at 499, 567. He also supported McClellan for President against Lincoln in 
1864. Id. at 499. It was only after a schism in his church over slavery in the early 
1870s that Harlan, following his Reverend, joined the Republican cause. Id. 
Bristow, in contrast, fought for both Lincoln's re-election and ratification of the 
thirteenth amendment. Id. at 20. When Hayes faced his next Supreme Court 
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when their ownjustices were on the Court, the North's ability to 
ensure that the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representa-
tion was fulfilled had to degenerate once justices became, at least 
in part, the South's Justices as well.7S 
m. A Case Against Creating Supreme Constitutional Texts 
Toward Perpetuating a Temporary Political Advantage 
Just as the remnants of Reconstruction were about to dis-
solve, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875,79 which pro-
vided broad protection against racial discrimination.so A 
Northern voter who supported the bill, however, might have 
feared that it would not long survive a potential alliance between 
Northern and Southern Democrats.s1 Anticipating this sort ofra-
vacancy, with the resignation of William Strong, he also turned to the South-
this time, Georgia. Id. at 522. 
78. Justice Harlan's nomination continues to be instructive. Justice Miller 
revealed that Senator Edmunds of Vermont and Senator Conkling of New York 
were deeply troubled about John Marshall Harlan: 
The Senate Judiciary Committee are making great trouble about 
Harlan's nomination. Edmunds ... [has] called on me about it. As far 
as I can learn Edmunds, Conkling· and Howe are disposed to make pro-
tracted inquiry into his fuklity to the constitutional amendments and the recon-
struction acts of Congress . ... I think this both unwise and unjust. Harlan 
is as true a man I have no doubt to the constitutional amendments as 
any man from a Southern State, who may have doubted the wisdom of 
some of them when they passed. 
c. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 518 (citing c. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890, at 369-70 (1939)) (emphasis added and foot-
notes omitted). Republicans anticipated that Southern-oriented judges might 
well thwart national racial policies, as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided for 
criminal penalties against state judges who rendered judgments undermining a 
federally protected right. See W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 105-06. 
79. See M. KoNVITZ & T. LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 90-91 (1961) 
(describing five-year congressional battle to enact the legislation); infra note 80. 
80. Section one of the Act provided: 
[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be 
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or 
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to 
the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike 
to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition 
of servitude. 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. l 14, § l, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875). In the view of its 
principal sponsor, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, the bill would do 
all that had to be done in order to ensure his vision of "equal rights in this 
Republic." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3180-90 (1872). 
81. The Act was among the last gasps of the Northern electorate's efforts to 
exploit their temporary political advantage over the white Southern electorate. 
In both the South and the North, the Democrats had made significant gains in 
the elections of 1874. Some of the Northern electorate had tired of fighting with 
the South over race and other issues emerged. See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note 
23, at 149; see also C. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 156, 180. But see infra note 82. 
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cist retrogression, a majority of Northern voters created the four-
teenth amendment toward perpetuating their extraordinary 
political advantage. 
These voters' concerns would have been well served if the 
Supreme Court had declared the Civil Rights Act's policies to be 
constitutionally mandated. This would have been a plausible exer-
cise of constitutional representation, as the legislation was, in 
fact, a choice that the Northern electorate made while still en-
joying an extraordinary political advantage.82 Protected by judi-
cial supremacy, this policy would have been immune from 
congressional erosion. 
Interesting speculation, perhaps, but far from what actually 
occurred. The Supreme Court never declared that the provisions 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were constitutionally mandated; 
instead, in the Civil Rights Cases, it determined that the Act was 
constitutionally prohibited.83 Thus, Northern Republicans lost 
their law not by action of their reinvigorated political opponents, 
but by a decision of the very Justices who were supposed to en-
trench their law. This was constitutional representation turned 
upside down.84 
• • • 
The Civil Rights Cases raise doubts about the extent to which 
people can effectively perpetuate an extraordinary political ad-
82. However much the elections of 1874 might cast doubt on the Northern 
electorate's continuing commitment to racial equality, the pattern of response to 
the Civil Rights Cases by the Northern states is striking. After the Supreme 
Court's decision, 16 Northern states passed virtually identical legislation: Con-
necticut, Iowa, New Jersey and Ohio in 1884; Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska and Rhode Island in 1885; 
Pennsylvania in 1887; Washington in 1890; Wisconsin in 1895; and California in 
1897. See G. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAw 121 (1910). 
But for the Supreme Court's decision, and absent congressional action repealing 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, such state-by-state legislation would have been un-
necessary-and other states that did not pass such legislation for themselves 
would have been governed by the apparent preferences of the Northern electo-
rate's majority. 
83. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
84. The Court's decision might be viewed as serving the values of the 
Northern electorate only if (i) they had desires for political self-constraint re-
lated to federalism and (ii) those concerns outweighed their desire to perpetuate 
their political advantage for concerns of racial justice. This is unlikely, however, 
for the motive of perpetuating an extraordinary political advantage necessarily 
implies a rejection of respect for local decisionmaking. Cf W. NELSON, supra 
note 23, at 104-09 (opponents of fourteenth amendment and Civil Rights Act of 
1866 raised federalism objections); id. at 114-16 (proponents argued amend-
ment would intrude on discretion only of Southern states that denied basic racial 
equality); id. at 197 (Northerners had conflicting desires to restrain South from 
racial discrimination while retaining nation's federal structure). 
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vantage by creating supreme constitutional texts. Two competing 
forces undermine any possibility of keeping Justices accountable 
to this "interpretive" goal of constitutional representation. On 
the one hand, a voter's Justices must be insulated from the power 
of his reinvigorated political opponents. On the other hand, the 
voter's Justices must be induced not to stray from the task of 
identifying the choices he and his allies would make if they still 
enjoyed their extraordinary political advantage. While judicial 
supremacy might address the first problem, it intensifies the sec-
ond. 85 Furthermore, because the motive of perpetuating an ex-
traordinary political advantage antmpates the loss of 
extraordinary political power, there can be no effective way to ad-
dress the second problem of ensuring perpetual judicial accounta-
bility. 86 Thus, one might question whether even those with the 
present power to deny their opponents the right to shape public 
policy should bother seeking to perpetuate that extraordinary 
political advantage by creating supreme constitutional provisions 
at all.87 
85. In giving themselves near "absolute authority to interpret" the Civil 
War Amendments, with life-tenure and the enforcement authority of judicial 
supremacy, those justices truly became the lawgiver, as Bishop Hoadly warned, 
and not the Northern electorate "who first wrote" those constitutional provi-
sions. See supra note 60. It was ultimately for those Justices, not for Northern 
voters, to decide whose values would be served. 
86. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. 
87. The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 were just part of a series of Supreme 
Court decisions that more than likely violated the ideal of constitutional repre-
sentation from the perspective of a Northern electorate that wanted to perpetu-
ate its temporary political advantage over its white Southern neighbors. Indeed, 
"of the six acts of Congress held unconstitutional by the Waite Court, three 
were acts guaranteeing rights to black Americans." THE RECONSTRUCTION 
COURT, supra note 73, at xii. Furthermore, the Court invalidated an 1869 (i.e., 
Reconstruction) Louisiana statute that prohibited racial segregation in public 
conveyances. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877). The Court viewed the 
legislation as a violation of the dormant commerce clause-an inordinate local 
intrusion on the free flow of interstate commerce. Id. at 488-90. Once again, 
then, rather than protect the Republicans' efforts to perpetuate an extraordinary 
political advantage against enemies reinvigorated in Congress--or, indeed, a re-
invigorated antebellum electorate within Louisiana-the Supreme Court was the 
instrument of the Republicans' defeat. This irony is intensified by a case in 
which the Court upheld against a dormant commerce clause claim an 1888 Missis-
sippi post-reconstruction statute that required racial segregation in public convey-
ances. See Louisville Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890). As Justice Harlan 
intimated in dissent, the DeCuir and Louisville decisions were embarrassingly in-
consistent. Id. at 593-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Again, the Court was the in-
strument not of perpetuating the Republicans' ideology of racial justice, but of 
thwarting it. See also supra note 74 (discussing Reese). 
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2. Selecting justices to "Interpret" Constitutional Texts Intended to 
Secure the Benefits of Political Self-Constraint 
a. The "Interpretive" Ideal: Constitutional Representation 
By creating constitutional provisions for political self-con-
straint, voters agree that public policy should respect certain 
ideals to a greater extent than they can trust themselves to pursue 
in ordinary politics.BB The predicate for creating such constitu-
tional provisions is debate and resolution that the electorate 
views as unusually thoughtful. Framed in supreme constitutional 
texts, the fruits of these extraordinary political labors are pro-
tected from being changed by congressional representatives. 
Thus, voters wish the benefits of the best politics they have ever 
pursued to persist once politics returns to the mundane.B9 
This analysis suggests an ideal definition of "interpretation." 
Each voter might conclude that in giving meaning to constitu-
tional mandates created with the motive of political self-con-
straint, judges ideally should replicate the electorate's 
extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics.90 Ideally, judi-
cial "interpretation" would yield the same decisions voters would 
reach if they were engaged in the same sort of extraordinarily re-
flective constitutional politics through which they made actual 
choices for political self-constraint.91 
88. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43. Indeed, in a better world, vot-
ers would not need to make special choices during the extraordinary politics of 
constitutional decisionmaking. In a better world, their politics would always be 
as good as they are during the debate that leads to constitutional choices for 
political self-constraint. Cf infra note 92. 
90. This assumes that each voter acknowledges the others' equal right to 
shape public policy or inevitable power to shape public policy-whether in creat-
ing constitutional provisions, national legislation, or selecting Supreme Court 
Justices-and, therefore, foreswears any desire to deny his opponents' rights to 
shape public policy. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 45-47. 
91. This is a variation on the classical notions of interpretation developed 
by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78 and by Chief Justice John Mar-
shall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803). In the view of Ham-
ilton and Marshall, who were part of a generation that created a constitution, the 
goal of constitutional "interpretation" should be to identify the choices that 
"the people" have made in constitutional politics. In the view presented here, the 
ideal goal in constitutional "interpretation" should be to identify the choices 
that voters would make if still engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics. 
Thus, for the generation that both creates constitutional text and installs judges 
to "interpret" that text, there is little distinction between my view and standard 
originalism. Cf Brest, The Misconceived Qy,est for the Origi,nal Understanding, 60 
B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980) (problems in resolving issues that framers did not con-
sider); Dworkin, supra note 75, at 482-97 (same). However, significant differ-
ences do develop as new generations live under aging constitutional provisions. 
See infra text accompanying notes 137-48. For a comparison of constitutional 
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Thus, after creating supreme constitutional provisions for 
political self-constraint, a voter would want judges to represent 
her preferences-not her ordinarily conceived, everyday prefer-
ences, but those preferences that can be identified only after ex-
traordinary reflection.92 This ideal of judicial behavior is another 
version of constitutional representation.93 Under this version, consti-
tutional representation would differ from congressional represen-
tation to the extent that the Court represents the electorate's 
extraordinarily thoughtful decisionmaking intended to constrain 
everyday politics, while Congress represents the electorate's eve-
ryday politics intended to be constrained.94 · 
representation with other theories of interpretation, see infra text accompanying 
notes 149-74. 
92. Indeed, in a more ideal world, politics would always be better than it is 
during actual constitutional politics. In a more ideal world, each voter would be 
smarter, more moral, more in touch with God, or better according to any 
number of criteria that people might deem relevant to politics. Accepting this 
ideal notion of politics, one might devise an ideal definition of "interpretation" 
that would have judges identify choices the electorate would make if voters were 
smarter, more moral, more in touch with God, than they can ever hope to be. 
This proposition could provide a populist justification for advocates of judicial 
activism who otherwise are unconcerned with electorate preferences that com-
promise constitutional "rights." See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 413 (1986) 
("[Law] is an interpretive, self-reflective attitude addressed to politics in the 
broadest sense. . . . [It] makes each citizen responsible for imagining what his 
society's public commitments to principle are, and what these commitments re-
quire in new circumstances."); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 24-3 l (l 985) (advocating more active judicial pro-
tection of private property based on "internal intellectual integrity" of fifth 
amendment takings clause); Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) (traces of democracy found in reflective deliberation and 
voting among Justices). This conception of a political ideal and concomitant 
"interpretive" ideal might seem beguiling. Yet it is ultimately unrealistic, for it 
would have voters choosing to delegate broad decisionmaking authority without 
a clear, convincing set of criteria by which they could identify judges who are 
themselves smarter, more moral, or more in touch with God, than the voters can 
ever hope to be. That political opposites such as Dworkin and Epstein might 
employ the better-than-reality-ever-could-be ideal of politics and "interpreta-
tion" vividly illustrates this point. Indeed, even putting aside the improbability 
of agreement about who should serve as Guardians, there remains an improba-
bility that a voter would choose to give her own preferred Guardians powers of 
judicial supremacy. Even one who goes to Church and who trusts her minister 
sufficiently to consider his exhortations would be rare indeed to trust that minister 
enough to give him authority to make decisions governing her life. CJ infra text 
accompanying notes 322-37 (discussing Brown). 
93. As with provisions intended to perpetuate an extraordinary political ad-
vantage, see supra text accompanying notes 62-66, this suggests a political foun-
dation for "interpretation" and, therefore, for the selection of Justices. Cf 
Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, IOI HARV. L. REV. 1202, 
1203, 1207 (1988) (appointment of Justices should be viewed as political). 
94. One could characterize the motive of securing the benefits of political 
self-constraint as a desire to perpetuate a temporary political advantage. Here, 
however, the temporary political advantage is not one of power against political 
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b. Judicial Supremacy as a Mechanism for Ensuring 
Accountability to the Ideal of Constitutional 
Representation 
1. The Case for Judicial Supremacy: Toward Limiting the 
Authority of Careless Politics 
In satisfying this "interpretive" ideal of constitutional repre-
sentation-by identifying the choices the electorate would make if 
extraordinarily thoughtful---courts would be making decisions with 
which most voters might reflexively disagree. Because Congress 
is the forum in which these more reflexive political impulses are 
vindicated, congressional supremacy might seem problematic. In 
contrast, judicial supremacy would preclude Congress from 
trumping judicial decisions that otherwise would serve the electo-
rate's concerns for political self-constraint.95 
11. The Case Against Judicial Supremacy: The Power, 
Prerogatives, and Fallibility of Judges 
Insulating judicial decisions from the popular impulses ex-
pressed in everyday legislative politics, however, does nothing to 
keep judges accountable to the "interpretive" goal of identifying 
choices the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily 
reflective constitutional politics. Indeed, voters must account for 
two potential problems. First, the "interpretive" ideal of consti-
tutional representation asks judges to pursue a difficult exercise 
enemies, but of one's better self against one's ordinary self. While the electorate 
that creates constitutional provisions for perpetuating an extraordinary political 
advantage is displaced by an electorate that includes newly invigorated oppo-
nents, the electorate that creates constitutional provisions for political self-con-
straint is displaced by an inferior version of itself. Both seek to perpetuate the 
otherwise ephemeral authoritative electorate by charging judges with the task of 
identifying the choices that the constitutional electorate would make if it still ex-
isted. Thus, the ideal of constitutional representation asks judges to act as if 
they were an electorate that once existed, and once made decisions, but that 
could not sustain itself indefinitely. 
95. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) 
(judicial independence protects enduring principle from erosion by momentary 
political impulse). Hamilton earlier suggested that without the "complete inde-
pendence of the courts ... all the reservations of particular rights or privileges 
would amount to nothing." Id. at 466. Indeed, appointment of judges for lim-
ited terms, subject to reappointment, would make them beholden to voters in 
the forums of ordinary, everyday politics. This section suggests that such rea-
soning is flawed as applied to judicial supremacy, if not life-tenure. See also 
Chang, supra note IO, at 880-81 (suggesting similar argument in Marbury 
flawed). Indeed, it is unclear whether Hamilton intended his notion of judicial 
independence to encompass judicial supremacy as well as life-tenure. See infra 
note 103. 
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in speculation.96 Second, judges must choose this "interpretive" 
goal. As people with extraordinary access to public power, judges 
might be more concerned with their own values than with those 
of the voters.97 If judges make mistakes while trying to serve con-
stitutional representation, or make constitutional decisions ac-
cording to some other "interpretive" ideal, the electorate's 
concerns of political self-constraint are not served; intrusions on 
96. This assumes a text with open-ended and indeterminate meaning-a 
reasonable premise to the extent that one cannot make decisions that anticipate 
every possible future issue. Cf Schauer, supra note 22, at 1721-22 (discussing 
Bentham's ideal of determinate legal code and Hart's proposition of textual in-
determinacy). Using past constitutional choices from which to infer the choices 
that the electorate would make today if engaged in constitutional politics assumes 
that voters have not changed their minds about what is important. It also as-
sumes a workable evidentiary connection between those past choices and pres-
ent preferences. I have elsewhere called this the premise of constitutional 
continuity. See Chang, supra note IO, at 790-94. The premise of constitutional 
continuity becomes more vulnerable when applied beyond those who have actu-
ally created their own constitutional provisions, toward those who live under 
aging constitutional provisions created by past generations. Id. at 843 n.306, 
847 n.318, 850 n.325, 863 n.370, 864 n.374, 865 n.376; see infra note 197 and 
accompanying text. 
97. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS I 05 
(1978) (judges tempted to use powers for personal notions of justice). Some 
feared, for example, that Robert Bork had undergone a convenient "confirma-
tion conversion"-changing his expressed views to placate opponents while re-
serving his real preferences for resurrection once his seat on the Court was 
secured. See, e.g., Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the judiciary, IOOth 
Cong., lst Sess. 423 ("I do not want this ... being a confirmation conversion. 
That is going to be a question in the minds of a number and that is why I am 
going into such detail.") (remarks of Sen. Leahy); id. at 437 ("What troubles me 
as I hear your testimony after having studied your writings and your opinions, is 
the very significant and pronounced shifts .... The concern I have is, where's 
the predictability in judge Bork?") (remarks of Sen. Specter). After all, to a sig-
nificant extent, it is within the power of each judge to choose the "interpretive" 
goal he will pursue. Cf Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. 
REV. 773. Professor Maltz, much like Owen Fiss, posits that judges almost al-
ways at least believe that they are acting within the constraints of their role-that 
they are serving some master, that they are acting in a neutral and impartial way. 
Id. at 782; see also id. at 784 (for judges to pursue their personal values would be 
"inconsistent with [their] self-images"). While it is undoubtedly true that judges 
are strongly influenced by clear conventions, it is not necessarily true that they 
have internalized those conventions as part of self-image. A judge might do 
what is expected to maintain his credibility (power) in anticipation of those is-
sues for which those conventions have unclear implications and, therefore, im-
pose relatively weak constraints on judicial discretion. Furthermore, there are 
so many "conventions" available to judges-so many ways of characterizing de-
cisions that have some degree of intellectual respectability-that a judge might 
well maintain his "neutral" self-image simply by picking the interpretive "con-
vention" that yields his preferred result. Indeed, Professor Maltz acknowledges 
that "nonoriginalist constitutional analysis allows judges and commentators at 
least to appear" to be "neutral" while seeing "their own views of justice embodied 
in the law." Id. at 788 (emphasis added). 
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legislative discretion would be unwarranted from the voters' 
perspective.98 · 
Thus the dilemma of judicial accountability: To subject judi-
cial decisions to congressional correction seems to make constitu-
tional law vulnerable to those relatively careless political forces 
that the notion of political self-constraint seeks to supersede. Yet 
to give judges the power of judicial supremacy is to manifest trust 
in fallible individuals to an extent that would be unthinkable if 
they were called "legislators" rather than "judges."99 Can one 
somehow resolve the tension between a concern for political self-
constraint (because voters feel good reason to distrust them-
selves) and a concern for ensuring judicial accountability (because 
voters have good reason to distrust judges)? 
m. The Case for Congressional Supremacy: Re-evaluating the 
Dichotomy Between the Electorate's Better 
Constitutional Selves and Worse Congressional 
Selves · 
This analysis has assumed a stark dichotomy between the 
thoughts and behavior of voters during everyday congressional 
politics and during the constitutional politics underlying choices 
for political self-constraint. This assumption is, perhaps, unreal-
istic for at least two reasons. First, voters are likely to be neither 
98. Michael Perry argues that the Court, rather than Congress, can better 
serve goals of "interpretivism"-identifying choices made by the framers. See 
PERRY I, supra note 7, at 16-17. While Perry recognizes that the President and 
Congress have "incentives ... to ignore constitutional limits on federal power," 
he says nothing about what, if any, incentives judges have to enforce the consti-
tution in an "interpretivist" way--or, indeed, in any way that subordinates the 
judges' preferences for those of some authoritative electorate. See id. It seems 
more reasonable to suppose not that judges will act in a "disinterested" way, but 
that they have their own agendas and perceptions that might not correspond 
with those of a majority among the voters. 
99. Hamilton denied that the Constitution would make "the legislative 
body ... themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers and that the 
construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments." See 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Rather, 
"[i]t is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an inter-
mediary body between the people and the legislature . . . to keep the latter 
within the limits assigned to their authority." Id.; see also Amar, supra note 42, at 
1056-57 (discussing framers' distrust of legislators). But see Monaghan, supra 
note 93, at 1212 (judicial unaccountability from life-tenure a "dubious policy"); 
Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1684 ("[l]n removing judges from the pressures ex-
erted by Congress, (which is acting as a majority faction), life-tenure creates the 
possibility that the judges would themselves become an oppressive minority fac-
tion."). I suggest, however, that while these latter concerns are applicable to 
judicial supremacy, life-tenure can serve ideals of political self-constraint under 
a regime of congressional supremacy. See infra note 359. 
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angels while engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional 
politics, nor devils while engaged in everyday politics. Rather, 
though she might deploy them differently, a voter carries the 
same values and impulses in both forums. She is the same person 
whether making choices for political self-constraint or for enact-
ing ordinary legislation. Second, although a voter's concerns for 
general principle and political ideals might lose a measure of 
prominence once constitutional politics ends, they need not be 
irretrievably lost. These concerns were the bases of her ex-
traordinary choices for political self-constraint and, like any mem-
ory, remain latent within her, a potential to be drawn out and 
reinforced. 100 
Thus, a voter's deficiency in everyday politics is not in being 
so removed from her own values of political self-constraint that 
she would wantonly choose to violate them. Rather, the voter's 
deficiency is in being insufficiently attuned to these ideals during 
the pressures and momentary passions of everyday legislative 
decisionmaking. Able to recall her own choices for political self-
constraint once reminded of them, the voter can choose to re-
spect them. 101 
100. Bruce Ackerman sees a greater independence between contemporane-
ous constitutional politics and ordinary politics. He suggests that "in fixing its 
sights upon a higher lawmaking victory, [a political movement] diverts its energy 
from the lower lawmaking track, passing upon the chance for cheaper victories 
that may further the more immediate interests of its followers." Ackerman, supra 
note 8, at 1041. Yet one diverts energy from tax policy, for example, whether 
one pursues gender discrimination policies in the forum of constitutional poli-
tics or that of ordinary legislation. Thus, displacement of tax victories with gen-
der discrimination victories is largely irrelevant to the central question 
considered in this section: Why make policy by creating constitutional provi-
sions rather than by enacting ordinary· legislation? Indeed, once the choice is 
made to pursue issues of gender discrimination, doing so through the higher 
"lawmaking" track could well facilitate victories on the same issues in the everyday 
legislature. Convincing a state legislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, for example, could have facilitated adoption of a similar state measure-
statutory or constitutional. See supra notes 80 & 82 (discussing enactment of 
state legislation prohibiting racial discrimination based on Civil Rights Act of 
1875). Furthermore, political leaders concerned with political self-constraint 
wish to transform, in Ackerman's terms, private citizens into private citizens. See 
Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1033-34. To the extent that they are successful, the 
electorate's memory of its private citizenship can be a lasting benefit in the forum 
of everyday politics, as suggested in the text. See infra text accompanying notes 
100-04. 
101. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCul-
loch, Chief Justice Marshall implied that deference to a congressional judgment 
might be appropriate because "[t]he power now contested was exercised by the 
first Congress elected under the present constitution." Id. at 401. Thus, many 
of those who framed the Constitution also chose to create the national bank 
challenged as unconstitutional. See also Brest, supra note IO, at 83-84 (early Con-
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This analysis suggests a solution to the dilemma of judicial 
accountability. If voters can trust themselves to give adequate 
weight to their constitutional ideals of political self-constraint once 
reminded, a correct judicial determination of unconstitutionality 
would be safe under congressional supremacy. 102 There would 
be no need to give judges the power to make unremediable de-
gresses extensively debated constitutional questions). Yet if those who partici-
pated in creating constitutional provisions were peifectly trustworthy to stay 
within bounds, it would not have made sense to accord judges any special en-
forcement authority at all. Indeed, if this were true, Chief justice Marshall in 
Marbury should have determined that the Supreme Court lacked authority to 
question the constitutionality of § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. After all, 
Marbury was decided within a generation from the time that "the people" of the 
United States engaged in constitutional politics and made their constitutional 
choices. Cf. supra note 91. Thus, Marshall's approach in Marbury and McCulloch 
to congressional decisionmaking was inconsistent. Essential to evaluating the 
two prongs of inconsistency is the subject addressed in the text-specifically, the 
extent to which a legislature does represent the electorate's current preferences, 
and the extent to which those preferences, after having made constitutional 
choices, can reflect their own concerns for political self-constraint. Judicial re-
view tempered by congressional supremacy, however, assumes that Congress 
might fail to reflect constitutional concerns in ordinary legislation, but more 
likely can do so in response to judicial suggestions of unconstitutionality. 
102. Paul Brest ar~es that Congress has shown itself unlikely to engage in 
effective constitutional mterpretation. See generally, Brest, supra note IO. Yet this 
view begs a definition for effective constitutional interpretation. For more on 
Brest's views about congressional supremacy for aging constitutional provisions, 
see irifra note 244. Some have gone even further, suggesting that Congress 
makes policy not by seeking the public good, but by "selling" legislation to the 
highest bidder. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 
548 (1983); Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 877 (recognizing legislative 
"deals" made by effective interest groups). But see Farber & Frickey, supra note 
51, at 883 (criticizing extreme conclusions of some public choice theorists); Sun-
stein, supra note 54, at 48-49 (legislators can engage in thoughtful deliberation 
without being unduly influenced by interest groups). This criticism oflegislative 
decisionmaking posits two basic flaws: first, that the legislature is inadequately 
representative to the extent that interest groups are minority factions and, sec-
ond, that the legislature is inadequately thoughtful to the extent that interest 
groups single-mindedly pursue narrow and short-term objectives. See Sunstein, 
supra note 54, at 32-34. 
judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy can address each 
of these difficulties. First, by striking down a governmental policy and inviting 
congressional response, the Court will have raised an issue to greater public 
scrutiny. The electorate-at-large, theretofore perhaps politically passive, will 
have a visible opportunity to evaluate an issue that otherwise was resolved by 
normal governmental processes (assumedly) captured by narrow interest 
groups. Second, if judicial invalidation of governmental policy is subject to con-
gressional revision, interest groups themselves will have been given an opportu-
nity to reconsider an issue in terms framed by the Court's judgment. Of course, 
Congress probably would remain imperfectly representative and thoughtful-
not a replication of true, formal constitutional politics. Yet questioning Con-
gress's representativeness is hardly a basis for supporting even less representa-
tive judicial supremacy. For elaboration of how congressional supremacy can 
serve goals of political self-constraint, see infra text accompanying notes 192-99 
& 220-305. 
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partures from the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional represen-
tation; judicial supremacy lacks justification. 103 
Indeed, judicial review tempered by congressional 
supremacy could serve as a warning that the electorate's own con-
stitutional ideals might have been compromised. It would pro-
vide Congress with the occasion to reconsider issues, framed in 
constitutional terms by the Supreme Court, giving each voter the 
opportunity to think about the decisions she would make if again 
engaged in formal constitutional politics. Thus, the electorate 
would be encouraged to recreate the constitutional politics through 
which it created the constitutional text now being interpreted, 
and thereby to perpetuate the benefits of its extraordinarily 
thoughtful constitutional politics. 104 And this, after all, is the 
103. As the framers' position on the existence of judicial review is unclear, 
their views on judicial supremacy are even more so. James Madison once 
seemed to reject vesting any branch with "interpretive" supremacy. See Fisher, 
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707, 710 (1985) 
(quoting l ANNALS OF CoNG. 493 U· Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Madison)). 
Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78 might be read as suggesting otherwise, see supra 
note 43, but even it is ambiguous about judicial supremacy. Hamilton noted 
that while "independence of the judges" is necessary to guard against baneful 
influences among the people, such influences "speedily give place to better informa-
tion, and more deliberate reflection." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) 
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis added). If it is true that the electorate's bad 
judgement is temporary, and that it is able to correct itself simply with more 
deliberate reflection, a regime of judicial· review tempered with congressional 
supremacy would seem to be appropriate-at least so far as choices for political 
self-constraint are concerned. Furthermore, one must confront a deeper ques-
tion that accounts for the "intertemporal difficulty": What is the relevance of 
their views about judicial supremacy for any given voter today? See infra text 
accompanying notes 136- 48. 
104. One who embraces an interest group theory of Congress's 
(non)deliberative processes might object to congressional supremacy as a route 
to a hopelessly incoherent constitutional law. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 
102, at 547-48. The value of coherence, however, is itself debatable. While 
some see law as a quest for moral coherence or "integrity," it is also undeniable 
that constitutional provisions themselves are created by politics, and often re-
flect intricate compromise. Compare R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 225-75 with 
Chang, supra note 10, at 833-45; see also infra note 366 (discussing priority of 
constitutional politics versus judicial review). 
Apart from the value of coherence, it is hardly clear that congressional 
supremacy would yield a body of constitutional law that is significantly less co-
herent (perhaps more accurately, more incoherent) than the constitutional law 
generated over the past two centuries. Indeed, some suggest that interest 
groups affect congressional deliberation in a far more limited way than that per-
ceived by radical public choice theorists. For example, "group influence is likely 
to be strongest when the group is attempting to block ... legislation; when the 
group's goals are narrow and involve low-visibility issues; when the group has 
substantial support from other groups and public officials." Farber & Frickey, 
supra note 51, at 887 (footnotes omitted). This characterization of interest 
group influence should allay some fears of those who trust courts more than 
Congress to make constitutional law. To the extent that interest groups block 
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ideal of community decisionmaking that the notion of political 
self-constraint seeks to achieve. 105 
3. Se/,ecting justices to "Interpret" Constitutional Texts Intended to 
Ensure Optimal Legislative Accountability 
a. The "Interpretive" Ideal: Constitutional Representation 
Voters, we have seen, might build their legislative structure 
with two goals in mind: accountability and political self-con-
straint. The first seeks to keep representatives tied to electoral 
preferences so voters need not be as jealously vigilant about pub-
lic policy as in a direct democracy. The second seeks to keep rep-
resentatives sufficiently removed from the latest electoral whims 
that they · can exercise independent, publicly-oriented judg-
ment.106 Both goals are served by framing the legislative struc-
ture in supreme constitutional texts. Constrained by the 
principles of constitutional supremacy, representatives may not 
change the legislative structure toward either insulating them-
selves from electoral retribution or serving the majority's own ill-
considered judgments about how public policy should be 
made. 107 
legislation more easily than prompt it, judicial choices would remain intact. Fur-
thermore, if interest group influence is greatest for narrow, low-visibility issues, 
it is likely to be relatively weak for proposed legislation reversing the Supreme 
Court under congressional supremacy-to the extent that overturning the Court 
is viewed as a sober, extraordinary occasion. This is especially likely to be true 
for issues that underlie the most controversial Supreme Court opinions. Finally, 
when interest groups need and gain the support of other forces and institutions, 
public decisionmaking is more inclusive and, therefore, more likely representa-
tive of the electorate-at-large. As Professors Farber and Frickey have observed: 
Faith in deliberative congressional resolution of sensitive issues is not 
entirely misplaced, particularly when courts assist the deliberative pro-
cess through structural and procedural review ... that shifts the burden 
of inertia to those seeking to reimpose the invalidated decision . . .. 
Considering the ease of killing legislation and the difficulty of passing 
it, these consequences of a suspensive veto are significant. 
Id. at 923. 
105. This resolution is far from perfect. Compounding the significance of 
the electorate's fading memories, new people will enter the political community 
who never focused on the virtues of political self-constraint by engaging in ex-
traordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. Inevitably, the entire political 
community will consist of people who never debated and struggled with the no-
tion of political self-constraint. I confront their plight in the next major section, 
where I consider whether, and why, voters should allow their constitution to 
grow as old as has the Constitution. Analysis of this truly long-term context will 
have much to say about the moderately long-term situation in which one portion 
of the electorate has fading memories of choices for political self-constraint, and 
another has no memories at all. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 44-55. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58. 
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Each motive for exploiting constitutional supremacy carries 
its own interpretive ideal. To the extent that the electorate has 
created constitutional provisions seeking to maximize legislative 
accountability, voters would want Justices to make the decisions 
the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily vigilant poli-
tics toward ensuring that power-hungry governmental functiona-
ries do not separate themselves from voter preferences. To the 
extent that constitutional provisions reflect concerns for political 
self-constraint, voters would want Justices to make the decisions 
the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful 
debate about the processes of public policymaking. 108 Each "in-
terpretive" ideal is a version of constitutional representation. 
b. Judicial Supremacy as a Mechanism for Ensuring 
Accountability to the Ideal of Constitutional 
Representation 
1. The Case for Judicial Supremacy: Toward Limiting the 
Authority of Power-Hungry Officials 
Congressional supremacy might be problematic in this con-
text because it would empower Congress to overturn judicial inter-
pretations of constitutional provisions designed to ensure 
Congress s accountability. Congressional authority· to reverse 
Supreme Court "interpretations" of constitutional mandates in-
tended to protect those who criticize government, or seek access 
to government information, for example, could facilitate legisla-
tive entrenchment. 109 Judicial supremacy would make it more dif-
ficult for renegade legislators to implement policies that detach 
themselves from electoral scrutiny and retribution. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94 ("interpretive" ideal for pro-
visions concerned with political self-constraint). If, for example, a wave of popu-
lar euphoria prompts the electorate to make some person Emperor-for-Life, a 
majority of voters would be served if justices interpreted provisions intended to 
ensure optimal legislative accountability in a way that reflects the choices the 
electorate would make if engaged in formal constitutional politics today, toward 
protecting their better selves from their worse selves. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (deci-
sion to limit Presidents to two elected terms after Franklin Roosevelt elected 
four times). 
109. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961) (legislature should not be judge of own powers). 
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n. The Case Against Judicial Supremacy: When Are 
Constitutional Provisions Intended to Police the 
Voters' Legislature, and When Are They Intended 
to Police the Voters Themselves? 
Constitutional provisions designed to ensure optimal legisla-
tive accountability are intended both to curb legislative corrup-
tion and to promote political self-constraint. 110 Previous analysis 
has questioned the merits of judicial supremacy for "interpret-
ing" constitutional provisions intended to secure the benefits of 
political self-constraint. 111 Thus, voters might deem it best to es-
tablish congressional supremacy with respect to constitutional is-
sues implicating concerns of optimal legislative accountability, but 
to accord judges the powers of judicial supremacy with respect to 
issues implicating concerns of optimal legislative accountability. 
This allocation of interpretive authority would be problem-
atic, because it begs the question of whether Congress or the 
Court has supreme authority to draw the "interpretive" line be-
tween those provisions and circumstances for which Congress en-
joys the powers of congressional supremacy and those for which 
the Court enjoys the powers of judicial supremacy. Congress and 
the Court might develop three behavioral patterns for answering 
this question. First, they could engage in a perpetual competition 
yielding ad hoc determinations of final "interpretive" authority 
issue by issue. Second, the competition might settle into a pre-
vailing ethic of judicial supremacy across the board-as now ex-
ists in the American constitutional scheme. Third, it might settle 
into a prevailing ethic of congressional supremacy across the 
board. 
An ad hoc pattern of perpetual competition not only could 
drain institutional energies, but also could yield haphazard results 
without established principles under which debate about final "in-
terpretive" authority would be conducted.1 12 Furthermore, if 
voters accept that there are significant problems with judicial 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 45-58. 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 96-105. 
112. Yet its desirability depends on the kind of interbranch struggle Con-
gress and the Court would create. Careful and open consideration of motives 
for exploiting the principles of constitutional supremacy-whether perpetuating 
a temporary political advantage toward denying one's opponents the right to 
shape public policy, securing the benefits of political self-constraint, or ensuring 
legislative accountability-can enhance public decisionmaking, as will reconsid-
eration of the particular challenged governmental action. See infra text accompa-
nying note 131. On the other hand, stalemate, tension, and gamesmanship 
undermine the chances that this careful and open public debate will occur. 
1991] A CRmQ.uE OF JumcIAL SUPREMACY 323 
supremacy for "interpreting" constitutional provisions intended 
to secure the benefits of political self-constraint, they hardly 
would want to establish a universal ethic of judicial supremacy. 
Perhaps we can refine the earlier analysis suggesting the desirabil-
ity of judicial supremacy for enforcing constitutional provisions 
intended to ensure legislative accountability. 113 If judicial 
supremacy is unnecessary or undesirable for this purpose, the 
electorate could safely establish congressional supremacy for 
resolving all questions arising under their newly created constitu-
tional texts designed to ensure optimal legislative accountability. 
[1] Bright Lines and Predictable "Interpretations": Judicial 
Supremacy as Unnecessary 
Many constitutional provisions by which voters might try to 
ensure legislative accountability would likely be framed in specific 
terms. Consider, for example, terms of office for representatives. 
Suppose that voters have created a unicameral legislature and 
specified a term of six years for its members. Suppose further 
that the legislature passed a statute increasing terms of office to 
eight years. Surely, this would be unconstitutional, for "six 
years" means six years, doesn't it? 
Of course it does, at least in this sense: If one asked any per-
son on the street, she would agree that "six years" means six years. 
Furthermore, based on pervasive and traditional notions of "plain 
meaning," 114 one can hardly imagine that any judge would find it 
to mean anything else--even if she were deeply committed to the 
"interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation and open to 
the possibility that the choices made in constitutional politics last 
year are not necessarily the choices voters would make if engaged 
in constitutional politics today .115 
113. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
114. See, e.g., Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Ru/.es of Statutory Interpretation, 3 
U. KAN. L. REV. l, 12-13 (1954) (although one can posit that all words are inher-
ently ambiguous, "the degree of ambiguity is likely to be substantial only in lim-
ited ... sets of situations."); Jones, The Plain Meaning Ru/.e and Extrinsic Aids in the 
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q 2 (1939) (discussing traditional 
application of plain meaning rule and cases which have disregarded it.); cf Nut-
ting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509, 521 (1940) 
(meaning of statutory words "will generally accord with the 'meaning' which 
would be attached to the words by ordinary persons, but in some cases a differ-
ent result may be reached because of considerations of equity or policy which, in 
the minds of the courts, are controlling"); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 
528-3 l ( 1988) (rules stated in language with clear meaning to legal and lay com-
munities can generate determinate legal outcomes). 
115. Pursuing goals of constitutional representation, however, one can 
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Indeed, one can hardly imagine that legislators would even 
attempt to extend their terms of office from six to eight years, 
precisely because the Constitution specifies terms of "six years." 
It would be still more incredible that a legislature given the pow-
ers of congressional supremacy would pass legislation overturn-
ing a judicial determination that the "eight years" statute violates 
the bright-line "six years" constitutional text. Thus, such bright-
line texts would appear to be as self-enforcing as any legal texts 
could be. To the extent that bright-line texts are self-enforcing, 
judicial supremacy is unnecessary .116 
[2] Fuzzy I.ines, Core Values, and Predictable 
"Interpretations": Judicial Supremacy as Unnecessary 
Other provisions that voters might create toward ensuring 
legislative accountability must be drawn with far less precision. 117 
For example, provisions guaranteeing rights to criticize and to re-
ceive information about governmental performance cannot be as 
precisely framed as those establishing terms of office for legisla-
tors and executives. Thus, the "interpretive" ideal of constitu-
tional representation, rather than the obvious meaning of words 
to any person on the street, can be the benchmark for determin-
ing the proper meaning of these provisions. 
Yet at least for some issues, the value of ensuring legislative 
accountability can provide clear guidance not only for judges who 
speculate that voters today, if they engaged in true constitutional politics, might 
choose a different, but equally specific, term of office for legislative representa-
tives. See, e.g., Oreskes, Bush Backs Move For limiting Tenns of U.S. Lawmakers, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 6 ("President Bush has decided to push for a 
constitutional amendment to limit the number of terms for members of Con-
gress .... "). But given the apparent clarity of the constitutional language, it is 
difficult to imagine a judge daring to find that a "six years" provision actually 
allows eight years, or, indeed, that a unicameral legislature provision actually 
allows transfer of all legislative authority to an Emperor-for-Life-even though 
the decisions voters made yesterday are not necessarily the decisions they would 
make today if engaged in formal constitutional politics. 
116. As Professor Schauer has observed, the.fact that Ronald Reagan was 
seldom mentioned as a possible presidential candidate in 1988 is a "legal event" 
reflecting the clear and broadly understood meaning of the twenty-second 
amendment. See Schauer, supra note 22, at 1719; see also Carter, Constitutional 
Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddl.e, 
94 YALE LJ. 821, 853-59 (1985) (arguing that some provisions have uncon-
troversial meaning that lends legitimacy to provisions with indeterminate mean-
ing); Grodin, supra note 22, at 1974 (results sometimes compelled by clear 
language, not logic, because "any judge would feel like a damned fool trying to 
justify a different result"); Schauer, supra note 22, at 1723-34 (clarity of applica-
ble law deters disputes); Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). 
117. See supra note 96 (impossibility of determinate legal codes). 
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endeavor to identify choices the electorate would make today if 
engaged in constitutional politics, but also for legislators who 
might wish to entrench themselves in power.1 18 For example, as-
sume that the political community consists of three identifiable 
groups with approximately equal political power: die-hard and 
closed-minded Roosevelt Democrats, die-hard and closed-
minded Reagan Republicans, and open-minded, wavering In-
dependents. A majority of voters almost certainly would deter-
mine, in the name of accountability, that a government staffed by 
Republicans should not pass a law prohibiting people from articu-
lating Democratic viewpoints. Not only would die-hard Demo-
crats make this determination; so would Independents who 
recently voted Republican but who can imag~ne voting Demo-
cratic in the future. The Independents would want to preserve 
the opportunity to change their minds. Thus, it is a matter of 
simple self-interest for a majority at any given time to assert that 
people have the right to criticize government and to have infor-
mation about their governmental functionaries. At least within a 
range of orthodoxy, for groups with significant political power, 119 
the idea is deeply rooted, widely accepted, viscerally felt, and not 
at all subtle. Rather than a value of political self-constraint that 
emerges only after extraordinarily careful deliberation, this is a 
value of political self-preservation sprung by a hair trigger. 12° 
118. Cf Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 608-12 ( 1958) (legal terms have core of settled meaning and penumbras of 
indeterminate meaning). 
119. A similar analysis will suggest that for a majority of the national electo-
rate at any given time, it does not make sense to exploit the principles of consti-
tutional supremacy toward denying one's opponents the right to shape public 
policy in Congress. See infra text accompanying notes 175-91; see also Chang, 
supra note 10, at 775-82 (given stable national electorate, political self-con-
straint, rather than desire to thwart preferences of one's political competitors, is 
more plausible motive for successfully creating constitutional provisions). This 
is to be contrasted with the plausibility that, for a minority of the national electo-
rate that happens to enjoy an extreme but temporary political advantage over 
political rivals, it might make sense to seek constitutional mandates toward 
thwarting congressional discretion in anticipation of their opponents' reclaimed 
political power. Even for them, however, the difficulty of perpetuating a temporary 
political advantage in practice counsels against trying to do so. See supra text 
accompanying notes 69-87. 
120. Professor Amar has made the point: "Because each American sees 
herself in the minority on some issues, each is likely to embrace some general 
idea of 'minority rights' out of self-interest, if nothing else." Amar, supra note 
42, at 1096. While Amar quite correctly notes that this self-interest justifies only 
some limited idea of minority rights, others have suggested that fear of being in a 
minority should lead people to protect "minority rights" well beyond the main-
stream. See, e.g.,]. RAWLS, A T_HEORX OF JUSTICE (1971). Significantly, Rawls's 
view is generated only by denying individuals knowledge of their actual circum-
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Because a majority of voters can clearly voice their interests, 
a majority of legislators would not likely attempt to suppress ideas 
within a range of orthodox political disagreement. 121 For similar 
reasons, even if the legislature enacted such a statute, it would be 
still more difficult for a majority of legislators to overturn a 
court's determination that the value of accountability had been 
violated. Again, judicial supremacy is unnecessary to vindicate 
the choices for legislative accountability that the electorate would 
make if engaged in constitutional politics today.1 22 
[3] Fuzzy Lines, Ambiguous Values, and Unpredictable 
"Interpretations": judicial Supremacy as Undesirable 
Consider, however, laws suppressing the expression of view-
points farther removed from the center of political ideology. It is 
less clear whether a majority of voters would want to prohibit the 
stances. Yet as suggested by Professor Bollinger's analysis of extremist speech, 
the motive of self-protection is relevant only to the extent that one is vulnerable 
and needs protection. For a discussion of Professor Bollinger's analysis, see in-
fra notes 123-29 and accompanying text. If unlikely ever to press interests well 
beyond the mainstream, one is unlikely to be motivated by self-interest to pro-
tect such unorthodoxies. But there might be other reasons, such as a concern 
for the welfare of individuals who hold an unorthodox minority interest, that a 
majority might wish to protect such unorthodoxies through provisions intended 
to secure the benefits of political self-constraint. See id.; cf L. LEVY, LEGACY OF 
SUPPRESSION (1960). 
121. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 provide a singular example of an 
effort to suppress an opposing faction within the range of political orthodoxy. 
See l C. WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 215 (1936). 
That this effort failed in the face of outraged political opposition-even in the 
absence of judicial review-supports the proposition that one facet of political 
orthodoxy cannot suppress another. That the effort was unique in American 
history supports the proposition that one facet of political orthodoxy likely will 
not even attempt to suppress another. 
122. Legislators might gerrymander electoral districts or manipulate census 
figures, hoping to perpetuate their political power. Such methods for perpetuat-
ing the present power structure are both more subtle and perhaps more effective 
than prohibiting the major opposition party's right to criticize. Thus, legislators 
might seek to violate the majority's preference for a fluid electoral process-
where here the majority includes members of the opposition parties and tempo-
rarily convinced members of the current governing party-if they think they can 
get away with it. This is not to say, however, that judicial supremacy will serve 
better than congressional supremacy or, indeed, that judicial supremacy is desir-
able at all. Courts have been deferential to states on matters of districting. In-
deed, it is likely that the high stakes of judicial invalidation that necessarily 
accompany the powers of judicial supremacy explain the prevalence of judicial 
deference. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53. Thus, the theoretical 
check of judicial supremacy is meaningless because it is not used. Under con-
gressional supremacy, courts might well be more willing to scrutinize these sorts 
of state and federal legislative maneuvers toward determining whether concerns 
for optimal legislative accountability have been violated. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 268-72 & 283-85. 
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government from suppressing the viewpoints of Communists, the 
Ku Klux Klan, child pornographers, or, indeed, flag burners, than 
that they would want to prohibit the government from sup-
pressing the viewpoints of mainstream Democrats or Republi-
cans-at least in the name of legislative accountability.1 28 Extremist 
values offend; they cause harm. More importantly, a majority of 
voters could not imagine adopting those values in the future. 
Thus, allowing expression of these offensive views does nothing 
to maximize the extent to which electoral preferences are re-
flected in legislative policy. Indeed, laws suppressing extremist 
viewpoints are more likely to reflect the present majority's im-
pulses than to reflect any legislators' efforts to perpetuate them-
selves in office against their constituents' will.1 24 
Thus, a better explanation for a majority's choices, if any, to 
protect extremist speech, is a desire for political self-con-
straint.125 Though a voter is offended by their ideas, though he 
cannot imagine ever being persuaded by their ideas, he might 
wish to protect the Communists' or Klansmen's speech because 
he values their interests in individual fulfillment through 
speech, 126 or because he views tolerance per seas an extraordina-
rily important political value.1 27 As previously suggested, how-
ever, if political self-constraint is a voter's reason for 
constitutionally prohibiting laws that forbid expression of obnox-
ious views, 128 then judicial supremacy is counterproductive.129 
123. This is the paradox of extremist speech. See, e.g., L. BOLLINGER, THE 
TOLERANT SoCIE1Y 12-42 (1986) (constitutional protection of extremist speech 
difficult to justify). 
124. For example, after the Civil War's end, but before congressional Re-
construction, "Southern intransigence ... took the form of denying freedom of 
speech to those who attacked Southern ways." W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 42. 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43. 
126. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (right of 
"intimate association" protected because individuals draw "emotional enrich-
ment" and define self-identity from close ties with others); T. EMERSON, THE 
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 ( 1970) (freedom of expression essential 
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment). 
127. See generally L. BOLLINGER, supra note 123. 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27; see also L. BOLLINGER, supra 
note 123, at 12-42 (protection of extremist speech difficult to justify); Schauer, 
Must Speech Be Speciaa, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1284, 1289-92, 1305-06 (1983) (be-
cause self-fulfillment value can justify protecting much more than speech, it is 
weak justification for protecting speech). 
129. Hamilton's skeptical view of a constitutionally protected free press 
does not support judicial supremacy. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 514 (A. 
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961) (free press depends on public opinion); see also 
supra note 103 (suggesting The Federalist No. 78 does not necessarily support 
judicial supremacy). Similar considerations apply to more subtle structural con-
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111. The Case for Congressional Supremacy 
The foregoing suggests that congressional supremacy is un-
likely to undermine electoral concerns for legislative accountability, 
which most likely are served by bright-line constitutional texts 
and the broadly uncontested core of fuzzy-line provisions. 130 
Furthermore, where the implications of the accountability value 
are unclear-where electoral ~oncerns are more likely for political 
self-constraint with respect to the processes of making public pol-
icy-congressional supremacy would better promote the "inter-
pretive" ideal of identifying the choices voters would make if 
engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful politics. 
By explicitly adopting congressional supremacy for all consti-
tutional issues, voters could avoid the risk not only that Congress 
and the Court would gradually develop an ethic of judicial 
supremacy, but also that Congress and the Court would have 
messy and unproductive confrontations over which institution has 
final "interpretive" authority with respect to any given constitu-
tional clause or issue. This is not to say Congress and the Court 
would avoid confrontation altogether. On the contrary, the point 
of judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy is 
precisely to encourage constructive interaction between Congress 
and the Court. 131 Yet rather than evoking a sense of constitu-
tional crisis, the interbranch struggle arising under congressional 
supremacy should focus attention on the merits of challenged 
policy, the merits of the Supreme Court's rationale for finding the 
policy constitutionally invalid, and the merits of subsequent con-
gressional reconsideration. By focusing debate on the merits of 
policy, judicial review supplemented by congression;il supremacy 
can enrich the "ordinary" political process and make it more like 
the extraordinary politics ideally underlying the creation of 
supreme constitutional text. 
* * * 
cerns such as the delegation of legislative power to procedures and institutions 
other than those prescribed in supreme constitutional texts. If such constitu-
tional issues implicate concerns for political self-constraint, judicial supremacy is 
inappropriate. If they implicate concerns for preventing legislative entrench-
ment and corruption, judicial supremacy might be desirable. See infra text accom-
panying notes 200-13 (same issue for people relying on aging provisions). In 
this event, however, the desirability of judicial supremacy must be discounted by 
the improbability that the Court will find the legislature to have acted unconsti-
tutionally. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53 (judicial supremacy en-
courages judicial deference). 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 114-22. 
131. See infra text accompanying notes 241-49, 268-72, 283-92 & 298-305. 
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This evaluation of judicial supremacy from the perspective of 
voters who have created their own constitutional texts yields 
three significant conclusions. First, while judicial supremacy 
seems necessary to perpetuate an extraordinary political advan-
tage, it is not sufficient. Indeed, it is doubtful whether people can 
perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage by creating con-
stitutional provisions. In the short term, they will lack control 
over their hand-pickedjustices; 132 in the longer term, as they lose 
their competitive edge, their opponents will regain influence not 
only in enacting legislation but also in selecting Justices. 133 Sec-
ond, congressional supremacy is a better route than judicial 
supremacy toward constitutional representation for people who 
have created constitutional provisions designed to secure the 
benefits of political self-constraint. 134 Third, for constitutional 
provisions designed to ensure optimal legislative accountability, 
"bright-line" texts and core values generate uncontroversial "in-
terpretive" answers and can be effectively enforced through con-
gressional supremacy. Controversial "interpretive" questions 
more likely reflect concerns for political self-constraint and, 
therefore, should be resolved through congressional 
supremacy.135 Thus, congressional supremacy seems a better 
method than judicial supremacy for achieving the "interpretive" 
goals of people who seek political benefits from the principles of 
constitutional supremacy by creating their own constitutional 
texts. 
• • • 
III. jUDICIAL REVIEW FOR PEOPLE WHO RELY ON AGING 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS 
This section will consider why voters today limit congres-
sional discretion with aging constitutional texts rather than (i) create 
new constitutional provisions, or (ii) abandon constitutional supremacy al-
together in favor of statutory supremacy .136 By explaining why the elec-
torate today exploits the principles of constitutional supremacy in 
this way, one might define ideal versions of constitutional "inter-
pretation," and determine whether judicial supremacy or con-
132. See supra text accompanying notes 69-76 & 79-87. 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05. 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 123-29. 
136. For a definition of"statutory supremacy," see supra text accompanying 
notes 14-15 & note 44. 
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gressional supremacy is a better mechanism for ensuring that 
Justices fulfill those "interpretive" ideals. 
A. Why Constitutional Supremacy with Agi,ng Constitutional Texts? 
1. Ancestor Worship: A Self-Contradictory justification 
Reverence for ancestral heroes might be a reason for limiting 
congressional discretion with aging constitutional texts. 137 If a 
voter wishes society to be governed by the choices made in past 
constitutional politics, rather than those that would be. made in 
congressional or constitutional politics today, her "interpretive" 
ideal might look like Raoul Berger's strict originalism: 138 to iden-
tify the specific compromises wrought by the framers and ratifiers 
of each constitutional provision. 139 Alternatively, it might resem-
ble Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Henry Monaghan's more specu-
lative version of originalism: to identify the choices that the 
framers and ratifiers would make if they were able to make deci-
sions about the world today. 140 
137. Cf Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1046; Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1566 
(originalism is one version of viewing law as coming "from above"; majoritarian-
ism is another). Ackerman seems to define ancestor worship as judicial invalida-
tion of a later legislative decision simply because it is inconsistent with an earlier 
one. While this scenario might suggest ancestor worship by the judiciary, it does 
not necessarily reflect ancestor worship by the electorate-at-large. For present 
purposes, ancestor worship is more properly viewed as a desire by the present 
electorate to remain governed by the past. 
138. See generally R. BERGER, supra note 33. 
139. People might create constitutional provisions to control future gener-
ations. See PERRY II, supra note 7, at 142 (constitutional amendment is dramatic 
way for present to speak with future); Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1039 (during 
constitutional politics, "the democrat has a means of amplifying the voice of the 
People in a way that will arrest attention for a long time to come"); Levinson, 
Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 376 (1982) (purpose of constitutional 
control to preserve particular vision held by constitutional founders and prevent 
its overthrow by future generations). The question now asked concerns whether 
those subsequent generations want to be bound by past choices and, if so, why. 
A desire by the past to control the future can be satisfied only by cooperation 
from the future. See Chang, supra note 10, at 787. 
140. Justice Jackson articulated-and criticized-both versions of the 
originalist's "interpretive" ideal: 'Just what our forefathers did envision, or 
would have envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined 
from material almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to in-
terpret for the Pharaoh." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 634 (1952) Uackson,J. concurring). Focusing on what the framers and ra-
tifiers wanted (or would want) begs the question of whether they wished their 
decisions and their interpretive ideal to govern later generations. Cf Bobbitt, 
Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 700 (1980) (noting John Adams' view 
that founders sought to create written constitution to provide expression of fun-
damental values to which later generations could refer); Brest, The Misconceived 
QJiestfor the Origi,nal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 209-21 (1980) (original-
ism must account for framers' "interpretive intent"); Maltz, supra note 97, at 796 
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Yet for several reasons, ancestor worship is a self-contradic-
tory reason for voters to rely on aging texts, rather than (i) to 
create new constitutional provisions of their own, or (ii) to aban-
don constitutional supremacy altogether in favor of statutory 
supremacy. First, if a voter identifies James Madison or Thaddeus 
Stevens as his ancestral hero, and wishes to be governed by the 
constitutional provisions they created, the voter makes his own 
choice. This choice must rest on the voter's own evaluations of 
the quality of each potential hero's thought. Thus, those who 
idolize the framers pursue their own values; they simply label 
their own values with some personified precedent. 141 One does 
not avoid responsibility for making public policy by choosing to 
be an ancestor worshipper. 
Second, if voters today wish to be governed by the values of 
those viewed as particularly wise, it does not make sense to limit 
the focus to Madison or Stevens. Indeed, voters might prefer 
constitutional provisions reflecting the wisdom not only of James 
Madison, but also that of other respected figures-whether Mo-
hammed, Sigmund Freud, or Martin Luther King. Madison might 
have been wise, but perhaps not wise in all things; perhaps he 
gave less attention to other heroes' wisdom than a voter views as 
ideal; perhaps he could not have given adequate attention to the 
wisdom of a voter's other heroes because they had not yet been 
born.142 
("[O]riginalist theory ... directs judges to use their best efforts to determine 
what the intent of the drafters would be in a particular situation."); Powell, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 ( 1985) (framers did 
not intend for later generations to interpret Constitution based on original 
intent). 
141. Cf White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. 
L. REV. 415, 418 (1982) (questioning how one chooses relevant framers). 
142. This observation applies to issues not yet experienced, as well as to 
heroes not yet born. Consider, for example, abortion. Madison and Stevens 
simply did not focus their wisdom on abortion as a social issue. See W. NELSON, 
supra note 23, at 6 (framers of fourteenth amendment never considered abortion 
issue). Even if they had, because of changes in sexual mores and gender roles, 
abortion could not have had the same significance in their social context as it has 
in society today. Cf Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954) 
("[W]e cannot tum the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment 
was adopted .... We must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation."); A. 
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 102-03 (seeking framers' intent as dispositive of present 
constitutional controversies is "wrong question"); id. at 110 ("[O]ur own rea-
soned and revocable will, not some idealized ancestral compulsion, ... moves us 
forward."); Brest, supra note 140, at 223 (originalism unworkable for resolving 
modem constitutional conflicts); Chang, supra note 10, at 784-88 (relevant val-
ues for constitutional interpretation are those of people today); Sunstein, supra 
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Third, Madison was not alone in 1787; Thaddeus Stevens 
was not alone in 1868. Their views were compromised by compe-
tition with their political opponents. Thus, even if Madison or 
Stevens were a voter's ideal, by choosing to apply the principles 
of constitutional supremacy to aging provisions, and to the "orig-
inal understanding" of those provisions, 143 the voter has dele-
gated to Madison's and Stevens' opponents, and the political power 
they happened to enjoy at the time, authority to determine the 
extent to which his heroes' preferences are reflected in public 
policy. 
Thus, from the perspective of voters today, ancestor worship 
is not a convincing reason for applying the principles of constitu-
tional supremacy to aging constitutional texts. One must look 
elsewhere to justify, or explain, an aging Constitution. 
2. Laziness and Inertia: Deriving "Interpretive" Ideals of 
Constitutional Representation for Voters Today 
The laziness and inertia of private citizenship reflect concerns 
that compete with a voter's desire to maximize the extent to 
which his preferences are reflected in public policy. 144 An unwill-
note 42, at 1563 (unclear why framers' values should matter to contemporary 
constitutional controversies). 
143. Analysis in the previous section should suggest the extent to which 
any view of "original understanding" must depend upon other factors, e.g., 
whether those who created the provision held selfish or community-oriented 
"interpretive" ideals, and upon choices that judges necessarily must make about 
whose values to pursue and why. See supra notes 33, 4 7 & text accompanying 
notes 69-70. The concern for ensuring judicial accountability suggests that 
much of the meaning ultimately given to a newly created constitutional provi-
sion in application must be a function of continuing power relationships in prac-
tical politics. So viewed, any "original understanding" is far less significant than 
is continuing competition, at any given moment, to resolve continuing issues in 
one's own preferred way. See supra text accompanying notes 69-87. 
144. Bruce Ackerman's treatment of the private citizen conflates two vari-
ables that should be viewed separately: first, the energy that one is willing to 
commit to making public policy and second, the extent to which one pursues 
"public regarding" concerns or "selfish" concerns when devoting energy to 
public policy. Ackerman attributes three characteristics to the private citizen-
apathy, ignorance and selfishness. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1034. Apathy and 
ignorance are functions of the energy one is willing to commit to public policy; 
selfishness relates to the extent to which one pursues "public regarding" con-
cerns when devoting energy to public policy. Cf Michelman I, supra note 42, at 
21-23 (republicanism and pluralism are distinguishable not by energy people 
commit to public policy, but by quality of political debate); Sunstein, Naked Pref 
erences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1694 (1984) (interested polit-
ical actors might exercise political power to serve both selfish and publicly-
oriented ends). I attribute only apathy and ignorance to the private citizen, and 
define him by the energy he is willing to commit to politics. The private citizen is 
one who is willing to devote energy to the formation of public policy-including 
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ingness to devote so much energy to politics, to sacrifice more 
insular concerns, can explain why voters today do not create their 
own constitutional provisions. 145 Yet such private citizenship does 
not suggest that voters are uninterested in attaining the benefits 
that constitutional supremacy can provide. Otherwise, it would 
make no sense to place limits on congressional discretion with the 
principles of constitutional supremacy. Thus, the laziness and in-
ertia of private citizenship do not vitiate the ideal of having consti-
tutional provisions reflecting one's own preferences to the 
greatest extent possible. 
This explanation for the infrequency of constitutional poli-
tics, despite a desire to attain the benefits of constitutional 
supremacy, suggests that if constitutional politics were much less 
bothersome, a majority among the national electorate would cre-
ate their own constitutional provisions-toward perpetuating a 
temporary political advantage, securing the benefits of political 
self-constraint, or ensuring optimal governmental accountability. 
This explanation further suggests that because constitutional 
politics is too bothersome, voters hope that the Constitution can 
provide some second-best substitute for the supreme provisions 
that they would create if it were easier to do so. 
Indeed, this explanation for aging constitutional provisions 
suggests the "interpretive" ideal that voters today would like 
choices to exploit the principles of constitutional supremacy. Furthermore, for 
purposes of my analysis, the energies of citizenship might be directed in either 
selfish or public-regarding ways. Limiting the focus in this way makes sense 
given my rationale for using the private citizen idea-to explain why voters might 
seek to limit congressional discretion by applying the principles of constitutional 
supremacy to aging constitutional texts, rather than to create new ones of their 
own. Thus, the private citizen might wish to exploit the principles of constitu-
tional supremacy to perpetuate a temporary political advantage, secure the ben-
efits of political self-constraint, or ensure optimal legislative accountability. 
Indeed, one should avoid adjectives such as "selfish" or "public-regarding" as 
question-begging. For example, are people who wish to achieve their prefer-
ences about abortion at the cost of denying their opponents' right to shape pub-
lic policy acting in a "public-regarding" or a "selfish" way? On the one hand, 
they are pursuing policies they view as morally correct; thus, their efforts, at least 
from this perspective, have a "public-regarding" aura. On the other hand, they 
are pursuing controversial policies at the expense of democracy-at the expense 
of their opponents' desire to vote their own morality. 
145. Unlike the antifederalists, most people do not seem to view public-
spirited politics as among the worthiest of pursuits. See, e.g., G. Wooo, supra 
note 42, at 500 (antifederalists of 1787 retained Republican ideology of 1776); 
id. at 53 ("The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole 
formed the essence of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the ide-
alistic goal of their [ 1776] Revolution."); Sunstein, supra note 54, at 35-38 (anti-
federalists valued unselfish, publicly-oriented participation in politics as route to 
happiness); cf. supra note 144. 
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Supreme Courtjustices to perform. But for the hard work, a ma-
jority among voters today would create their own constitutional 
provisions. Previous analysis has suggested that voters who cre-
ate constitutional provisions would articulate the "interpretive" 
ideals characterized under the rubric of constitutional representa-
tion.146 Thus, voters today should articulate the very same "inter-
pretive" ideals of constitutional representation for their aging, 
second-best constitutional provisions 147-to identify choices they 
would make if engaged in constitutional politics. If voters could 
findjudges to fulfill this "interpretive" ideal, the electorate could 
thereafter effortlessly serve their reasons for exploiting constitu-
tional supremacy-whether perpetuating a temporary political 
advantage, securing the benefits of political self-constraint, or en-
suring optimal legislative accountability-as if they actually had 
engaged in constitutional politics and created their own constitu-
tional texts. 148 
3. Constitutional Representation Versus Other Interpretive Theories: 
The Living Electorates Perspective 
a. Originalism 
Originalism would have the Court's interpretations of consti-
tutional meaning remain static, despite a substantial evolution of 
social values and institutions. Rather than an ideal of identifying 
choices today's electorate would make if engaged in formal con-
stitutional politics, the originalist would identify choices that past 
electorates actually made in constitutional politics. 149 Signifi-
146. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66 (provisions intended to per-
petuate extraordinary political advantage); supra text accompanying notes 88-94 
(provisions intended to secure benefits of political self-constraint); supra text ac-
companying notes l 06-08 (provisions intended to ensure optimal legislative 
accountability). 
14 7. One might have a selfish, personal ideal, yet be unable to achieve it in 
practice because one's opponents are pursuing their own selfish ideals. To-
gether, such voters would generate a compromise, corporate ideal and select a 
compromise judge. See supra notes 33, 45; infra text accompanying notes 175-91. 
148. Cf Lee, supra note 10, at 1011 ("The [Supreme] Court does not sit as a 
continuous constitutional convention. It is the Constitution itself-and not the 
pronouncements of the justices-that is the supreme law of the land."). But why 
is the Constitution the "supreme law of the land"? Surely not simply because it 
says so. It is the supreme law of the land to the extent that the bulk of society 
accepts or endorses the proposition. I have endeavored to consider why people 
should accept or endorse that proposition. Why should people wish to exploit 
the principles of constitutional supremacy by applying them to aging constitu-
tional texts? 
149. Raoul Berger has acknowledged that "[h]ad it fallen to me ... to de-
cide some of the 'substantive due process' and 'equal protection' cases ab initio, I 
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candy, however, the originalist does not deny the essence of con-
stitutional representation as the ultimate benchmark for 
generating constitutional meaning: the Constitution should re-
flect social changes and the present electorate's political values, 
but only through formal amendment. 150 
Yet it is only when a court's originalist decisions become in-
tolerably removed from contemporary political reality that voters 
could possibly be induced to overcome laziness and inertia and 
overturn judicial doctrine by creating their own constitutional 
provisions. So viewed, the costs of originalism are remarkable. 
On the one hand, only through years of ever-increasing judicial 
deviation from the choices voters today would make if engaged in 
constitutional politics will the national electorate gain sufficient 
incentive to overcome laziness and inertia, respond to the need 
for more relevant uses of constitutional supremacy, and create its 
own constitutional provisions. 151 On the other hand, it is pre-
cisely to avoid the hard work and high stakes of formal constitu-
tional politics that voters apply the principles of constitutional 
supremacy to aging texts, rather than create new ones of their 
own. Thus, not only does originalism promise years of "interpre-
tive" failure; 152 it promises, when its "interpretive" results be-
should have felt constrained to hold that the relief sought lay outside the con-
fines of the judicial power." R. BERGER, supra note 33, at 412 (footnote 
omitted). 
150. See id. at 353-54; R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990). 
151. An originalist might claim that the failure to amend past constitutional 
choices implies public acceptance of those choices. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra 
note 33, at 396 (departure from originalism undermines article V process for 
amendment); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 376 
( 1981) ("Our legal griindnorm has been that the body politic can at a specific point 
in time definitively order relationships, and that such an ordering is binding on 
all organs of government until changed by amendment.") (emphasis in original). 
This claim is weak for several reasons. First, the electorate is simply unaware of 
the "original intention" underlying the Constitution's provisions. Second, given 
this lack of awareness, failure to amend the Constitution at best reflects acquies-
cence to the Court's "interpretations" of the Constitution's meaning. Cf Amar, 
supra note 42, at 1079 (failure to amend constitution suggests "basic (even if not 
perfect) contentment" with "constitutional status quo"). This "constitutional 
status quo" includes both text and judicial gloss. Thus, failure to amend sup-
ports Justice Brennan's decisions as well as Justice Rehnquist's. See Chang, supra 
note l 0, at 789 n. l l l. Third, a discontinuity between original intent and con-
temporary values underlying constitutional amendment could develop only over 
a period of time. Thus, as suggested in the text, if courts did enforce the origi-
nal understanding, constitutional amendment would be evidence of a long pe-
riod in which judicial review failed to reflect the choices the national electorate 
would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics 
today. 
152. Thus, I disagree with Michael Perry that interpretive (i.e., originalist) 
judicial review is easily justified as "legitimate," while the legitimacy ofnoninter-
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come so utterly deviant, to force voters to devote the 
extraordinary effort to formal constitutional politics that they pre-
sumably hope to avoid.1ss 
b. Conventional Morality 
Harry Wellington has suggested that in making constitutional 
law, courts should "translate conventional morality into legal 
pretive (i.e., nonoriginalist) judicial review is far more problematic. To serve the 
framers' values (Perry's "interpretivism," see PERRY I, supra note 7, at 10-11), is 
not necessarily to serve the constitutional values that voters would pursue today 
if engaged in constitutional politics. See infra text accompanying notes 234-44; 
infra note 237. Indeed, even Perry's own axiom of 1.egitimacy as el.ectorally accounta-
bl.e policymaking raises serious questions about the legitimacy of interpretivism. 
See PERRY I, supra note 7, at 125. Institutions that serve the values of past elec-
torates do not necessarily serve the values of the present electorate, and "electo-
ral accountability" implies concern for the present. Thus, Perry's professed 
strongest justification for noninterpretive review-"[i]f in fact the framers had 
authorized the judiciary to exercise (some sort of) noninterpretive review," id. at 
24-is not strong at all. The question must instead be about the choices that the 
present el.ectorate, if engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics, would make 
about proper.judicial behavior. 
Perry's search for a "functional justification for noninterpretive [judicial] 
review," id. at 7, differs from my inquiry in at least two other important respects. 
First, Perry does not define the perspective from which "function" is evaluated. 
I explicitly take the perspective of political competitors who can endeavor to 
affect public policy in different political forums. Second, by questioning all judi-
cial review, rather than just noninterpretive review, I am led to seek "functional 
justifications" not just for a method of judicial review, but for constitutional 
supremacy itself. In short, my inquiry seeks "functional justifications" for insti-
tutional arrangements more fundamental than different versions of judicial re-
view, and does so from the perspective of political competitors pressing their 
own values. 
153. Even accepting all of this, one might argue that originalism at least 
best serves the "rule of law." See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 33, at 283-99. A 
judge who speculates about the choices voters today would make if engaged in 
constitutional politics arguably has more latitude than one who seeks to identify 
the original meaning of constitutional provisions. By requiring judges to remain 
bound by relatively clear "interpretive" rules, originalism at least predictably 
limits judicial discretion. Id. at 283-99. But "there is a profound difference be-
tween the rule of law and submission to any particular institution's understand-
ing of what that law requires, unless of course one adopts a catholic view oflaw, 
which identifies it with the utterances of a specific institution." Levinson, Could 
Meese Be Right This Timer, 61 TuL. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1987). Indeed, a goal of 
predictably limiting judicial discretion argues against originalism as well, be-
cau.se the most predictably restrictive rule would be the elimination of judicial 
review. 
Judicial review makes sense only as a means to an end. If the end is consti-
tutional representation, the pertinent question must be what provides the best 
means: originalism with judicial supremacy; or originalism with congressional 
supremacy; or speculative inquiry into contemporary values with judicial 
supremacy (or congressional supremacy); or even the abandonment of judicial 
review altogether. 
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principle." 154 Justices Goldberg and Harlan pursued such an ap-
proach in Griswold v. Connecticut 155 by referring to dominant na-
tional traditions and practices in evaluating the constitutionality 
of Connecticut's quirky law prohibiting the use of contracep-
tives.156 Similarly, Justice White examined national values as sug-
gested by prevailing state legislation in concluding that laws 
criminalizing homosexual sodomy are not unconstitutional. 157 
Among three of the dominant modes of "interpretation" 
positing a "living" Constitution whose meaning develops outside 
of article V processes, 158 the notion of conventional morality is 
most rooted in dominant political consensus. By referring strictly 
to prevailing traditions and practices that people pursue in every-
day living and prevailing policies that voters choose in everyday 
politics, this approach loses sight of the special benefits voters 
might wish to achieve by creating supreme constitutional texts-
reasons for making law by extraordinary constitutional politics 
rather than by ordinary legislation. Thus, while conventional mo-
rality might keep judicially-declared constitutional law more in 
step with the times than can originalism, it also transforms the 
nation's constitutional law into national common law. 159 
c. "Living" Principle 
Among those who advocate departure from the original un-
derstanding by focusing on the coherent development of moral 
"principle" are Ronald Dworkin and Michael Perry. 160 Professor 
Dworkin argues thatjudges should seek "integrity"-a consistent 
adherence to principle-rather than "checkerboard solutions" 
that accommodate conflicting principles or compromise principle 
154. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some 
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE LJ. 221, 266-67 (1973). 
155. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
156. Id. at 486-87, 493 (Goldberg,J., concurring); id. at 501-02 (Harlan,J., 
concurring); see Chang, supra note 10, at 819-25. 
157. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986) (reviewing stat-
ute criminalizing sodomy only as applied to homosexual sodomy); see also Chang, 
supra note 10, at 819-25. 
158. The other two dominant modes of interpretation positing a "living" 
Constitution are" 'living' principle" and "liberal republicanism." For a discus-
sion of "living" principle, see infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text. For a 
discussion of liberal republicanism, see infra notes 169-73 and accompanying 
text. 
159. See Chang, supra note 10, at 799-803 & 819-25. 
160. For a discussion of Dworkin's theories, see infra notes 161-64 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of Perry's theories, see infra notes 165-68 and 
accompanying text. 
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to "expediency." 161 He justifies this proposition with a quasi-
majoritarian argument: 
[M]any of us, to different degrees in different situations, 
would reject the checkerboard solution not only in gen-
eral and in advance, but even in particular cases if it were 
available as a possibility. We would prefer either of the 
alternative [principled] solutions to the checkerboard 
compromise. 162 
Dworkin's view is vulnerable because it is demonstrably false 
that people prefer coherent moral positions with which they en-
tirely disagree to "checkerboard" solutions with which they par-
tially agree. The original understanding of the fourteenth 
amendment was a checkerboard. 168 Both pro-choice and pro-life 
activists fight vigorously about every case that might marginally 
weaken or strengthen Roe v. Wade. 164 To the extent that Dworkin 
does care what "we" think, assuming that "we" means the citi-
zenry-at-large, an insistent pursuit of moral coherence (beyond 
choices "we" would make if engaged in extraordinary constitu-
tional politics) is wrong. 
Professor Perry argues for judicial development of constitu-
tional principle without regard to majoritarian sentiment. While 
he suggests that the American people are committed to moral de-
velopment as a community, 165 Perry insists that "answers to 
human rights questions are right (or not) independently of what a 
majority of Americans happen to believe, either in the short-term 
or in the long-term." 166 Thus, Perry suggests that ajudge should 
not pursue "majoritarian beliefs as to what the relevant aspiration 
requires," but "should rely on her own beliefs as to what the aspira-
tion requires." 167 
Perry's view is vulnerable because every provision of the 
161. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 178-85. 
162. Id. at 182. 
163. See generally Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 
69 HARV. L. REV. I (1955); Chang, supra note 10, at 828-38. 
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
165. See PERRY I, supra note 7, at 98-102, 111. 
166. Id. at 11 l. 
167. PERRY II, supra note 7, at 149. Perry asks, "why should judicial review 
be majoritarian? For the nonoriginalist no less than for the originalist, judicial 
review is a deliberately countermajoritarian institution." Id.; cf. id. at 4 (constitu-
tional adjudication should be "a species of deliberative, transformative poli-
tics"-"distinct from a politics that is merely manipulative and self-serving"); id. 
at 121 (same); id. at 151-60 (same). 
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Constitution was created by representatives of a majority of the 
eligible electorate; every Supreme Court Justice was approved by 
representatives of a majority of the eligible electorate. Perry bows 
to this electoral perspective to some extent in suggesting that 
Americans are committed to moral development as a commu-
nity .168 But if Perry believes that the views of the American citi-
zenry are significant for justifying his brand of constitutional 
"interpretation," he must rely on Dworkin's vulnerable premise 
that "we" prefer an entirely wrong position of coherent principle 
to a partially right moral checkerboard. If Perry and Dworkin do 
not truly believe that the Court's constitutional decisions should 
(somehow) be rooted in majoritarian choice, then they have 
strayed far from the political foundation of American 
constitutionalism. 
d. Liberal Republicanism 
Cass Sunstein articulates four principles of "liberal republi-
canism": political deliberation, equality of political actors, agree-
ment as the basis for public policy, and participatory 
citizenship. 169 Bruce Ackerman focuses on processes of formal 
constitutional amendment as reflecting an ideal of engaged elec-
toral policymaking.17° Both Sunstein and Ackerman seem to con-
ceive liberal republicanism in terms similar to the notion of 
political self-constraint presented in this article: policymaking 
that is publicly-oriented in an extraordinary way and rooted in the 
electorate-at-large .111 
Liberal republicanism is less a theory of constitutional inter-
pretation than an ideal conception of the processes by which pub-
lic policy should be made. Sunstein does not prescribe guidelines 
168. In his discussion of Roe, Perry seemed to shift to a perspective closer 
to the one I advance here. Criticizing Roe, but advocating a narrower invalida-
tion of the Texas anti-abortion statute, Perry argued that the Court should have 
found a constitutional right to abort a fetus (i) to save the life of the mother, 
(ii) when the pregnancy was caused by rape or incest and the fetus is not yet 
viable and (iii) when the fetus is genetically defective and would live a "short and 
painful" life. Id. at 175. He advocated this view "[b]ecause it is most unlikely 
that abortion legislation failing to provide even for those relatively narrow ex-
ceptions would be enacted or maintained in contemporary American society." 
Id. This is not an approach seeking the judge's personal view of moral aspira-
tion; rather, this is an approach based on a realistic evaluation of the political 
deliberation in which voters today would engage. 
169. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1541. 
170. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at l 053-56. 
171. Cf Michelman I, supra note 42, at 74-77 (conceiving civic republican-
ism in elitist terms of nine Justices as relevant electorate). 
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for vindicating an ideal of liberal republicanism through judicial re-
view .172 Ackerman does so only with the notion of "structural 
amendment," which is less a theory for interpreting old constitu-
tional provisions than a prescription for making and interpreting 
new constitutional prov1S1ons by non-article V political 
processes. 173 
• • • 
Originalism is deficient because it focuses on the wrong elec-
torate and, in so doing, prescribes judicial failure until a new elec-
torate is driven to create its own constitutional text and its own 
original understanding. Conventional morality is deficient be-
cause it focuses on the wrong category of values and, in so doing, 
transforms constitutional courts into common law courts. "Liv-
ing" principle is deficient because it focuses on no electorate at all 
and, in so doing, denies electoral rights and responsibilities for 
making constitutional law. Liberal republicanism is deficient, de:-
spite prescribing an ideal attitude about public policy for today's 
electorate, because it provides little guidance for interpreting ag-
ing constitutional provisions. 
From the voters' perspective, the essential question for judi-
cial enforcement of aging constitutional provisions must concern 
a majority s aspirations-not their everyday preferences, but their 
constitutional aspirations. This is the essence of constitutional rep-
resentation. The task remains to determine how best to ensure 
that judicial review does yield the decisions voters would make if 
engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics. 174 
172. Sunstein does tentatively prescribe various aspirations as consistent 
with values of liberal republicanism. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1578 (in-
creased sensitivity to concerns of federalism); id. at 1579 (more vigorous ration-
ality review); id. at 1580 (more judicial challenges to conventional morality like 
Roe); id. at 1585 (invigorating the voices of disadvantaged groups (blacks, wo-
men, handicapped, gays)). But he provides little guidance on how, when, and to 
what extent courts should promote such values. Courts might still intrude 
wrongly on legislative decisionmaking, thereby undermining the republican 
value of self-determination by the citizenry, or wrongly fail to challenge legisla-
tive thoughtlessness, thus undermining the republican value of deliberation. See 
id. at 1587. 
173. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1053-56 (political activity in 1936 elec-
tions responded to Supreme Court by "structural amendment" of the Constitu-
tion); infra note 265 (evaluating Ackerman's "structural amendment"). 
174. Attaching the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation to 
aging provisions fails to serve the republican valuation of political activity: that 
politics enriches life and ennobles individuals. Cf Sunstein, supra note 54, at 37 
("Jefferson proposed that the Constitution should be amended every genera-
tion, partly to promote general attention to public affairs."). Thus, even if 
judges successfully achieved constitutional representation with aging provisions, 
government will have become a public policy machine without the republicans' 
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B. Why judicial Supremacy? 
This section considers whether a regime of judicial 
supremacy can achieve the "interpretive" ideals of constitutional 
representation toward fulfilling each motive voters might have for 
applying the principles of constitutional supremacy to aging con-
stitutional texts: (i) perpetuating a temporary political advantage, 
(ii) securing the benefits of political self-constraint, or 
(iii) ensuring optimal legislative accountability. 
1. "Interpreting" Aging Constitutional Texts Toward Perpetuating a 
Temporary Political Advantage 
a. Ideals of Constitutional Representation and the Case for 
Judicial Supremacy 
Like a majority among the Northern electorate in 1868, a 
voter might have certain values that she views as more important 
than her opponents' democratic right to shape public policy. 175 
For example, one might care so much about a woman's right to 
choose an abortion, a fetus's right to life, or affirmative action, 
that she wishes to deny others the right to vote their contrary 
preferences. Such a voter might wish for Supreme CourtJustices 
who will "interpret" aging constitutional provisions by represent-
ing her personal preferences while ignoring those of her oppo-
nents. Voters who succeed in finding suchJustices might want to 
give them the powers of judicial supremacy toward achieving na-
tional public policy unattainable in, and untouchable by, 
Congress. 176 
This psychology of trumping Congress describes a prevailing 
attitude about constitutional "interpretation," judicial review, 
and the selection of Supreme Court Justices. For example, Presi-
dent Reagan often argued that the Constitution, properly inter-
preted, not only permits laws restricting access to abortions, but 
also itself prohibits abortion, because a fetus is a "person" for 
purposes of the fourteenth amendment. 177 Diametrically op-
cherished human soul. Cf Michelman I, supra note 42, at 76-77 (republican poli-
tics best reflected within Supreme Court). I will suggest, however, that this defi-
ciency would be mitigated if judicial review were supplemented by congressional 
supremacy. See infra text accompanying notes 241-46, 346. 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 23-35. 
176. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 22, at 1577 ("Vindication of the person's 
own [political] preferences might appear more likely if at least some government 
officials were shielded from pressures generated by the misguided majority."); 
supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
177. President Reagan remarked: "I believe that until and unless someone 
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posed, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has argued 
that the Constitution, properly interpreted, prohibits laws that re-
strict access to abortions. 178 Another example: the Reagan Ad-
ministration argued that the Constitution prohibits affirmative 
action programs that have an "unfair" impact on "innocent" 
whites. 179 Diametrically opposed, the ACLU has argued that the 
Constitution, properly interpreted, not only permits laws using 
racial classifications to compensate for the effects of past racial 
discrimination, but also prohibits policies having an "unfair" dis-
criminatory impact on blacks 180--essentially a position that acer-
tain measure of affirmative action is constitutionally mandated. 181 
Thus both President Reagan and the ACLU would like to es-
tablish national norms governing abortion and affirmative action 
through judicial review and in the name of the Constitution, when 
they lack the political clout to enact their preferred policies in 
Congress. Their attitude is one of constitutional representation 
toward denying their opponents' right to shape public policy-
the same ideal of constitutional representation held by Thaddeus 
Stevens and the Northern electorate when they created the four-
teenth amendment to perpetuate an extraordinary political ad-
vantage over their less enlightened political opponents. 182 
can establish that the unborn child is not a living human being, then that child is 
already protected by the Constitution, which guarantees life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness to all of us." Debate Between the President and Former 
Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Louisville, Kentucky, 2 Pus. PAPERS 1441, 
1451 (Oct. 7, 1984); see also id. at 1021, ll 15. 
178. See w. DONAHUE, THE PoLmcs OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION IOI (1986). 
179. See Shenon, Meese Sees Racism in Hiring Goals, N.Y. Times. Sept. 18, 
1985, at Al6, col. 5 ("The idea that you can use discrimination in the form of 
racially preferential quotas, goals and set-asides to remedy the lingering social 
effects of past discrimination makes no sense in principle; in practice, it is noth-
ing short of a legal, moral, and constitutional tragedy.") (quoting former Attor-
ney General Meese). In Meese's view, affirmative action programs are 
unconstitutional because the Civil War amendments were intended to make the 
Constitution "officially colorblind." Id. Racial "classifications are wrong when 
they are used by Government to bestow advantages on whites and men; they 
have no greater claim of morality when the tables are turned." Id. 
180. See W. DONAHUE, supra note 178, at 81. 
181. See id. (South Carolina chapter argues bar examination unconstitu-
tional because of discriminatory impact on blacks). 
182. Cf Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1175 (Bork nomination "a desperate 
effort by a lame-duck President to impose a constitutional program that had 
otherwise failed to gain the support of Congress"). 
1991] A CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 343 
b. The Improbabilities of Constitutional Representation and 
the Case Against Judicial Supremacy 
From 1861 through 1874, the Northern electorate that cre-
ated the fourteenth amendment also could install Supreme Court 
Justices without meaningful competition from the antebellum 
white Southern electorate.183 Despite this extraordinary political 
advantage, however, Northern voters could not keep the Court 
accountable to their values in the short term, let alone a genera-
tion hence. 184 Thus, previous analysis suggested that it might not 
make sense even for those who do have an extraordinary political 
advantage to seek to perpetuate that advantage by creating 
supreme constitutional provisions.185 
For several reasons, voters today must face even greater diffi-
culty in denying their opponents' right to shape public policy by 
selecting Supreme Court Justices to exercise the powers of judi-
cial supremacy. First, unlike the Northern electorate of 1868, vot-
ers today lack an extraordinary political advantage to exploit. In 
selecting Supreme Court Justices to "interpret" aging constitu-
tional texts, Republicans must compete with Democrats, and the 
John Birch Society must compete with the ACLU, just as they 
must compete in enacting congressional legislation. This is not 
to say that there are no momentary political advantages to be ex-
ploited. It is to suggest, however, that any such advantages reflect 
the cycles of ordinary politics. The advantage that might enable 
conservatives to put Judge Bork on the Court today is the sort of 
advantage that liberals might enjoy four years hence-and with it, 
the power to respond to Robert Bork with Laurence Tribe. Vot-
ers who are part of a contemporary majority-whether the ACLU 
Democrats in the 1960s or Ronald Reagan Republicans in the 
1980s-are, at best, in a position analogous to the Northern elec-
torate after it lost its extraordinary political advantage over the 
white Southern electorate .186 
183. From 1861 through 1868, Southern states were not represented in 
Congress at all. Although the Southern states regained their formal representa-
tion after the fourteenth amendment's ratification in 1868, Congress's efforts to 
reconstruct the Southern electorate greatly weakened the antebellum power 
structure. It was not until the election of 1874 that the Republicans' domination 
began to weaken significantly. See supra note 81. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 69-87. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 79-87. 
186. Richard Friedman attributes to Laurence Tribe the motive of trying to 
fill the Court with like-minded Justices and argues its ineffectiveness. 
Tribe's ... goal is to ensure that ... the Court is composed of Justices 
who think the way he does .... If Tribe is in the minority, as I suspect, 
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Second, because no portion of the electorate today is disen-
franchised, unlike the Southern electorate of 1868, it is unlikely 
that voters could install even one predictable idealogue (like Bork 
or Tribe) on the Court to insulate policies supported by majori-
ties today from future erosion. On the one hand, if a congres-
sional majority with respect to a given issue is permanent and 
unchallengeable, there would be no need for Justices to protect 
relevant statutes from congressional erosion; the motive of per-
petuating a temporary political advantage is inapplicable. On the 
other hand, if a congressional majority is unstable and temporary, 
it might include some people who are inexorably committed to 
the policy, but also must include others who are only tentatively 
committed. Those who are only tentatively committed would be 
reluctant to bind their own discretion to change their minds. 187 
Thus, a significant conclusion: For a majority among the national 
electorate with respect to controversial issues at any given time-
those temporarily in a minority and those temporarily in the ma-
jority who might change their minds-the goal of binding congres-
sional discretion toward perpetuating a temporary political 
advantage and, therefore, judicial supremacy as a means toward 
attaining that goal, make little sense. 188 
Third, even if a voter is part of a political minority who are 
inexorably committed to some policy and who want to exploit a 
temporary alliance with more casual dilettantes, it follows from 
the foregoing that these minority ideologues must find a judicial 
candidate who might perform their "interpretive" ideal of consti-
tutional representation, but whose commitment to that ideal is 
not so obvious as to frighten temporary allies. This would be a 
then over the long run his standard would tend to work against the 
implementation of his views more often than in favor of them .... 
Friedman, supra note 64, at 1290. Lino Graglia sees a similar futility for conserv-
atives in trying to perpetuate a temporary political advantage through selecting 
Justices. See Graglia,judicial Activism: Even on the Right, It's Wrong, THE Pus. IN-
TEREST, Spring 1989, at 57. For a discussion of Graglia's view, see infra note 
190. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22. This proposition does not 
apply to the motive of political self-constraint for limiting congressional discre-
tion. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43, 88-105, 123-29; infra text accom-
panying notes 193-99; see also Chang, supra note 10, at 774-82. 
188. See Seidman, supra note 22, at 1577 (trumping legislature against ma-
jority's preferences "has no force at all with the majority that disagrees"). The 
Bork nomination provides an example. Friends and foes viewed Robert Bork as 
a judicial candidate with hard ideological contours. His prospective service on 
the Court easily provoked intense passions. Anthony Kennedy's friends were 
fewer and his foes were far less moved because he was so much more of an 
enigma than Bork. Bork failed; Kennedy sits on the Court. 
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risky enterprise, because such potentialJustices might be not only 
less committed in appearance to the policy at issue, but also less 
committed in fact.189 
Fourth, even if a minority of the national electorate who are 
inexorably committed to some policy (i) could hand-pick some 
Justices and (ii) could predict how those Justices will vote, it is still 
not clear that these voters will be served by constitutionalizing 
their preferences and removing issues from congressional pur-
view. Over the long run, their opponents, members of a minority 
who are inexorably dedicated to other policies, might respond by 
selecting Justices toward perpetuating their own cyclical political 
advantages. By matching short-term "succe~ses," minority ideo-
logues might do no better than simply trade issues, resolved in 
the name of constitutional supremacy by a Supreme Court exer-
cising the power of judicial supremacy. 190 Thus, even for a com-
mitted ideologue, endeavoring to perpetuate this sort of ordinary 
political advantage makes sense only if he cares more about the 
issues that his own Justices manage to constitutionalize than 
about the issues that his opponents' Justices will manage to 
constitutionalize.191 
189. See Freund, Appointment of justices: Some Historical Perspectives, IO 1 HARV. 
L. REV. 1146, 1156 (1988) (hazards in judicial selection as route to make public 
policy include unforeseen issues, changes in nominee's views); Friedman, supra 
note 64, at 1291-302 Uustice's performance over time difficult to predict). Presi-
dent Bush's nomination of the unknown, and largely unknowable, David Souter 
reflected this strategy, to the dismay of those who wish to preserve Roe v. Wade. 
See, e.g., Sullivan, Bush '.s Supreme Court Red Herring, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1990, § 4, 
at 19, col. 1 ("There was a 'litmus test' ... on abortion: the President looked for 
the candidate that would turn the litmus paper no visible color at all."); see also 
Lauter & Ostrow, And Then There Were 2 and Finally I-Souter, L.A. Times, July 25, 
1990, at Al, col. 3 (Souter's intellect was persuasive factor in President's selec-
tion of Souter over Judge Edith Jones, "[b]ut even more important was his lack 
of a 'paper trail' on controversial issues."). 
190. Lino Graglia argues that while "the Left" has been able to enact its 
policies through judicial activism, "the Right can have no similar expectation," 
because of the purportedly liberal orientation of academia and the media. See 
Graglia, supra note 186, at 73-74. Nevertheless, the Court's decisions limiting 
local discretion to pursue affirmative action programs can well be characterized 
as effective judicial activism from "the Right." See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (restricting local discretion to set aside per-
centage of public contracts for minority business enterprises); Wygant v.Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (restricting local discretion to pursue affirma-
tive action goals in lay-off provision of collective bargaining agreement); see also 
Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: judicial Conser-
vatism or Conservative justices'!, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 810-21 (1991). 
19,l. The analysis must be refined a bit if one focuses on Ackerman's peri-
ods of "transformative appointments." See Ackerman, supra note 6. Suppose, 
for example, that one political party has an opportunity to appoint a controlling 
majority of the Supreme Court-such as the Roosevelt Democrats and the Rea-
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This analysis suggests that from the perspective of ordinary 
voters, selecting Supreme Court Justices to "interpret" aging 
constitutional texts toward perpetuating an ordinary political ad-
vantage makes little sense. For a majority at any given time-
those opposed to the policies that committed ideologues wish to 
mandate as constitutional law plus those temporarily in favor of 
such policies who might change their minds-the motive is self-
defeating. For minorities of committed ideologues temporarily 
empowered by an alliance with wavering moderates, the goal 
makes good sense, but effective means are largely unattainable. 
2. "Interpreting" Aging Constitutional Texts Toward Securing the 
Benefits of Political Self-Constraint 
While no one today has enough power to create constitu-
tional provisions toward perpetuating an extraordinary political 
advantage, the electorate can engage in extraordinarily thought-
ful politics toward securing the benefits of political self-con-
straint. Voters have not done so, however, because of laziness 
and inertia. Thus, the electorate relies on aging constitutional 
texts as a second-best source of evidence from which Justices 
might identify the choices voters would make if engaged in ex-
traordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics today. 192 
Previous analysis concluded that if voters actually did create 
their own provisions for political self-constraint, they could serve 
the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation better 
with congressional supremacy than with judicial supremacy. 193 
Given the possibility of judicial misbehavior in rejecting the ideal 
of constitutional representation, or error even while endeavoring 
to serve that ideal, the electorate needs some mechanism for 
gan-Bush Republicans. In selecting Justices to perpetuate a temporary political 
advantage, one faction would not trade issues and Justices piecemeal with its 
primary opponents. Rather, the factions might be viewed as trading wholesale 
control of different eras. Thus, the Roosevelt Court persisted beyond 
Roosevelt; the Reagan Court outlasts Reagan. While Roosevelt and Reagan 
themselves might support judicial supremacy toward controlling the future, the 
significant question concerns whether future voters-voters among the national 
electorate today-wish their discretion constrained by the ideology of the preced-
ing era. It is implausible for a majority to be ancestor worshippers as a justifica-
tion for governance by aging constitutional provisions. See supra text 
accompanying notes 139-43. It would be equally implausible-at least for a ma-
jority of the electorate at any given time-for people to be Roosevelt or Reagan 
worshippers as a basis for giving Roosevelt or Reagan Justices the powers of 
judicial supremacy. See supra note 139, text accompanying notes 117-22. 
192. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48. 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05. 
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keeping judges accountable. 194 By supposing that voters would 
retain meaningful memories of their extraordinary constitutional 
politics-that a voter remains latently sensitive to her own con-
cerns for political self-constraint-one could conclude that the 
electorate would not choose through Congress to overturn a judi-
cial "interpretation" that rings true as a better judgment made in 
formal constitutional politics. Furthermore, with congressional 
supremacy, voters could overturn a judicial "interpretation" that 
deviated from their "interpretive" ideal of constitutional 
representation. 195 
This justification for congressional supremacy does not apply 
to members of the national electorate today. Voters today have 
no memories of choices for political self-constraint to recapture. 
They have not engaged in formal constitutional politics about the 
broad range of issues the Supreme Court faces. They have 
neither seriously considered whether and why political self-con-
straint might be a good idea, nor identified specific values that 
should be specially protected. Thus, without memories of choices 
for political self-constraint to recapture, voters today seem to 
have far less reason to trust themselves to keep judges accounta-
ble to the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation 
than they would if they actually had engaged in their own extraor-
dinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. 196 
At the same time, however, aging constitutional texts provide 
less effective evidence for justices to fulfill an "interpretive" ideal 
of constitutional representation today than they provided for the 
justices chosen by the voters who actually created those provi-
194. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05. 
196. Indeed, one can question the competence of Presidents and Senators 
to evaluate judicial candidates and judicial philosophies. Yet as Professor Carter 
has suggested, "This is no knock on Senators; it is, if anything, a knock on the 
notion that something as obscure and subtle as 'judicial philosophy' is a sensible 
measuring stick for use in the essentially political process of selecting judges." 
Carter, supra note 116, at 1195. This point is also implicit in Professor Schauer's 
view that for such divergent "interpretive" approaches as positivism, realism, 
and Dworkinism, there is no determinate result for controversial legal questions. 
"Instead," he notes, "the decision is likely to require, under any of a number of 
now popular theories of adjudication, recourse to the political, economic, social, 
cultural, and moral norms of the milieu in which the judge operates." Schauer, 
supra note 22, at 1731; cf. PERRY I, supra note 7, at 100 ("Executive and especially 
legislative officials tend to deal with fundamental political-moral problems, at 
least highly controversial ones, by reflexive reference to the established moral 
conventions of the greater part of their particular constituencies.") (emphasis in 
original); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (l 982) (in-
terpretation determined by expectations of "interpretive community"). 
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sions. Indeed, it is hardly clear why, and how, aging provisions 
provide any basis for a judge to identify choices the electorate 
today would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful poli-
tics.197 Beyond this, with each passing year, disputes about 
proper methods of constitutional interpretation, and proper an-
swers to specific constitutional issues, further undermine any 
common understanding of what judicial review is, or should be. 
Thus, a dilemma: Voters today have less reason than do peo-
ple who create constitutional texts to trust both themselves and 
their judges to vindicate the electorate's concerns for political 
197. I have elsewhere posited that a past electorate's constitutional choices 
can reflect the present electorate's constitutional values. See Chang, supra note 
IO, at 792. While a premise of "constitutional continuity" is necessary for fulfil-
ling ideals of constitutional representation by reference to aging constitutional 
provisions, it is problematic as an "interpretive" device for several reasons. 
First, it assumes that judges today can determine which constitutional provisions 
were enacted with a motive for political self-constraint, which to perpetuate an 
extraordinary political advantage, which to ensure optimal legislative accounta-
bility, and which as a result of some combination of the three. A mistake could 
have far-reaching consequences. See id. at 830-70 (examining implications of 
viewing fourteenth amendment as originally intended to secure benefits of polit-
ical self-constraint); id. at 832 n.266 (implications of viewing fourteenth amend-
ment as originally intended to perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage). 
Second, even if one assumes that the tenth amendment's concern for federalism, 
for example, was framed toward securing the benefits of political self-constraint, 
but see infra note 262, one can recite a litany of changes from 1787 or 1868 to 
1991-changes in attitudes, composition of the electorate, the nature of the 
economy, technology, America's global role, among many others. One must 
wonder whether these changes, given a premise of constitutional continuity, are 
merely superficial or instead are deeply meaningful for fulfilling the "interpre-
tive" ideal of constitutional representation. If meaningful, how and why? See 
Chang, supra note IO, at 794-807 (unsatisfactory attempt to address these ques-
tions and to generate specific "interpretive" answers from a premise of constitu-
tional continuity toward an ideal of constitutional representation). Third, 
although the framers and ratifiers of aging constitutional provisions never fo-
cused on abortion and, therefore, never made extraordinarily thoughtful policy 
about abortion, it hardly follows that voters today, if engaged in extraordinarily 
thoughtful constitutional politics, would not make choices for political self-con-
straint about abortion. One can be extraordinarily thoughtful about any issue, 
and if extraordinarily thoughtful, one's choices might be different from those 
made carelessly in everyday politics. Whether the electorate's extraordinary 
thoughtfulness about abortion would yield a pro-choice policy, a pro-life policy, 
or a pro-federalism policy, however, seems an unanswerable question. See infra 
text accompanying notes 293-303. Fourth, the foregoing has assumed that a 
judge would choose to adopt the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional represen-
tation, and generated from the probabilities of good faith error a need for some 
mechanism to keep judges accountable to that ideal. Yet judges might fail to 
serve electoral concerns not only by error, but also by design. See supra text 
accompanying notes 73-76 & 96-98. It hardly needs stating that there is intense 
disagreement about what approaches for constitutional interpretation are best-
originalism, conventional morality, "living" principle, liberal republicanism, 
something in between or beyond. Even within each approach, there are dis-
agreements about specific results in specific controversies. 
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self-constraint. Toward mitigating this dilemma, one might con-
sider other options by which these constitutional concerns might 
be served. For example, voters could overcome laziness and iner-
tia to create a new Constitution. In doing so, the electorate could 
develop an essential self-awareness they now lack. Voters (and 
their representatives) would have memories of their own better 
politics, and thereby could replace judicial supremacy with con-
gressional supremacy as a mechanism to ensure that their own 
concerns for political self-constraint are effectively vindicated. 
Yet this option requires a level of political activity that, appar-
ently, most voters would rather avoid. 198 
A second option would take aging texts as they are and deter-
mine whether judicial supremacy or congressional supremacy is 
the less imperfect "interpretive" regime to serve concerns for 
political self-constraint. I will argue that enforcing aging consti-
tutional provisions through judicial review supplemented by con-
gressional supremacy is the better option. 199 
Before this, however, we must finish considering whether ju-
dicial supremacy can serve a voter's reasons for exploiting consti-
tutional supremacy-for deviating from statutory supremacy-by 
relying on aging constitutional texts. Thus, we turn to the third 
motive for exploiting constitutional supremacy: ensuring optimal 
legislative accountability. 
3. "Interpreting" Aging Constitutional Texts Toward Ensuring 
Optimal Legislative Accountability 
a. Bright Lines and Predictable "Interpretations": Judicial 
Supremacy as Irrelevant 
Previous analysis of issues facing people who create their 
own constitutional provisions to ensure optimal legislative ac-
countability200 suggested that bright-line texts could be essen-
198. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45. In the controversy over 
burning the flag, some have argued that one should not tamper with the Consti-
tution. Cf infra text accompanying notes 320-21. If accepted by a majority, this 
argument reflects fear that present political activity might not be undertaken 
with sufficient care. Thus, recognition of one's own unwillingness to make suffi-
ciently thoughtful political decisions, combined with concerns for political self-
constraint, can explain the aging Constitution. 
199. See infra text accompanying notes 215-337. 
200. A voter's concern for optimal legislative accountability encompasses 
how much influence over public policy he (and his opponents) will have, as well as 
what kind of influence over public policy he (and his opponents) will have. The first 
criterion reflects a concern for conflict and political competition; the second cri-
terion reflects a concern for political self-constraint. See supra text accompanying 
notes 44-55. 
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tially self-enforcing.201 For voters today, those same bright-line 
provisions, though now aging, are similarly self-enforcing. "Six 
years" is probably as definite a statement today as in 1787. Judi-
cial behavior in "interpreting" those provisions, and congres-
sional behavior in complying with them, is also predictable. 
Thus, not only would Bork and Tribe likely treat the "six years" 
provision the same way on the Court; so too do Jesse Helms and 
Edward Kennedy in Congress. To the extent that Justices and 
members of Congress are fungible for issues governed by bright-
line provisions, judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy 
are fungible. 202 
b. Fuzzy Lines, Core Values, and Predictable 
"Interpretations": Judicial Supremacy as Unnecessary 
Given consensus about the first amendment's core political 
concerns, 203 one can confidently predict at least some "interpre-
tations" that judges would make to ensure legislative accountabil-
ity. For example, no matter who sits as a Supreme CourtJustice, 
the first amendment will be "interpreted" as prohibiting the gov-
201. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16. 
202. This is not to say that the predictable judicial behavior necessarily will 
serve an "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation. It is not necessar-
ily true that voters today would choose a six-year term for Senators if they were 
creating constitutional provisions to ensure optimal legislative accountability, 
nor that voters would choose a bicameral legislature, a Senate representing 
states equally, or, indeed, an amendment process with a strong states' rights 
bias. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 42, at 1071. Thus, the only realistic way in which 
voters today can improve the extent to which the system vindicates the bright-
line choices they would make if engaged in constitutional politics is actually to 
overcome laziness and inertia, engage in constitutional politics, and create their 
own bright-line provisions. Yet voters also must decide that doing so is worth 
the effort. Cf supra notes 144- 48 and accompanying text (laziness and inertia 
explain aging Constitution). 
203. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (first amendment might be viewed as 
"primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy"); 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (speech protected "to the 
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people") (quoting 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1932)); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (speech protected "to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple"); L. BOLLINGER, supra note 123, at 43-50 (core speech values concern demo-
cratic self-government); P. DIMOND, supra note 20, at 81 (first amendment 
protects political expression "essential for self-government in a representative 
democracy"); T. EMERSON, supra note 126, at 7 (free speech promotes consent of 
governed); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE 16-17 ( 1960) (free speech necessary for popular control of gov-
ernment); Bork, supra note 50, at 20 (Constitution should be deemed concerned 
only with explicitly political speech). 
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erning party from silencing the opposition party, because this is a 
relatively uncontested implication of a presumed concern for en-
suring legislative accountability. 204 
To the extent that there are uncontested implications of core 
values underlying vaguely drawn provisions originally intended to 
ensure optimal legislative accountability, judges will behave as if 
they were "interpreting" a bright-line provision. Indeed, to the 
extent that uncontestable "interpretations" reflect a present con-
sensus, only the most extraordinary of circumstances could in-
duce Congress to violate them in the first instance,205 let alone 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22. There are so many Demo-
crats, so many Republicans, and, perhaps more significantly, so many "in-
dependents" who are sometime-Democrats and sometime-Republicans that, at 
any given time, a majority among the electorate would want to protect the oppo-
sition party's right to criticize the governing party. The opposition party, of 
course, would want to protect its right to criticize the governing party, and the 
"independent" sometime-governing party would want to protect the opposition 
party's right to criticize the governing party, because these "independents" 
know that they might want to change their minds and join the opposition party 
in the future. Cf PERRY I, supra note 7, at 79 (though denying existence of con-
sensus for issues that occupy judicial attention, recognizing that "if there were 
anything approaching a consensus as to ... speech ... rights ... , the judiciary 
would likely have a severely diminished role in defining ... such rights, because 
the consensus ... would presumably be reflected in ... legislative and executive 
action."). Perry does not, however, deny the existence ofa consensus about the 
sort of issue addressed here. As he has observed: 
[I]t is fanciful to suppose that incumbents would often protect their 
incumbency by conspiring to deny to the electorate access to that basic 
store of information and ideas essential to the evaluation of the main 
features of public policy and performance. It is difficult to imagine 
such a conspiracy in contemporary American political culture--and 
among incumbents who have, after all, mutually antagonistic interests. 
Id. at 81 (footnote omitted); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l, 14 (1976) 
("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are 
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Consti-
tution."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically 
universal agreement that a major purpose of ... [the First] Amendment was to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs ... includ[ing] discussions of 
candidates . . . . "). 
205. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts). Although an advocate of congressional supremacy for many issues of 
constitutional interpretation, Professor Dimond would retain judicial supremacy 
for "representation-reinforcing values." See P. DIMOND, supra note 20, at 79-88. 
Dimond views accountable representation not only as unambiguously valuable, 
but also as a value limiting only "the process of national lawmaking" rather than 
"the substantive policies that Congress determines to enact into law." Id. at 87. 
Dimond illustrates a case for judicial supremacy with a hypothetical situation in 
which Congress prohibits disruptive demonstrations against presidential 
speeches and authorizes the states to legislate similarly with respect to guberna-
torial speeches. A case arises when the acts are applied to abortion protestors. 
Id. at 97-100. Dimond's analysis is flawed because, as suggested in the text, 
some issues of representation-reinforcement have relatively uncontroversial an-
swers while others are complex and deeply contestable. For the former issues, 
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choose to overturn a judicial determination that this congres-
sional effort was unconstitutional. Although Jesse Helms might 
try to silence Robert Mapplethorpe, not even he could think of 
silencing Edward Kennedy. Joseph McCarthy's excesses were 
roundly repudiated, and even he claimed to be concerned only 
about enemies of consensus ideology. To the extent that there is 
a consensus about core values, therefore, judicial supremacy and 
congressional supremacy are, again, fungible.206 
c. Fuzzy Lines, Ambiguous Values, and Unpredictable 
"Interpretations": Judicial Supremacy as Undesirable 
Some issues of optimal legislative accountability go beyond 
the uncontested meaning of bright-line provisions and the con-
sensus implications of core values. Rulemaking by administrative 
agencies, for example, neither clearly falls within the category of 
"legislative powers" vested in the Congress by article I, nor 
clearly violates consensus implications of core values underlying 
the legislative process.2°7 Similarly, because it lacks both bright-
line boundaries and underlying values with sufficiently expansive 
implications, the first amendment's category of "speech" gener-
ates controversy among voters and judges about whether its pro-
tections extend to pornography, Klan propaganda, or flag 
judicial supremacy is unnecessary; for the latter, it is undesirable. Dimond's 
anti-protest hypothetical is designed to evoke a sense of horror at the possibility 
that such a law could be re-enacted under congressional supremacy. Yet pre-
cisely because it can evoke such a sense of horror, the scenario is just as implau-
sible as re-enactment of the Alien and Sedition laws. As applied to Klansmen 
rather than abortion protesters, however, the hypothetical is more plausible, but 
the "right" representation-reinforcing answer is far less dear. Thus, as the ne-
cessity of judicial choice in the absence of dear interpretive answers undermines 
judicial supremacy in other contexts, as Dimond acknowledges, so it does for 
contestable issues traditionally classified within the first amendment's rubric. Cf 
id. at 18-20, 153-56. 
206. As with predictable "interpretations" of the "six years" provision, pre-
dictable "interpretations" of the aging first amendment's protection of speech 
must still be examined to determine whether, in fact, they will serve the electo-
rate's ideal of constitutional representation. See supra note 202. The basis for 
· uncontestable "interpretations" of the first amendment's protection of speech is 
a postulated consensus about implications of a broadly based concern for ensuring 
optimal legislative accountability. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text. 
Here, unlike for a bright-line provision, there is a political foundation for judi-
cial decisionmaking to better ensure that the goal of constitutional representa-
tion is fulfilled. 
207. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983); Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-27 (1944); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); infra text accompanying notes 220-49. 
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burning.208 Laws apparently intended to limit the influence of 
pressure groups,209 corporations,210 and the wealthy211 are also 
ambiguously related to an ideal of optimal accountability. Previ-
ous analysis has suggested that such subtle questions concerning 
optimal legislative accountability reflect concerns for political 
self-constraint through, and with respect to, the legislative 
structure. 212 
• • • 
We are led back to the dilemma and the question with which 
the previous section ended. The dilemma: Given the inevitability 
of judicial error, concerns for political self-constraint are best vin-
dicated by people who have created constitutional provisions of 
their own and retained the powers of congressional supremacy. 
By relying on aging provisions, however, voters today have both 
less reason to trust a Justice's "interpretive" decisions, and less 
reason to trust the electorate's own political judgment, than 
would voters who have engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful 
constitutional politics. The question: As a second-best alterna-
tive to creating new constitutional provisions to secure the bene-
fits of political self-constraint, would it be better to retain judicial 
supremacy in "interpreting" aging constitutional texts, or would 
judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy better 
enable voters today to approach the ideal of identifying the 
choices they would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful 
constitutional politics?213 
208. Consensus rationales for ensuring optimal accountability do not apply 
well to extremist speech. See supra text accompanying notes 123-29. 
209. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political 
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (invalidating federal law limiting expendi-
tures of political action committees in federal campaigns). 
210. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 
(1990) (upholding state statute prohibiting corporations from using treasury 
funds for independent political expenditures); First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating state law prohibiting corporate expendi-
tures to influence referenda). 
211. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating federal law 
restricting political expenditures by individuals, groups and candidates). 
212. By self-constraint through the legislative structure, I mean to suggest 
Madisonian arguments for longer rather than shorter legislative terms and for a 
bicameral rather than unicameral legislative structure. See supra notes 51-55 and 
accompanying text. By self-constraint with respect to the legislative structure, I 
mean to suggest a rationale for framing the legislative structure as a constitu-
tional mandate-in case the measure of self-constraint provided through the leg-
islative structure is not enough to deter voters from choosing thoughtlessly to 
change the legislative structure. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
213. Professor Seidman has argued that a judicial task of maintaining de-
mocracy cannot justify unaccountable judges. "[A]n independent judiciary in-
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C. Why Congressional Supremacy? 
[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions 
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by 
decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are 
made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal 
actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rul-
ers, having to that extent practically resigned their Gov-
ernment into the hands of that eminent tribunal.214 
1. The Essential Qp,estion: Would judicial Supremacy or Congressional 
Supremacy Better Serve Goals of Political Self-Constraint? 
Based on the foregoing analysis, one can simplify matters by 
reducing from three to one the relevant motives for exploiting the 
principles of constitutional supremacy. The motive of denying 
political opponents the right to shape public policy in Congress 
by perpetuating a temporary political advantage can be put aside 
as senseless for a majority among the national electorate,215 and 
as a dangerous gamble for a minority of ideologues.216 Further-
more, in choosing between judicial supremacy and congressional 
supremacy, voters can view concerns for optimal legislative ac-
countability essentially as concerns for political self-constraint. 
The meaning of bright-line provisions and the implications of 
core values are likely to be largely uncontested-viewed similarly 
whether by Robert Bork, Laurence Tribe, Jesse Helms, or Edward 
Kennedy. When meaning is contestable and, therefore, the iden-
tity of the decisionmaker affects the content of decisions, the un-
derlying concern is likely to be for optimal legislative 
accountability-that is, for political self-constraint with respect to 
the legislative process. 211 
Thus, the following analysis will consider the relative merits 
of judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy against a 
tent on pursuing 'representation reenforcement' could not avoid choosing a 
theory of democracy that was itself controversial. But without some democratic 
check, we would have no assurance that the judiciary's theory of majoritarianism 
was itself supported by a majority." Seidman, supra note 22, at 1586; cf. supra 
note 205 (discussing Professor Dimond's view). 
214. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1861, reprinted in G. 
GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 24. 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 183-88. 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 189-91. This is not to say that no 
one would choose to take this gamble. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying 
text. 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58, 123-29. 
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benchmark of constitutional representation for concerns of political self 
constraint-from the perspective of voters who choose not to cre-
ate their own constitutional provisions, but instead to rely on ag-
ing texts created by others long since dead. Would judicial 
review supplemented by congressional supremacy identify 
choices the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily 
thoughtful constitutional politics better than judicial review insu-
lated by judicial supremacy? After addressing this question 
through a series of case studies, I will consider the relative merits 
of judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy against a 
benchmark of other theories for constitutional interpretation-
originalism, conventional morality, "living" principle, and liberal 
republicanism. Would judicial supremacy or congressional 
supremacy better ensure that each of these "interpretive" ideals 
is fulfilled? 
2. The Benchmark: Constitutional Representation and Case Studies 
Constitutional politics toward securing the benefits of polit-
ical self-constraint differs from ordinary politics in three signifi-
cant ways: first, extraordinary vigilance-the electorate is focused on 
issues that otherwise might be ignored; second, extraordinary 
thoughtfulness-the electorate considers issues more broadly, 
deeply, and systemically than the manner in which they address 
issues in everyday politics; and third, extraordinary electoral roots-
more of the electorate is more involved in making public policy 
than in everyday politics.218 Voters make choices for political 
self-constraint because they expect that the decisions they reach 
in extraordinarily vigilant, thoughtful, and electorally rooted poli-
tics will be better than the decisions they reach in everyday 
politics. 
When the Court reviews policies made by Congress or its 
proxies, the national electorate's representatives have been suffi-
ciently vigilant to notice an issue and respond with policy. When 
the Court reviews policies made by states and localities, the na-
tional electorate's representatives have made no relevant policy. 
Congress might have chosen not to make policy in the relevant 
context. More likely, however, Congress simply has not been suf-
ficiently vigilant about relevant issues to determine whether na-
tional policy should govern and, if so, what that policy should be. 
Whether examining a national law, or a state law that governs 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43, 107-08. 
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in a vacuum of national choice, the Court might strike down poli-
cies as "unconstitutional"-which, from the perspective of consti-
tutional representation, means that the policy is not that which 
the electorate would choose if engaged in extraordinarily 
thoughtful constitutional politics---or the Court might defer to 
the primary decisionmaker. These two potential outcomes sug-
gest that judicial review might deviate from constitutional repre-
sentation for concerns of political self-constraint in two ways: 
(i) an erroneous invalidation of a policy that voters would decide to 
leave intact, if they engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful consti-
tutional politics, and (ii) an erroneous refusal to invalidate a policy 
that voters would decide to supersede, if they engaged in extraor-
dinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. I next consider 
whether judicial review under congressional supremacy or judi-
cial supremacy can better avoid, and compensate for, the pos-
sibilities for each type of "interpretive" error in the context of 
specific constitutional cases. 
a. A Preliminary Note: Congressional Supremacy Does Not 
Preclude Congressional Deference to the Court 
Despite judicial supremacy, the Court generally defers to 
Congress and state legislatures in determining the constitutional-
ity of challenged policies.219 Similarly, congressional supremacy 
need not mean that members of Congress should, or will, feel 
free to enact statutes modifying or overturning the Court's consti-
tutional decisions. Indeed, the same notions that underlie pres-
ent conceptions of judicial supremacy-for example, the Court's 
special capacity to make constitutional decisions--can induce 
congressional caution in responding with legislation. Although I 
argue that prevailing ideas about such a special judicial capacity 
are overdrawn, I also will suggest that under congressional 
supremacy, judicial decisionmaking would play an essential role 
in constitutional representation warranting a good measure of 
deference from Congress. Thus, as judicial deference to legisla-
tures under judicial supremacy reflects concerns about errone-
ously overturning a valid majoritarian choice, congressional 
deference to the Court under congressional supremacy would re-
flect concerns about erroneously violating values the electorate 
would respect if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitu-
tional politics. 
219. I will later suggest that the Court follows this course because of judicial 
supremacy. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53. 
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b. Evaluating the Constitutionality of National Policies 
1. Addressing the Possibility of an Erroneous Invalidation 
Responding to a perceived need for more pervasive and intri-
cate national standards and following an ideology of government 
by experts, 22° Congress began to delegate rulemaking authority 
to executive agencies during the first quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury. 221 Although many believed that executive rulemaking un-
dermined the constitutionally designed separation of powers,222 
the New Deal Court eventually settled on a posture of deference 
to these congressional choices.223 Nevertheless, even today, 
"[t]he wisdom and constitutionality of these broad delegations 
are matters that still have not been put to rest. " 224 Indeed, Con-
gress itself was apparently uncomfortable with executive rulemak-
ing, for it devised the "legislative veto," which empowers one or 
both Houses to veto a specific rule promulgated by the executive 
branch under broadly delegated rulemaking authority. 
In INS v. Chadha,225 a divided Supreme Court determined 
that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional. Chief Justice Burger's 
majority opinion found that the Constitution specifies certain 
procedures for enacting measures having a "legislative character 
220. See, e.g.' G. McCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
43-48 (1966) (early twentieth century Progressive movement laid foundation for 
delegation with its "confidence in impersonal expertise" and "scientific" regula-
tion by administrative commissions). 
221. See, e.g.' T. Low1, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
CRISIS OF PuBLIC AUTHORITY 93-97 ( 1969) (sketching development of adminis-
trative rulemaking). 
222. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 
(1935) (invalidating authority delegated to administrative agencies to prescribe 
and enforce codes governing industry). 
223. See infra text accompanying notes 255-60. 
224. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983) (White,]., dissenting); see also 
Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 
AM. U.L. REv. 295, 299-309 (1987) (arguing that delegation of legislative power 
to executive "deranges" constitutional design of limited government); Schoen-
brod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1223, 1249-74 (1985) [hereinafter Schoenbrod I] (developing test for improper 
delegation); Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be: The Constitu-
tional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 355, 387-89 (1987) 
[hereinafter Schoenbrod II] (arguing that delegation doctrine serves constitu-
tional policies); cf. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 325-
29 (l 987) (courts cannot effectively limit delegation of legislative power); Stew-
art, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1693-
97 (1975) (same). 
225. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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and effect,"226 and that the legislative veto is not among them.227 
The Chief justice adopted an originalist approach, basing his con-
clusion on the framers' reasons for requiring the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate and the President to participate in 
enacting legislation. 22s 
Justice White's dissent reflected far more an attitude of con-
stitutional representation than did the majority opinion.229 He 
focused on changes in national lawmaking since the time of the 
framers' decisions-for example, the pervasive delegation of 
rulemaking authority to the executive. While Justice White con-
sequently was more sanguine than the Chief Justice about the 
constitutionality of such legislative vetoes,230 he was also more 
unsure that any "interpretive" answer could be deemed correct: 
If the legislative veto were as plainly unconstitu-
tional as the Court strives to suggest, its broad ruling 
today would be more comprehensible. But, the constitu-
tionality of the legislative veto is anything but clear-cut. 
The issue divides scholars, courts, Attorneys General, 
and two other branches of the National Government. 
... That disagreement stems from the silence of the 
Constitution on the precise question.231 
Thus, he counseled deference to Congress's choices in the face of 
such "interpretive" doubt. 232 
226. Id. at 952 (quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)). 
227. Id. at 958-59. The veto device challenged in Chadha empowered one 
House of Congress to overturn a prior executive determination that individual 
aliens, otherwise deportable under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 
qualified under statutory criteria for a "suspension" of deportation proceedings 
and continued residence in the United States. Id. at 925. 
228. Id. at 944-51. Mark Tushnet sees Burger's opinion as reflecting a 
"plain meaning" approach. See Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1689-90. I quarrel 
with this characterization of the opinion, as the Chief Justice resorted not just to 
"plain meaning," but to the framers' policies underlying the text they employed. 
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-51. 
229. Justice White's analysis was, in fact, inapplicable to Chadha because 
§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act was not a broad and 
vague delegation of rulemaking authority to the executive, but a provision con-
taining relatively narrow and clear criteria for the executive to apply. See Chadha, 
462 U.S. at 967 (Powell, J., concurring). 
230. Justice White observed: "If Congress may delegate lawmaking power 
to independent and Executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand 
Art[icle] I as prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on legislative 
power for itself." Id. at 986 (White, J., dissenting). 
231. Id. at 976-77 (White, J., dissenting). 
232. See id. at 974 (White, J., dissenting) ("The Court has frequently called 
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No one who frames the "interpretive" issue in terms of con-
stitutional representation could be confident of reaching a "cor-
rect'' decision, precisely because the electorate has not engaged 
in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics to determine 
the desirability of either the veto mechanism or the underlying 
broad delegations of rulemaking authority to the executive. Ex-
trapolating from the decisions made by the framers to determine 
the constitutional decisions voters today would make is an exer-
cise in indeterminate speculation.233 
Yet from the perspective of voters today, Chief Justice Bur-
ger's originalism is even more problematic. Asking whether legis-
lative vetoes fit the framers' choices ignores that the original 
constitutional design has been substantially changed, if not dis-
torted, by precisely those broad delegations of rulemaking au-
thority to which many legislative vetoes were responses. Indeed, 
in general, the originalist would have constitutional meaning re-
main static, despite otherwise significant social changes.234 From 
the perspective of constitutional representation, therefore, 
originalism must posit not only that voters today would adopt the 
same constitutional rules as did those who actually created those 
provisions in quite different circumstances, but also that in choos-
ing such rules under different circumstances, voters would make 
quite different constitutional decisions-different value judg-
ments-than did the framers. Thus, rather than a premise of con-
stitutional continuity, originalism reqmres a premise of 
discontinuity. 235 
Despite these specific problems with Chief Justice Burger's 
originalism, and despite the general problem of "interpretive" in-
determinacy, 236 judicial supremacy requires that Chief Justice 
attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the 
validity of an act of Congress ... .'" (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis,]., concurring)); id. at 984 (White,J., 
dissenting) (Congress may rely on its experience and reason "to accommodate 
its legislation to circumstances") (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat) 316, 415-16 (1819)). 
233. Justice Brennan has acknowledged as much. In a speech at Ge-
orgetown University, he said: "It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage 
point we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of princi-
ple to specific, contemporary questions.'' Johnson, Restoring Balance to the Seal.es 
of justice, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1985, at A3, col. 3. 
234. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. 
235. See Chang, supra note 10, at 857-61. 
236. Professor Schauer has suggested that for most, if not all, controversial 
issues that survive from filing a complaint to pressing an appeal, "both sides can 
make more or less equivalent legally plausible arguments from the positive law.'' 
See Schauer, supra note 22, at 1726-27. Professor Dimond also has constructed 
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Burger's Chadha opinion circumscribes national policy regarding 
legislative vetoes. Despite its vulnerability as "interpretation" 
and its controversial status as policy, it is law governing Con-
gress. 237 The issue must be largely closed. 23s 
If judicial review were supplemented by congressional 
supremacy, however, judicial invalidation of legislative vetoes es-
sentially would issue a challenge to Congress: Accept the ruling 
and abandon legislative vetoes, or reverse the Court's "interpre-
tation." Congress might pass legislation responding to the 
Court's decision by amending or reversing the Court's declara-
tion of governing constitutional principles.239 Such a statute 
would supersede the Court's opinion as the "precedent" upon 
his argument for "provisional judicial review" (congressional supremacy) in 
large part on the premise that "people ... [should] be skeptical of claims that the 
Constitution provides a single, simple answer for every question." P. DIMOND, 
supra note 20, at 20 (emphasis in original). 
237. Professor Conkle implies that because it is an originalist decision, 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion should be protected with judicial finality. See 
Conlde, supra note 22, at 14-15. At the same time, Conkle suggests that judicial 
finality is problematic, and should be abandoned, with respect to nonoriginalist 
review-at least for "individual rights" issues. Id. at 11. However, because 
originalist interpretations often conflict with nonoriginalist interpretations, a 
prior question must be when, if ever, originalism is good interpretation. See 
supra text accompanying notes 149-53. Whether and when originalism is appro-
priate is itself a question of "interpretation," and as such can be resolved either 
in an originalist way or a nonoriginalist way. See Chang, supra note 10, at 784-96 
(nonoriginalist way); Powell, supra note 140 (originalist way); supra text accompa-
nying notes 144-48. The nationalization of moral policy may be a primary bene-
fit emerging from nonoriginalist review of individual rights cases. See Conkle, 
supra note 21, at 26-30. But this benefit conflicts with an originalist view of fed-
eralism. Thus, the proposal of judicial finality for originalist decisions and con-
gressional supremacy for nonoriginalist decisions is untenable. 
238. In fact, Congress has continued to employ legislative vetoes despite 
Chadha. See Tolchin, The Legislative Veto, An Accommodation That Goes On and On, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at All, col. l. This practice challenges judicial 
supremacy and raises questions about the extent to which Congress does accept 
the principle. I do not doubt that judicial supremacy might be vulnerable in 
practice. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 309-13 (Biden flag statute chal-
lenges judicial supremacy). But this possibility does not undermine the impor-
tance of determining the desirability of judicial supremacy versus an ethic of 
congressional authority to contradict Supreme Court "interpretations" of the 
Constitution. Such an analysis will suggest either that Congress should feel 
more free to contradict Supreme Court opinions or should refrain from doing 
so. For a suggestion that any legislative response under congressional 
supremacy must explicitly address relevant judicial precedent, see infra notes 
241 & 244. 
239. Congressional supremacy could require developing new congressional 
institutions and procedures-for example, "a special committee in each house 
developing traditions of deliberative, dispassionate, and (relatively) nonpartisan 
consideration of constitutional issues." Brest, supra note 10, at 1092; see also D. 
MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN RESPONSIBILITY 351-57 
(1966). 
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which future relevant cases would be decided. Alternatively, Con-
gress might pass no responsive legislation at all.240 If so, the 
Court's opinion would continue to govern.241 
Under judicial review supplemented by congressional 
supremacy, the best decisionmaking attributes of both the Court 
and Congress can be joined to simulate the three special charac-
teristics that distinguish constitutional politics toward political 
self-constraint from everyday legislative politics: extraordinary 
vigilance, extraordinary thoughtfulness, and extraordinary electo-
ral roots. 
The nature of litigation helps provide extraordinary vigi-
lance. Issues of public policy that otherwise might be overlooked 
are easily raised by litigants and, therefore, brought to the atten-
tion of authoritative policymakers. For example, to the extent 
that Congress enacted the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
240. As the Court now has rules for deference to Congress, see infra notes 
255-60 and accompanying text, congressional supremacy suggests that Congress 
should develop rules for deference to the Court. Cf Seidman, supra note 22, at 
1587 (people can and do defer to experts even while not giving them final au-
thority to decide). An example of such a rule of deference might be to give more 
weight to a unanimous judicial decision than to a 5- 4 decision. 
241. Thus, congressional supremacy would require that governmental in-
stitutions reflect, respect, and respond to two new ethics. First, Congress should 
actively consider enacting direct responses to Supreme Court opinions. See 
Brest, supra note 10, at 98 (Congress lacks strong tradition of constitutional deci-
sionmaking). Second, the Supreme Court should defer to such legislative re-
sponses. See id. at 76. Whether the Court should defer to all relevant responses, 
only to explicit congressional responses, only to explicit and thoughtful (defined 
procedurally) responses, only to explicit and thoughtful (defined substantively) 
responses, etc., should also be analyzed from the perspective of constitutional 
representation. Dean Brest suggests that if Congress sought to respond to the 
Court's constitutional decisions, then the Court should defer only if "Congress 
develops systematic and trustworthy procedures of constitutional decisionmak-
ing" -by which he means not so much an extraordinarily thoughtful considera-
tion of the merits of competing policies, but more traditional and pseudo-
judicial approaches to constitutional "interpretation." See id. at 103. Because I 
question the viability of traditional notions of "interpretation," by courts let 
alone by Congress, I would reject Brest's particular standard, if not the principle 
that Congress's responsive legislation satisfy some procedural standard of ex-
traordinary thoughtfulness. Cf P. DIMOND, supra note 20, at 85 (Court has ap-
plied dear statement rule when Congress compromises constitutional 
concerns); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 316-17 (2d ed. 1988) 
(Court has applied clear statement rule when federal statute reaches to outer 
limit of commerce power and would conflict with state institutional interests); 
Farber & Frickey, supra note 51, at 917-19 (existing doctrines requiring legisla-
tive deliberation); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976) 
(advocating judicial doctrine to improve legislative processes); Sandalow, supra 
note 20, at 1189 (courts should defer to political decisions reflecting deliberate 
judgment by representative institutions). For further discussion of Dean Brest's 
view of congressional competence to engage in constitutional "interpretation," 
see infra note 244. 
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without considering whether legislative vetoes compromise val-
ues underlying the separation of powers doctrine, Mr. Chadha's 
lawyers helped focus public attention on potentially important is-
sues that otherwise would have been ignored. 
The nature of judicial decisionmaking helps provide ex-
traordinary thoughtfulness. Judges can shape an understanding 
of issues as they relate to putative constitutional values. Rela-
tively insulated from the pressures of give-and-take legislative 
politics, and constrained to write opinions that satisfy standards 
of reason, judges can help ensure that such constitutional values 
are not forgotten. Thus, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Chadha 
helps frame the merits of legislative vetoes from the perspective 
of traditional concerns for separated powers. Justice White's dis-
sent frames the issues from a more contemporary perspective, but 
one still guided by similar concerns for separated powers. 
Finally, the nature of responsive congressional decisionmak-
ing could help provide extraordinary electoral roots. Congress's 
second look would be closer to the ideal of extraordinarily 
thoughtful constitutional politics than was the Court's review of 
the initial congressional choice, for Congress's "interpretive" de-
cision would be political. Far more than the Court's, Congress's 
decision would be constitutional representation.242 To the extent 
242. Some might object to equating Congress with voters, or with "the 
People." See T. Low1, supra note 221, at 68-72 (President and Congress identify 
with, and vote for, different interest groups rather than broadly conceived ma-
jorities); G. McCONNELL, supra note 220, at 339 ("[A] substantial part of govern-
ment in the United States has come under the influence or control of narrowly 
based and largely autonomous elites."); Amar, supra note 42, at 1079-85 (argu-
ing that Congress is inadequately majoritarian). Bruce Ackerman argues that 
"we must systematically reject the idea that when Congress (or the President or 
the Court) speaks during periods of normal politics, we can hear the genuine 
[constitutional] voice of the American people." Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1027 
(emphasis in original). However valid these observations might be, they are 
hardly arguments against congressional supremacy. To question Congress's 
representativeness should not lead one toward less representative judicial 
supremacy, but toward more representative options for constitutional poli-
cymaking. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text; cf Farber & Frickey, 
supra note 51, at 911-13 (advocating political process reform rather than height-
ened judicial review to cure perceived defects in legislative representation). 
Significantly, Ackerman acknowledges that the Court, as well as Congress, is 
a poor proxy for true constitutional politics. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 
1027. But true constitutional politics must be episodic. See id. at 1040, 1050 
(noting that after intense political activity achieves its goal (e.g., an amendment), 
"most private citizens ... inevitably will [find] that they have better things to do 
with their time than continue the political struggle at fever pitch"). Any "inter-
pretive" regime must therefore be imperfectly representative and imperfectly 
deliberative. The challenge for voters today is to identify an interpretive regime 
that best approximates the decisions the electorate would make if engaged in 
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that Chief Justice Burger's opinion successfully identifies values 
the electorate would pursue in extraordinarily thoughtful consti-
tutional politics, it should ring true, and influence Congress's sec-
ond look.243 To the extent that the Court has sought to protect 
concerns that voters would not favor in extraordinarily thoughtful 
constitutional politics-if, for example, Justice White's observa-
tions ring true-congressional supremacy would allow the electo-
rate's representatives to correct the Court's mistake.244 
extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. See supra text accompanying 
notes 144-48. 
243. This is not inconsistent with a focus on interest groups underlying 
economic theories of legislation and public choice theory. "Interest group the-
ory treats statutes as commodities that are purchased by particular interest 
groups or coalitions of interest groups that outbid and outmaneuver competing 
interest groups." Macey, supra note 48, at 227. "Payment takes the form of cam-
paign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes 
outright bribes." Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 877. Thus, public choice 
theory raises questions about the representativeness and the quality of legislative 
decisionmaking. See supra note 51. While such theories of legislation find polit-
ical capital in resources other than the vote, they do not necessarily deny that 
interest groups might spend their resources to support legislation serving "legit-
imate, public-regarding, noneconomic goals." Macey, supra note 48, at 228. 
The recognition that the "publicly articulated purpose [of a statute] will almost 
invariably be a public-regarding purpose" suggests that electoral accountability 
remains a significant influence on legislative behavior, because clearly articu-
lated factional purposes could induce the otherwise quiet members of the public 
to mobilize in opposition. See id. at 250-53. Nevertheless, such public choice 
theory suggests that the bulk of interest group activity seeks wealth transfers at 
the expense of other groups and, therefore, "that politicians can advance their 
own private interests by ... helping enact legislation that transfers wealth from 
groups with high information and transaction costs to groups with low informa-
tion and transaction costs." Id. at 229-30. Viewing "public-regarding" policies 
as superior to interest group policies, Macey advocates methods of statutory in-
terpretation that temper the latter by, for example, enforcing the general lan-
guage of a statute rather than by examining a legislative history which might 
indicate specific targets and beneficiaries of the legislation. See id. at 236-40 
(criticizing view that judges should consider the "deals . . . struck in 
cloakrooms" in seeking proper enforcement of statutes). Macey's analysis of ju-
dicial and legislative interaction in the statutory context to encourage "public-
regarding" policies might be applied to a judicial and legislative interaction for 
constitutional "interpretation"-which, as I have suggested, should seek a rep-
resentative determination of the extraordinarily thoughtful choices the electo-
rate would make if engaged in constitutional politics today. See supra text 
accompanying notes 144- 48. 
244. Dean Brest suggests that if Congress may "subvert judicial doctrine," 
it may do so only if, "after engaging in independent constitutional interpreta-
tion, Congress determines that the doctrine is legally incorrect." Brest, supra 
note 10, at 59. "Congress must engage in independent constitutional interpre-
tation." Id. at 80. By suggesting that such "interpretation" requires not only 
facility with constitutional text, history, structure, and precedents, but also "dis-
interested" decisionmaking, Dean Brest concludes that Congress is, at least for 
now, institutionally incapable of validly overturning a judicial finding of uncon-
stitutionality. See id. at 82, 103; see also PERRY I, supra note 7, at 16, 19 (Congress 
lacks impartiality necessary to interpret Constitution); Mikva, How Well Does Con-
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Thus, while the Court's opinions can provide Congress's sec-
ond look with some of the extraordinary vigilance and thoughtful-
ness that voters anticipate in true constitutional politics, 245 the 
choices ultimately emerging from the processes of congressional 
supremacy246 are more the voters' own, as they would be in the 
extraordinarily thoughtful politics through which constitutional 
provisions for political self-constraint ideally are created. To the 
extent that legislators are cautious about exercising the powers of 
congressional supremacy, and sensitive to the Court's role in pro-
viding extraordinary thoughtfulness, the goal of constitutional 
gress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 587, 610 (1983) (Con-
gress cannot effectively interpret Constitution). 
Dean Brest's analysis is problematic for several reasons. First, he seems to 
rely on a surprisingly technical notion of "legal" correctness and "interpreta-
tion." Yet the notion of constitutional representation is more political than 
technical and, indeed, even speculative. It is questionable whether courts can 
,effectively pursue that "interpretive" ideal. Even without resort to any notion of 
constitutional representation as an ideal, it is hardly novel to question protesta-
tions of technically correct "interpretive" results. See Schauer, supra note 22, at 
1731-32 (appellate review does not involve technical legal skills so much as re-
quire "recourse to the political, economic, social, cultural, and moral norms" of 
society). Thus, contrary to Dean Brest's view, the judicial point of departure is 
not sacrosanct. Second, Dean Brest's observation that Congress is not sufficiently 
"disinterested" to overturn judicial determinations of unconstitutionality attrib-
utes to courts a virtue they do not necessarily possess, and transforms into a vice 
a characteristic of congressional decisionmaking that is, in fact, a virtue. As 
judges are hardly "disinterested" in the controversial issues they resolve in the 
name of constitutional law, Dean Brest again paints a rosier picture of the judi-
cial point of departure than it deserves. More importantly, although congres-
sional decisionmaking is expressly political and interested, so are the politics of 
constitutional ratification and, therefore, the choices voters today would make if 
engaged in constitutional politics. Indeed, Congress itself has drafted many of 
the constitutional provisions so revered by proponents of judicial review. Cf 
Fisher, supra note 103, at 718 ("Constitutional law often turns on factfinding and 
the balancing of conflicting values. Members of Congress can make important 
contributions in both areas."); id. at 732 (Congress's constitutional judgments 
"compare favorably to those announced by the courts"). Third, courts might 
develop rules for reviewing congressional review, perhaps requiring certain indi-
cia that Congress has, in fact, engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful decision-
making, before the Court would need to defer to Congress's "interpretive" 
statute. See supra notes 240-41. 
245. This function of the Court would provide good justification for main-
taining judicial life-tenure under a regime of congressional supremacy. See infra 
note 359. The new system might also encourage even greater judicial activism, 
to mitigate Congress' errors of omission, because the Court's errors of commis-
sion could more easily be remedied. See infra text accompanying notes 268-72, 
283-86. 
246. Some might fear that constitutional law under congressional 
supremacy would be less coherent than under judicial supremacy. But not only 
is the value of coherence debatable; it is by no means certain that congressional 
supremacy would, in fact, generate a constitutional law significantly less coher-
ent than that heretofore developed by the Court. See supra note 104. 
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representation-simulating extraordinarily vigilant and thought-
ful politics-can indeed be approached. 
Given the indeterminate meaning of aging constitutional 
texts, it is, perhaps, only by the processes of "interpretive" deci-
sionmaking that voters today can hope to attain the choices the 
electorate would make if engaged in true constitutional politics. 247 
Some might doubt, however, whether congressional response can 
achieve this ideal of constitutional representation. 248 Indeed, one 
might question the extent to which congressional decisionmaking 
can be either truly representative or truly thoughtful. 249 But the 
issue is not whether judicial review supplemented by congres-
sional supremacy replicates true, formal constitutional politics. 
My suggestion is more modest: that congressional supremacy is 
the less imperfect of two options. 
11. Addressing the Possibility of an Erroneous Refusal to 
Invalidate 
Constitutional representation can be as badly compromised 
by erroneous refusals to invalidate congressional choices as by er-
roneous invalidations.250 Yet since the New Deal struggle over 
24 7. As Professor Sandalow has suggested, "The central problems in devis-
ing a satisfactory theory of judicial review is ... to define and justify the process 
by which societal norms should be constructed for the purpose of giving content 
to constitutional law." Sandalow, supra note 20, at 1185. 
248. Even enacting a constitutional amendment~r failing to do so--
under article V procedures might not necessarily yield the decisions voters today 
would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, for 
the most extraordinary thoughtfulness would have the electorate consider its 
own rules for constitutional ratification, i.e., article V itself. Cf Amar, supra note 
42, at 1099 ("[A]ny political process that weights some Americans ... more than 
others . . .-as does Article V . . .-is legitimate only if that process itself is 
approved by, and is subordinate to, a process which weights all Americans 
equally."). 
249. See supra notes 102, 242. Professors Farber and Frickey reach a con-
trary conclusion even after carefully· considering public choice theory concep-
tions of problematic congressional behavior: 
Congress is not merely the reflection of private political power. Faith 
in deliberative congressional resolution of sensitive issues is not en-
tirely misplaced, particularly when courts assist the deliberative process 
through structural and procedural review. To be sure, judicial invalida-
tion under this approach constitutes only a suspensive veto. Yet even 
that shifts the burden of inertia to those seeking to reimpose the invali-
dated decision, highlights the perceived unfairness of the decision, and, 
because of the passage of time, often presents the issue to a legislature 
constituted somewhat differently from the one that made the original 
decision. Considering the ease of killing legislation and the difficulty of 
passing it, these consequences of a suspensive veto are significant. 
Farber & Frickey, supra note 51, at 923 (footnote omitted). 
250. But see R. NAGEL, supra note 21, at 22-26 (judicial deference gives to 
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delegation and federalism, 251 the Supreme Court has taken an es-
pecially deferential posture when reviewing the constitutionality 
of congressional acts. 252 One can trace this deference to judicial 
supremacy. From fear of erroneously invalidating a congres-
sional choice, the Supreme Court risks erroneously upholding a 
congressional choice. 253 
During this century, the Supreme Court has taken three ap-
proaches to constitutional federalism. First, through the early 
New Deal, the Court struck down many congressional statutes in 
the name of federalism.254 The Depression notwithstanding, and 
against the judgments of the President and Congress about how 
other institutions responsibility for making constitutional law). Nagel's position 
ignores that other institutions, at least without interaction with judicial decision-
making, generally are incapable of the extraordinary thoughtfulness and vigi-
lance that constitutionalism toward political self-constraint seeks to promote. 
251. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v.Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 
(1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
252. Even when using racial classifications, otherwise subject to close (if 
somewhat ill-defined) judicial scrutiny, Congress has enjoyed the Court's defer-
ence. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990) 
("It is of overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's minority owner-
ship programs have been specifically approved-indeed, mandated-by Con-
gress."); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (racial classification 
must be examined "with appropriate deference to Congress"). The Court has 
looked far more critically at affirmative action programs designed by states and 
localities. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 
( 1989) (restricting local discretion to set aside percentage of public contracts for 
minority business enterprises); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 
282-84 ( 1986) (restricting local discretion to adopt affirmative action program in 
lay off provision of collective bargaining agreement); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (restricting state discretion to adopt affirma-
tive action program in university admissions policies); see also Chang, supra note 
190. 
253. James Bradley Thayer made the point: "The courts are revising the 
work of a co-ordinate department, and must not, even negatively, undertake to 
legislate. And, again, they must not act unless the case is so very clear, because 
the consequences of setting aside legislation may be so serious." Thayer, supra 
note 60, at 150; see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 41 ( 1980) ("If a princi-
pled approach to judicial enforcement of ... the Constitution's open-ended pro-
visions cannot be developed, one that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our 
nation's commitment to representative democracy, responsible commentators 
must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply should stay away from 
them."); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958) (questionable foundation for 
judicial review demands cautious exercise of presumed judicial power to invali-
date legislation); Conkle, supra note 20, at 34-36 (finality of constitutional deci-
sions induces cautious judicial inaction). 
254. See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 293-97 (national wage and hour standards 
applied to mining industries); Schechter, 295 U.S. at 549-51 (national wage and 
hour standards applied to poultry industry); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 
251, 273-77 (1918) (national fair labor standards governing employment of 
children). 
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to invigorate national economic health, the Court denied the na-
tional electorate its congressionally-expressed preferences. Sec-
ond, perhaps in response to the political turmoil generated by this 
restrictive view of Congress's authority, the Court broadened its 
definition of Congress's discretion. The process culminated in 
United States v. Darby, 255 where a unanimous Court determined 
that Congress could, under the commerce clause, enact statutes 
regulating "commerce"-defined essentially as the "shipment in-
terstate of goods" or "activities intrastate which ... affect inter-
state commerce"256-"[w]hatever their motive and purpose."257 
Although the possibility of judicial intervention for the sake of 
federalism remained, it was widely perceived as insignificant.258 
Third, by its decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,259 the Court today has deemed federalism to be essen-
tially a political question, wholly within Congress's discretion, 
based on the view that "[s]tate sovereign interests ... are more 
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the 
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limita-
255. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
256. Id. at 115, 118. 
257. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). National discretion is far greater under a 
commerce clause understood as permitting regulation for any purpose, rather 
than one understood as permitting regulation for limited purposes-for example, 
only for purposes of promoting economic health and development. 
A restrictive, purpose-oriented approach for defining the scope of Con-
gress's discretion against claims of federalism-based limits is suggested in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall 
announced: "should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass 
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would 
become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the 
law of the land." Id. at 423 (emphasis added). In a pre-Darby case, the Court 
had articulated a purpose-oriented principle defining the scope of Congress's 
discretion under the commerce clause: "[T]he power to regulate commerce is 
the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and advance-
ment'; to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and insure its safety'; 'to foster, 
protect, control and restrain.'" NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 
1, 36-37 (1937) (citations omitted). Though this principle could be distorted 
toward Darby's endorsement of congressional regulations, "[w]hatever their mo-
tive and purpose," it was articulated in a context limited to commercial purposes. 
Hence it was far more a principle respecting local discretion than that. which 
evolved in Darby and that which signaled the death of constraint altogether in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
258. For example, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy stated during Sen-
ate hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "I think that there is an injustice 
that needs to be remedied. We have to find the tools with which to remedy that 
injustice .... The commerce clause will obtain a remedy and there won't be a 
problem about the [constitutionality]." G. GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 159. 
259. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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tions on federal power."260 Thus, Congress is now the exclusive 
guardian of this putative constitutional concern; federalism is not 
an issue for judicial review. 
What decisions about federalism would the national electo-
rate make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional 
politics today? Perhaps, like the framers, voters would conclude 
that local decisionmaking is a value that weighs against establish-
ing national standards-that governmental diversity serves free-
dom; heterodoxy creates options; options forestall unhappy 
citizens' perceptions of tyranny-and, therefore, that one should 
think twice about these benefits of local decisionmaking before 
establishing national standards.261 Voters alternately might con-
clude that local decisionmaking serves no value that should weigh 
against establishing national standards.262 What is right is right, 
260. Id. at 552. 
261. Indeed, major antifederalist currents against the Constitution were 
notions of community, participation and autonomy within a small and local 
realm. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
DEBATES 275-77 (R. Ketcham ed. 1986) (Brutus's first essay). Concern for one's 
neighbors was essential for good public decisionmaking, but possible only on a 
small scale, in relatively homogeneous circumstances, like a family. Cf Sunstein, 
supra note 42, at 1556 ("[R]epublican belief in deliberation about the common 
good is most easily sustained when there is homogeneity and agreement about 
foundations."). These values would be compromised by a national govern-
ment-through expanding the community beyond recognition; through bring-
ing together (though not unifying) diverse interests and perspectives; through 
creating more incentive for conflict and more chance lo lose. See G. Woon, supra 
note 42, at 499-502. Thus, one might suppose that responding to these ideas, 
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution acted with a motive of political self-
constraint in choosing to protect concerns of federalism with the principles of 
constitutional supremacy. Because the benefits of local government-the costs 
to local values imposed by national government-could be overlooked in the 
pressures and passions of everyday congressional decisionmaking, the Congress 
was to be vested with only certain enumerated powers. But see infra note 262 
(suggesting federalism might have reflected desire by recalcitrant minority to 
perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage). Furthermore, federalism in-
volves issues of when it is right for one group (the nation) to impose its will on 
another (a state). This, it seems to me, involves not only questions of raw 
power, but also subtle questions of political morality. But see J. CHOPER, supra 
note 10, at 201-03 (federalism issues concern practicality rather than principle). 
262. Yet the tenth amendment, as well as the Senate's structure, originally 
might have reflected a desire by minority states to perpetuate an extraordinary 
political advantage, e.g., by exploiting the desire of majority states to win the 
minority's participation. Cf Amar, supra note 42, at 1069-71 (provision requir-
ing state's consent before loss of equal suffrage in Senate may be overridden by 
non-article V amendment procedures devised by "We the People"). If so, then 
the "interpretive" implications would be even more complex-requiring a de-
termination of what past choices by a minority to perpetuate a temporary polit-
ical advantage imply about the choices a majority of voters today would make if 
engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics about federalism. See supra note 
197. 
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and should govern New York as well as Georgia,263 Georgia as 
well as New York.264 Here, as elsewhere, "interpretive" indeter-
minacy reigns.265 
The Darby and Garcia approaches to constitutional federalism 
raise the potential "interpretive" error of failing to strike down 
national policie~ that the national electorate, if engaged in ex-
263. See, e.g., GA. CooE ANN.§ 16-6-2 (1988) (prohibiting consensual "sod-
omy"); cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91, 196 (1986) (upholding this 
statute as applied to homosexuals). 
264. New York courts have struck down sodomy statutes as violating the 
New York Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 272-73, 424 
N.Y.S.2d 566, 569, ajf'd on other grounds, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
265. Bruce Ackerman would have the Court interpret the national political 
activity that culminated in the elections of 1936, i.e., debate about the New Deal 
provisions, as comprising a "structural amendment" of the Constitution, estab-
lishing a new, unrestrictive policy on federalism. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 
1053-56. His "structural amendment" is an effort to link constitutional interpre-
tation with contemporary politics, while maintaining a distinction between ordi-
nary national politics and extraordinary constitutional politics. See id. at 1027-
31. Although my own enterprise in this article might be similarly characterized, 
one should recognize a critical distinction between my suggestion of congres-
sional supremacy as a route to constitutional representation and Ackerman's 
modified processes for constitutional amendment as a means of linking judicial 
behavior with contemporary politics. Ackerman focuses on reforming the 
processes of formal constitutional amendment, while I focus on the processes of 
interpreting formally intact and progressively aging constitutional provisions. 
This line is blurred for Ackerman's 1936 "structural amendment"-as that 
"amendment" was "ratified" without a formal text. See Amar, supra note 42, at 
1091; Chang, supra note 10, at 824 n.233. Nonetheless, Ackerman is rather in-
sistent that he views 1936 as true amendment rather than simply as a basis for new 
interpretation. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1056. In a later effort, however, 
he was unambiguously concerned with formal constitutional amendment. See 
Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1182 (proposing modified processes for formal con-
stitutional amendment). 
Whether the "structural amendment" is viewed as a true, formal amend-
ment or as a method for interpreting intact and aging texts, Ackerman's linkage 
of interpretation to contemporary electoral politics is far more limited than the 
linkage would be under congressional supremacy. Ackerman would have the 
Court find a "structural amendment" only after political struggle of a sort so 
extraordinary that he finds only one example in United States history. He also 
characterizes the fourteenth amendment as a "structural amendment," despite 
its ratification by formal article V processes. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1063-
69. For discussion of the different issues involved in the fourteenth amendment 
and the 1936 elections as "structural amendments," see Chang, supra note 10, at 
824 n.233, 830 n.255. It seems to me that the "structural amendment" is no 
solution to the problematic disjunction between judicial interpretation and con-
stitutional politics--or, at least, a solution so rarely available that the pervasive 
problems of judicial interpretation remain largely undisturbed. Whether viewed 
as an interpretive method or as a new species of constitutional amendment, the 
"structural amendment" is at least as rare as article V amendment has been. As 
the existence of the article V option provides inadequate assurance that judicial 
decisions will satisfy an ideal of constitutional representation, so, it seems to me, 
does Ackerman's "structural amendment." 
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traordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, would decide do 
not justify undermining the benefits of local decisionmaking.266 
Such deference essentially destroys the benefits of judicial review, 
for the Court not only fails to measure challenged policies against 
putative constitutional concerns; it fails even to articulate relevant 
constitutional values by which legislators should feel themselves 
constrained. With such deference, the extraordinary vigilance 
and thoughtfulness that the Court otherwise could provide to-
ward simulating true constitutional politics are lost altogether.267 
Under congressional supremacy, however, there would have 
been less incentive for this sort of deference. The Court could 
have retained federalism as a meaningful constitutional value, as 
part of judicial doctrine.268 Thus, the potential concern for feder-
alism could be less lost than under judicial supremacy; the ideal 
of constitutional representation would be better approached as 
judicial review (more than meaningless deference) helps simulate 
266. When the Court took a hostile posture to congressional legislation, 
striking down much of the early New Deal response to the Depression, it risked 
the potential "interpretive" error of striking down national statutes that the na-
tional electorate, if then engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional 
politics, would have decided were sufficiently important to justify intruding on 
the benefits of local decisionmaking. For an analysis of how congressional 
supremacy can mitigate this error, see supra text accompanying notes 239-49. 
267. See infra text accompanying notes 288-92. 
268. A judicially articulated doctrine of constitutional federalism, even if 
deferentially enforced, could guide legislative decisionmaking far more than the 
view that federalism is merely a political question. For example, in debates 
about the Civil Rights Act of 1964, members of Congress explicitly considered 
whether they would violate constitutional federalism by voting for the legislation 
under the commerce clause. In answering this question, they referred to 
Supreme Court doctrine. Given Darby, members of Congress were advised that 
they would act permissibly under the commerce clause, so long as the subject was 
commerce, no matter what the object (purpose) of their regulation might be. See 
G. GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 159-62 (testimony of Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy during Senate Hearings on Civil Rights Act of 1964). But ifthe Court 
had retained the commerce clause doctrine devised injones & La.ugh/in, members 
of Congress would have been advised that the act would be permissible only if 
their major object was economic. Unless a putative constitutional principle is ju-
dicially articulated, legislators are unlikely to consider respecting it. The Garcia 
abandonment of constitutional federalism as a political question not only elimi-
nates the possibility of judicially invalidating a statute on tenth amendment 
grounds, but also diminishes the chances that members of Congress themselves 
can give the issue due deliberation. On the other hand, the Jones & La.ugh/in 
approach articulates principles limiting congressional discretion while applying 
those principles deferentially. It minimizes the possibility that a court will invali-
date a statute on tenth amendment grounds, but provides an articulated putative 
constitutional principle of federalism that Congress can choose to respect on its 
own. This difference is significant to the extent that one views the essence of 
constitutional decisionmaking as extraordinarily thoughtful politics. See supra 
text accompanying notes 36-43, 192-99 & 215-18. 
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the vigilance and thoughtfulness of constitutional politics, while 
the opportunity for congressional evaluation and response helps 
simulate the electoral roots of constitutional politics. 
This is not to suggest that unbridled judicial activism would 
be proper under congressional supremacy.269 While the costs of 
"erroneous" judicial declarations of national policy in the name 
of the Constitution would be mitigated, they cannot be elimi-
nated. 270 Neither is it to suggest, however, that Congress should 
be eager to overturn the Court's decisions under congressional 
supremacy. Rather, members of both the Court and Congress 
should evaluate the other's decisions according to the strengths 
and weaknesses each institution can bring to the task of constitu-
tional representation. Thus, toward serving the ideal of political 
self-constraint in a context of congressional supremacy, judges 
would need to develop new guidelines for deference in their ini-
tial review of national policies.271 Members of Congress would 
need to debate principles of deference to the Court's declarations 
of constitutional principle. Such mutual consideration of under-
lying institutional capacities can enhance decisionmaking about 
specific substantive policies and thereby promote the extraordina-
rily thoughtful decisionmaking that is the goal of political self-
constraint. 272 
269. Even given congressional supremacy, the Court must develop princi-
ples suggesting when deference is appropriate and when it is not. See supra notes 
240-41; infra text accompanying note 270; see also infra note 285. 
270. It is a matter of no small consequence that Congress must rouse itself 
from the inertia that seems to have been part of its original design if it is to 
exercise the prerogatives of congressional supremacy. It is a matter of no small 
consequence that voters, in evaluating their representatives' "interpretive" deci-
sions, must devote more attention to public policy than under judicial 
supremacy. "Erroneous" judicial declarations of national policy in the name of 
the Constitution might well not be corrected by a Congress that sees little polit-
ical capital in acting. See J. CHOPER, supra note 10, at 16-24 (structure of Con-
gress inhibits action); Amar, supra note 42, at 1078-79 (arguing that presentment 
and bicameralism are countermajoritarian). 
271. To the extent that this greater judicial activism would mitigate the er-
roneous failure to invalidate congressional choices, it also would increase the 
chances for erroneous invalidations of congressional choices. See infra text ac-
companying notes 281-83 (same point for judicial review of local policies). "In-
terpretive" indeterminacy suggests, however, that results cannot be the basis for 
choosing among different institutions of judicial review or different people to 
serve in those institutions. To the extent this is true, one must evaluate the 
processes by which those results are reached. See infra text accompanying notes 
283-86 (same point for judicial review of local policies). 
272. Similar problems with judicial deference arise when the Court exam-
ines national policies implicating individual rights. For example, a sharply di-
vided Court held that an Orthodox Jewish rabbi was not denied his first 
amendment rights by an Air Force regulation that prohibited him from wearing 
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c. Evaluating the Constitutionality of State Policies 
1. Striking an Optimal Balance Between the Erroneous 
Invalidation and the Erroneous Refusal to Invalidate 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court invalidated a Connecticut 
statute that prohibited people from using, or counselling the use 
of, contraceptives.27!1 Justice Douglas's majority opinion recog-
nized a constitutional right of privacy that includes a married 
couple's interest in using contraceptives.274 Justices Black and 
Stewart each wrote dissenting opinions acknowledging, respec-
tively, that the Connecticut law was "offensive" and "unwise," but 
emphasizing the lack of constitutional foundation on which to in-
validate the statute.275 
Would a majority among the national electorate today, if en-
gaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, choose 
to establish a national standard protecting a right to use contra-
ceptives? On the one hand, as even the dissenters implied, Con-
a yarmulke. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The regulation 
had been promulgated pursuant to a congressional grant of rulemaking author-
ity. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion could hardly have been more deferen-
tial: "UJudicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the 
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regula-
tions for their governance is challenged." Id. at 508 (quoting Rostker v. 
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)). With such deference to military policies, 
Justice Rehnquist gave no consideration to competing putative constitutional in-
terests. Because the costs of an "erroneous" judicial invalidation would be less 
under congressional supremacy, the Court might justifiably forgo the extreme 
deference rooted in fears of the "erroneous" invalidation toward avoiding the 
"erroneous" failure to invalidate, when it appears that constitutional values were 
inadequately considered--or not considered at all-by Congress or its 
subordinate decisionmakers. Thus, the extraordinary vigilance and thoughtful-
ness of constitutional politics is simulated. Congress's authority to respond pro-
vides ultimate electoral resolution. Ironically, the Court's decision in this case 
spurred Congress to enact responsive legislation. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 774 (West 
Supp. 1991). 
273. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
274. Id. at 485. Justice Douglas found the right of privacy in the "penum-
bras" emanating from the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. Justice 
Goldberg joined the majority opinion, but wrote a separate concurring opinion, 
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, that derived a right of pri-
vacy from the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people." Id. at 493 
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Justices White and Harlan each concurred in the 
judgment in separate opinions. For an analysis of the relationship between Gris-
wold and Hardwick, see Chang, supra note 10, at 808-25. 
275. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-10 (Black,]., dissenting); id. at 527, 530-31 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinions were originalist in scope-
rooted in, and limited by, history. See id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting) (courts 
should "stick to the simple language of the First Amendment in construing it"); 
id. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing original intent of ninth amend-
ment). For an analysis of originalism's inadequacies for purposes of constitu-
tional representation, see supra text accompanying notes 149-53. 
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necticut's law might well deeply offend a national majority. 
Perhaps voters would establish a national norm if they were vigi-
lant about public policy-as they would be if engaged in extraor-
dinarily thoughtful constitutional politics.276 On the other hand, 
if voters also accounted for concerns of federalism in an extraor-
dinarily thoughtful way, they inight choose not to impose their 
views as a national standard. Again, "interpretive" indeterminacy 
prevails. Thus, Griswold potentially represents the erroneous es-
tablishment of national policies preempting local discretion. 
In 0 'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 277 the Court considered whether 
New Jersey prison officials violated the free exercise clause by re-
quiring Muslim inmates to adhere to a work schedule that pre-
vented them from attendingJumu'ah, a.weekly Muslim service.278 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion adopted a standard of 
review deferential to state prison officials and held that the free 
exercise clause was not violated.279 Justice Brennan, for four dis-
senters, argued that the majority had ignored the Constitution's 
purpose "to provide a bulwark against infringements that might 
otherwise be justified as necessary expedients of governing."280 
Justice Brennan concluded that "[o]ur objective in selecting a 
standard of review is therefore not, as the Court declares, '[t]o 
ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison offi-
276. The Senate judiciary Committee focused on this matter during the 
Bork confirmation hearings. One might infer from exchanges between the Sen-
ators and the nominee that most believed that states should not be free to pro-
hibit the use of contraceptives. See, e.g., Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate 
justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on 
the judiciary, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 114-21, 149-51, 240-43, 182-84 (1987) 
(questioning by Senators Biden, Kennedy, Hatch and Simpson). If so, Griswold 
has served the national electorate's values. See Chang, supra note 10, at 819. 
Without it, Congress probably would never have addressed the issue, and Con-
necticut might well have retained its offensive law. Thus, judicial review pro-
vided a vigilance, about public policy that congressional government alone would 
lack. While the Senate had occasion to review, evaluate, and potentially control 
the Supreme Court's disposition of the issue through such rare and inefficient 
mechanisms as the Bork confirmation hearings, congressional supremacy would 
provide a method for a more engaged electoral review of the Court's disposition 
of issues that otherwise would escape national attention. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 239-42; infra note 291. 
277. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
278. Id. at 345. 
279. Id. at 349, 353. Chief justice Rehnquist stated, "when a prison regula-
tion impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 349 (quoting Tur-
ner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). In form and in substance, this inquiry 
amounts to the extreme deference employed in most cases applying mere ra-
tionality review under the equal protection clause. 
280. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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cials,' " but "to determine how best to protect" the constitutional 
rights of prisoners.281 Thus, he employed a non-deferential bal-
ancing approach that, in form and substance, amounted to the 
"strict scrutiny" applied in many fundamental rights cases.282 
It is conceivable that voters today, if engaged in extraordina-
rily thoughtful constitutional politics, would consider prisoners' 
interests in free religious exercise unimportant and, therefore, 
would have no impulse to displace New Jersey's policy. It is also 
conceivable that voters might sympathize with the religious claims 
of prisoners, yet, on balance, respect values of local autonomy. 
Finally, it is conceivable that voters would decide that religious 
free exercise is a particularly important component of sound 
prison policy, warranting national standards preempting local dis-
cretion. Here, as with most constitutional questions that survive 
from complaint to Supreme Court review, the merits are contro-
versial and the correct "interpretive" results are indeterminate. 
Thus, Shabazz potentially represents the erroneous refusal to es-
tablish national policies preempting local discretion. 
• • • 
As judicial review of congressional choices might become less 
deferential under congressional supremacy than it tends to be 
under judicial supremacy,283 so judicial review of state policies 
could be similarly affected. If so, congressional supremacy can 
redress the error of which Shabazz is a possible example: the erro-
neous refusal to establish national policy. Yet by encouraging 
greater judicial intrusiveness, congressional supremacy could ex-
acerbate the error of which Griswold is a possible example: the 
erroneous intrusion on values of federalism. Furthermore, de-
spite congressional supremacy, natural legislative inertia might 
preclude congressional responses restoring the level of state dis-
cretion that voters today would choose to respect if engaged in 
281. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion) (emphasis in 
original). 
282. See id. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (degree of scrutiny should 
depend on nature of right, type of activity being restricted, and extent of restric-
tion) (citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985) (Kauf-
man, j.)). Judicial supremacy is especially problematic when the basis for 
judicial decisionmaking is a "balancing" of competing values. Balancing begs 
such questions as whose values to balance and how to calibrate a scale for bal-
ancing. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 
972-83 (1987) (highlighting analytic and operational problems balancing 
presents). But see PERRY II, supra note 7, at 149 (judge should enforce personal 
notion of community's proper moral aspiration). For a criticism of Perry's view, 
see supra text accompanying notes 165-68. 
283. See supra text accompanying notes 266-68. 
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extraordinarily thoughtful (and vigilant) constitutional politics.284 
Thus, although congressional supremacy could redress the po-
tential Griswold error once committed better than judicial supremacy, 
it also could encourage more potential Griswold errors, some of 
which would be left unremedied. 285 
This suggests a trade-off. Judicial supremacy poses a greater 
risk of erroneously refusing to establish national standards that 
voters would choose if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful con-
stitutional politics. Congressional supremacy poses a greater risk 
of erroneously intruding on local discretion that voters would 
choose to respect if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful consti-
tutional politics. Identifying the error that voters would rather 
avoid (if they confronted the question in an extraordinarily 
thoughtful way) is itself an issue of constitutional representation 
and, therefore, a matter of indeterminate speculation. In this 
sense, judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy cannot be 
evaluated according to the substance of the policies each would 
generate. 286 
284. The structure of Congress, after all, was originally intended to protect 
concerns of federalism by inhibiting congressional action. See J. CnoPER, supra 
note IO, at 26 (commenting that either house of Congress may defeat a bill, and 
senators representing only 15% of population can block federal action). Such 
structures-and legislative inertia in general-could similarly operate to inhibit 
congressional responses toward restoring state discretion, thus preventing deci-
sions which favor federalism. Dean Calabresi has analyzed problems of legisla-
tive inertia in responding to judicial efforts to serve contemporary community 
values by invalidating or "updating" legislation in a common law, rather than 
constitutional, capacity. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 72-80, 120-45. 
285. It is not necessarily true that justices will become less deferential in eval-
uating state policies under congressional supremacy. If judicial behavior re-
mains the same, then congressional supremacy can mitigate the erroneous 
establishment of national standards, see supra text accompanying notes 236- 46, 
273-76, and the establishment of erroneous national standards, see supra text ac-
companying notes 293-303, while leaving the erroneous failure to establish na-
tional standards unaddressed. In the end, whether Justices become less 
deferential, how much less deferential, and under what circumstances less defer-
ential, will depend on their judgments about the continuing constitutional sig-
nificance of federalism. With the goal of constitutional representation, this 
should be a matter of determining whether voters today, if engaged in extraordi-
narily thoughtful constitutional politics, would more often decide to establish na-
tional standards or to leave matters to local discretion. 
286. During debates preceding the Constitution's framing, some proposed 
a congressional power to invalidate offensive state legislation. This was rejected 
as being too nationalistic. See G. Wooo, supra note 42, at 525-26. It is reason-
able to suggest, however, that federalism is far less important today than it was 
to the framers and ratifiers of 1787-or even those of 1868. More today than in 
1787, the national community is viewed as primary; issues are viewed as na-
tional; culture and perspective are formed as national. See J. CHO PER, supra note 
IO, at 191-93 (regional heterodoxy more perceived than real); Ackerman, supra 
note 6, at 1180 (national perspective developed through Civil War; accelerated 
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Yet results are not the only basis by which to evaluate the 
rival "interpretive" regimes. Congressional supremacy still 
promises three process-oriented benefits discussed in other con-
texts. First, with more active judicial review both encouraged and 
tempered by congressional supremacy, the Court could confront 
the inevitable competition between concerns for federalism and 
concerns for the best governing national policy. This contrasts 
favorably with both congressional silence, born of the national in-
ertia in which judicial review of state policies necessarily oc-
curs, 287 and the know-nothing deference of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's Shabazz opinion, induced by the high stakes of judi-
cial supremacy. Thus, more active judicial review encouraged by 
congressional supremacy could help to simulate the extraordinary 
vigilance of constitutional politics. Issues otherwise ignored would 
be confronted.288 
Second, the judicial focus on constitutional norms histori-
cally acknowledged as fundamentally important helps these 
processes of constitutional policymaking to simulate the ex-
traordinary thoughtfulness of constitutional politics. While Justice 
Brennan in Shabazz could have focused national political attention 
on values of religious free exercise, for example, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist might have focused attention on values of federalism. 
Because of the judicial deference induced by the high stakes of 
judicial supremacy, however, the competition between concerns 
of federalism and concerns of religious free exercise in this con-
text was left entirely unexamined by any accountable representa-
tive of the national polity, let alone examined m an 
extraordinarily thoughtful way. 
Finally, the nature of congressional resolution under con-
gressional supremacy helps to simulate the electoral roots of consti-
tutional politics. Although legislative inertia would inhibit 
through New Deal); Brest, supra note IO, at 75 n.54 (prevalent notion that values 
of federalism are less important today). How much less significant concerns for 
federalism are, however, remains the indeterminate issue of constitutional rep-
resentation. Cf supra text accompanying notes 261-65 (discussing possible posi-
tions that national electorate could take on issues of federalism). 
287. See Mikva, supra note 244, at 609-10 ("Congress is a reactive body un-
able to enact legislation until the problem at hand reaches crisis proportions.") 
(footnote omitted). This observation cuts two ways: in favor of greater judicial 
activism, because Congress cannot (or will not) address issues that voters would 
wish to consider if engaged in extraordinarily vigilant and thoughtful politics; 
and against greater judicial activism, because Congress cannot easily correct ju-
dicial errors. 
288. Cf PERRY I, supra note 7, at 152-54 (litigation of institutional reform 
cases can bring to public attention issues otherwise ignored). 
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statutory responses that, ideally, should be enacted, any debate is 
intrinsically valuable.289 The mere acknowledgment of congres-
sional authority to overturn the Court's "interpretations," even 
. when that authority is not exercised, could have both symbolic 
and practical value in lending majoritarian legitimacy to the 
Court's decisions. Furthermore, when Congress overcomes its 
inertia and enacts responsive legislation, constitutional issues will 
have been resolved by accountable representatives of the national 
electorate, just as constitutional provisions themselves are framed 
and ratified . by accountable representatives of the national 
electorate. 290 
Thus, while Chief justice Rehnquist's approach would pro-
tect federalism (and risk the erroneous refusal to establish na-
tional standards) through congressional inertia and judicial deference, 
greater judicial act1v1sm supplemented by congressional 
supremacy would reduce erroneous refusals to establish national 
standards (and risk undermining federalism) by promoting con-
scious choice-the Court's choice or Congress's choice. As either 
choice is surely more thoughtful than inertial know-nothingness, 
and ultimately subject to Congress's nationally accountable judg-
ment, the processes by which constitutional policy are made could 
better approximate extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional poli-
tics. 291 In the end, because successful constitutional representa-
289. The intrinsic worth of public discourse is a central proposition in the 
recent prominence of republicanism in constitutional scholarship. See, e.g., B. 
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8-19 (1980) (proposing con-
versational paradigm for generating ideas of justice); Ackerman, supra note 8, at 
1022 (describing higher-track politics characterized by appeals to public good 
evaluated by mobilized citizenry); Michelman II, supra note 42, at 1495 (republi-
canism emphasizes deliberative functions of politics); Sunstein, supra note 42, at 
1589 (noting importance of disagreement and dialogue in republican theories); 
Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1691 (republican model is "town meeting, where de-
cisions are made during a process of collective self-determination"); cf. 
Michelman I, supra note 42, at 76-77 (judicial plurality "is for dialogue, in sup-
port of judicial practical reason, as an aspect of judicial self-government, in the 
interest of our freedom"). Michelman's republicanism here is more elitist, fo-
cused on dialogue among Supreme Court Justices rather than within the electo-
rate. See also PERRY I, supra note 7, at 152-56 (deliberative politics valuable as 
means to gain knowledge of self and others). 
290. Under article V, constitutional provisions are proposed by representa-
tives, whether Congress or a convention, and are ratified by representatives, 
whether state legislatures or special state conventions. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
291. The Court's "dormant" commerce clause jurisprudence provides an 
example. Justice Stone suggested that when the Court invalidates a state policy 
as excessively burdensome on interstate commerce, it may be pursuing "the pre-
sumed intention of Congress" rather than a constitutional mandate. See South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-69 (1945). One might question why 
the Court should act as Congress's quasi-legislative front; indeed, one might 
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tion must be defined in terms of process-making the decisions 
that voters today would make if engaged in extraordinarily 
thoughtful constitutional politics-it is perhaps only by better ap-
proaching the processes of constitutional politics that voters can 
hope to approach their ideal results. 292 
u. Redressing the Establishment of Erroneous National 
Policies 
A court might commit a third possible "interpretive" error 
within the spectrum between the erroneous establishment of na-
tional policies and the erroneous refusal to invalidate offensive 
local policies. It might correctly invalidate a local policy that vot-
ers would decide to displace if engaged in extraordinarily 
thoughtful constitutional politics, yet create the wrong national 
policy. 
Consider Roe v. Wade as a potential example of this "interpre-
tive" error.293 Justice Blackmun, for a majority of seven, held that 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects a 
right of privacy which "is broad enough to encompass a woman's 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."294 After 
finding this right, he invoked the familiar judicial balance called 
"strict scrutiny." Weighing the woman's privacy interest against 
state interests in protecting health and "potential life," Justice 
argue that the "dormant" commerce clause involves an unconstitutional delega-
tion (or arrogation) of legislative power to (or by) the Court. Cf Schoenbrod I, 
supra note 224, at 1224-48, 1283-90 (arguing against delegation of legislative 
power to executive). But several arguments support this relationship between 
Court and Congress that parallel my rationale for judicial review tempered by 
congressional supremacy. First, Congress is not sufficiently vigi.lant to notice 
state and local policies that might unduly burden interstate commerce. Litiga-
tion provides an easier mechanism by which government may notice potential 
issues of public policy than does the legislative process. Second, the Court can 
devise a reasoned, coherent theory for resolving an issue of public policy. Third, 
Congress's power to correct the Court's "common law" commerce clause policy 
provides ultimate electoral control. While legislative inertia might make con-
gressional response difficult, it is probably easier for Congress to notice and 
respond to an offensive judge-made commercial policy than to notice and re-
spond to the entire range of state and local policies that might unduly compro-
mise national commercial concerns. 
292. Based on the proposition that the results of "interpretation" are inde-
terminately creative, Professor Sandalow has posited that the essence of consti-
tutional decisionmaking is the deliberative processes from which constitutional 
law emerges, rather than the substance of those decisions. See Sandalow, supra 
note 20, at 1184-85. 
293. Roe might also be an example of the erroneous establishment of na-
tional policies that compromise values of federalism. 
294. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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Blackmun determined that the state may not regulate abortion 
during the first trimester of pregnancy; may regulate abortion for 
the sake of maternal health during the second trimester; and may 
prohibit abortion altogether for the sake of the fetus during the 
third trimester.295 
If voters today engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful consti-
tutional politics to establish some national standard governing 
abortion, would they choose the policies imposed by Justice 
Blackmun in Roe? Few would deny that if any issue of constitu-
tional representation is indeterminate, this one is.296 Given such 
indeterminacy, judicial supremacy is problematic, for it protects 
as governing constitutional law a judgment that has no firm basis 
as sound "interpretation. "297 
In contrast, rather than having to wait nearly two decades for 
the Court to hand the abortion issue back to the political pro-
cess-a development suggested by Webster 298-voters would have 
had authority to strike their own balance far sooner under a re-
gime of congressional supremacy.299 Given a healthy measure of 
295. Id. at 164-65. Recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices 
White and Kennedy, indicated an inclination to strike a different balance among 
these competing considerations. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490, 517-21 (1989) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, CJ.). 
296. See supra text accompanying note 164; see al.so Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973). While Ely allows that 
"[w]ere I a legislator I would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court 
ends up drafting," he believes that "Roe lacks even colorable support in the con-
stitutional text, history, or any other appropriate source of constitutional doc-
trine." Id. at 926, 943. 
297. Justice Blackmun's methodology, relying in part on century-old com-
mon law, "logic," and biology, was hardly well-suited to satisfying the ideal of 
constitutional representation. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-36, 163. Lo'gic is mean-
ingless except as a means toward effectuating values. Biology might be a matter 
of fact, but the facts of biology can relate differently to the values of different 
people. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that century-old common 
law reflects values of the national electorate today-whether their ordinary legis-
lative values or their extraordinary constitutional values. The dissenters' answer 
was based on a methodology similarly ill-suited to constitutional representation. 
Justice Rehnquist limited his opinion to original intent. See id. at 173 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (majority "eschew[ ed] the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment"). Justice White's dissent in a companion case was also mired in 
originalism. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White,]., dissent-
ing) ("nothing in the language or history of the Constitution" to support Court's 
view that Constitution encompasses special solicitude for liberty to choose abor-
tion). For an argument that originalism poorly serves the "interpretive" ideal of 
constitutional representation, see supra text accompanying notes 149-53. 
298. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, CJ.) 
("[T]he goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove ... [contro-
versial] issues from the ambit of the legislative process, whereby the people 
through their elected representatives deal with matters of concern to them."). 
299. Professor Bickel noted that with judicial supremacy, "the ultimate, fi-
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congressional deference to the Court, 300 the political judgment 
made by Congress responding to Roe, regardless of its sub-
stance,301 more likely could have better reflected the choices that 
voters in 1973 would have made if engaged in extraordinarily 
thoughtful politics than did Blackmun's opinion, or White's, or 
Rehnquist's.302 As the years passed, voters might have remained 
satisfied with their "interpretive" response; they might not have. 
With congressional supremacy, Congress could have passed new 
naljudgment of the Court is quite frequently ajudgment ultimate and final for a 
generation or two. That, however, is quite long enough to worry about, and the 
really interesting question, therefore, is what happens within the generation or 
two." A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 244-45 (footnote omitted). 
300. See supra text accompanying notes 219, 271-72. 
301. Congressional response could be radically different from Justice 
Blackmun's opinion-for example, establishing a national norm prohibiting abor-
tion based on viewing the fetus as an entity worthy of protection. If Congress 
did make this choice in exercising its powers of congressional supremacy, it 
would be difficult to argue that the Court's opinion, rather than Congress's "in-
terpretive" statute, more likely reflects the choices voters today would make if 
engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. Congress's deci-
sion, after all, would be not only a national political decision, but also an ex-
traordinarily thoughtful one-compared with ordinary congressional politics-
like constitutional politics itself. This view is consistent with Sunstein's version 
of "liberal republicanism." See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1574-76. While a re-
publican perspective (more than one of pluralism or of hopelessly victimized 
minorities) might suggest that some views "are better than others," the proof of 
the better view comes "through discussion with those initially skeptical." Id. at 
1574. Thus, a process of public discussion and resolution, more than one of 
judicial imposition, satisfies republican notions ofreflective self-government. Id. 
at 1579-80 (republican rights emerge from deliberative politics rather than from 
pre-political natural law). Michelman has a more outcome-specific view of re-
publicanism and, therefore, is satisfied with the "traces" of popular republican-
ism found among a dialogic (and liberal-activist) Supreme Court. See Michelman 
I, supra note 42, at 73-77. 
302. Reasons supporting this proposition should, by now, be familiar. First, 
in presenting an issue for Congress's consideration, the Court's decision, better 
than Congress's erstwhile inaction, helps national policymaking to simulate the 
extraordinary vigilance of constitutional politics. Second, Justice Blackmun's opin-
ion, as well as the dissents, provides a relatively comprehensive, if not coherent, 
point of departure on the merits of the abortion issue. Any congressional re-
sponse can simulate the extraordinary thoughtfulness of constitutional politics bet-
ter than did the failure of consideration reflected in the absence of any national 
policy at all. Finally, Congress's response can be closer to constitutional politics 
than was the Court's initial determination because Congress's resolution is polit-
ical in an electorally accountable way-as is constitutional ratification itself. This 
is particularly significant given Justice Blackmun's self-acknowledged "interpre-
tive" method of balancing competing concerns. Congressional response under 
a system of congressional supremacy seems far more likely to satisfy the "inter-
pretive" ideal of constitutional representation than does Justice Blackmun's gut 
reaction. Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 282, at 982 (criticizing prevalent judicial bal-
ancing where the "weights" of competing interests "are asserted, not argued 
for"); id. at 1004 (judicial balancing turns constitutional law into decisionmak-
ing no better than that in ordinary politics). 
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legislation, reflecting experience gained and lessons learned, to 
supersede its first "interpretive" statute. Indeed, even if Con-
gress did not act again, congressional supremacy need not have 
precluded the Court from striking down Congress's first "inter-
pretive" response after a decade or so, posing the constitutional 
issue to the national electorate once again, based on a judgment 
that voters then would have created a different abortion policy if 
engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics.303 
• • • 
The foregoing analysis suggests that toward serving concerns 
of political self-constraint, judicial review can better serve ideals 
of constitutional representation under congressional supremacy 
than under judicial supremacy-not only for people who create 
constitutional provisions of their own, 304 but also for people who 
rely on aging constitutional texts. The "interpretive" ideal of 
constitutional representation seeks to replicate decisions that vot-
ers would make if engaged in constitutional politics. Constitu-
tional politics toward political self-constraint embodies three 
essential elements-electoral roots, extraordinary vigilance, and 
extraordinary thoughtfulness. 305 
Better than judicial review insulated by judicial supremacy, 
judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy could 
simulate all three elements. Ultimate congressional resolution of 
constitutional questions would provide electoral roots. The judi-
cial opinions to which Congress would respond-with a likely 
measure of healthy deference to the Court-challenge established 
policy and would help provide extraordinary thoughtfulness. A 
reduction in the paralytic judicial deference inspired by judicial 
supremacy would improve the extent to which otherwise unexam-
ined policies become subject to extraordinarily thoughtful scru-
tiny and, therefore, would provide extraordinary political 
vigilance. 
The point is obscured when there is no clear notion of what 
"interpretation" should be. Yet by framing ideal "interpretation" 
303. Cf G. CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 2, 7 (common law courts should 
supersede statutes believed no longer to reflect community values). On an issue 
such as abortion, ferment seems inevitable; strife and change likely. In the end, 
the transition from Roe to Webster suggests that judicial supremacy might delay 
change, but not prevent it. Judicial supremacy might simply have delayed the 
day when voters learn practical lessons about the abortion controversy that must 
be learned. 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 88-105. 
305. See supra text accompanying notes 241-42. 
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as a replication of constitutional politics-identifying choices the 
electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful 
constitutional politics-and by viewing judicial supremacy and 
congressional supremacy as alternative mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability to this ideal of constitutional representation, con-
gressional supremacy seems to emerge as the better option. 
d. Special Cases 
1. The Flag: Congressional Supremacy and the Preservation of 
Exhortatory Constitutional Texts 
The recent controversy about flag burning provides a unique 
context in which to consider the relative merits of judicial 
supremacy and congressional supremacy. In Texas v. johnson,806 
the Supreme Court decided that a state may not criminalize ex-
pressive flag burning if the state's purpose is to "preserv[e] the 
flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity."807 President 
Bush pressed for a constitutional amendment to supersede the 
Court's judgment.80 8 Congress, led by Senator Biden, pursued 
legislation to protect the flag. 309 
The President openly acknowledged that his concerns were 
content-motivated and, therefore, inconsistent with the Court's 
opinion in Johnson. 810 Thus, by seeking a constitutional amend-
ment, he acted in a manner consistent with judicial supremacy. 
Although Senator Biden professed a content-neutral concern 
with the flag as a physical entity, his argument for legislation was 
indistinguishable from President Bush's content-motivated argu-
ment for a constitutional amendment: The flag is a special and 
revered symbol that must be protected.811 To the extent that 
306. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
307. Id. at 410-20. 
308. See Remarks by the President Announcing the Proposed Constitu-
tional Amendment on Desecration of the Flag, l Pus. PAPERS 831-33 Uune 30, 
1989) [hereinafter Remarks] (the proposed text: "The Congress and the States 
shall have power to prohibit the physical desecration of the Hag of the United 
States."). 
309. S. 1338, lOlst Cong., lst Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 15,067 (1989) ("Who-
ever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the 
floor or ground, or tramples upon any Hag of the United States shall be fined not 
more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year."). 
310. See Remarks, supra note 308, at 832-33 (The Hag is "one of our most 
powerful ideas. And like all powerful ideas, if it is not defended, it is 
defamed."). 
31 l. See Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the Supreme Court Decision in 
Texas v. Johnson: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civ. and Const. Rights of the House 
Comm. on thejudiciary, lOlst Cong., lst Sess. 12, 15 (1989) ("What we've done 
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Senator Biden claimed to have acted consistently with the Johnson 
opinion, his approach also remained within the bounds of judicial 
supremacy. By acting with the very motive that the Court de-
clared unconstitutional,312 however, Senator Biden sought to ex-
ercise powers Congress would possess only under a regime of 
congressional supremacy. Senator Biden's legislation passed, 
while President Bush's amendment died. 
Under congressional supremacy, there would have been no 
need for Senator Biden's disingenuous denial that his bill directly 
contradicted the Court's op1mon. Indeed, congressional 
supremacy would encourage open and direct legislative responses 
to judicial decisions as legitimate. Furthermore, under congres-
sional supremacy, congressional legislation that, unlike the Biden 
statute, openly and directly responded to Johnson would have been 
spared the fate of the Biden statute-invalidated by the Court in 
United States v. Eichman.3 13 
Thus, one might argue that the flag burning controversy sug-
... is draft a bill that is 'content neutral.' ") (statement of Sen. Biden). In intro-
ducing this legislation, however, he explained, "The flag is truly the nation's 
most revered and profound symbol, representing what this country stands for 
. . . . That is why ... just two days after the Supreme Court handed down its flag 
decision, I stood on this floor and offered a bill to amend the federal flag burn-
ing law .... " Id. at 12-14. 
312. In reaching his decision for thejohnson Court, Justice Brennan rested 
on the "bedrock principle" that "the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreea-
ble." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, reaching his 
conclusion without significant reference to constitutional text, the framers' in-
tent, or judicial precedent. See id. at 421-35 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
Rather, he looked outside the usual confines of his (self-proclaimed) originalism 
and sought to measure the deeply felt values of the national electorate today. 
He noted: 
[M]illions of Americans regard [the flag] with an almost mystical rever-
ence regardless of what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs 
they may have. I cannot agree that the First Amendment invalidates the 
Act of Congress, and the laws of 48 of the 50 States, which make crimi-
nal the public burning of the flag. 
Id. at 429 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
313. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). In a 5-4 decision, Justice Brennan found that 
"[a]lthough the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation 
on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Govern-
ment's asserted interest is 'related to the suppression of free expression.' " Id. at 
2408 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547 (1989)). 
A requirement that congressional response to Supreme Court opinions be 
open and direct to carry the authority of congressional supremacy would en-
courage Congress to deliberate more seriously about the issue at hand-toward 
simulating the concern for general principle that is more prominent in extraor-
dinarily thoughtful politics. See supra notes 239-41, 244. Thus, a statute that did 
openly and directly contradict the Court might not have been so easy to enact as 
was Senator Biden's duplicitous measure. 
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gests at least one context in which judicial supremacy is better 
than congressional supremacy as a route to constitutional repre-
sentation: Because judicial supremacy required the national elec-
torate to pursue the Bush route of constitutional amendment to 
override the Court's flag policy-a proposed amendment that did 
not even approach ratification-voters were less likely than they 
would be under congressional supremacy to create an ill-consid-
ered policy. Actual constitutional politics is, by definition, a bet-
ter route to extraordinarily thoughtful decisions than Congress's 
pseudo-constitutional politics would be.3 14 
Although congressional supremacy would indeed encourage 
the inferior electoral route (responsive congressional legislation) 
to overturning unpopular constitutional decisions by the Court, it 
is important to remember that under judicial supremacy, the bet-
ter electoral route (ratification of constitutional amendments) has 
been successfully completed only four times in the nation's his-
tory.315 For those infrequent circumstances when voters actually 
would respond to a Supreme Court decision by formal constitu-
tional amendment, the electorate might well construct a policy 
more likely to reflect extraordinarily thoughtful choices than if it 
acted simply with responsive congressional legislation. 
Yet when the electorate's representatives consider, but fail to 
ratify, formal constitutional amendment in response to a judicial 
314. See supra text accompanying notes 241-47. It should be emphasized 
that the Biden statute was not an example of the open and direct response to 
judicial review envisioned by the pseudo-constitutional politics of congressional 
supremacy. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
One might object that neither President Bush's politics of constitutional 
amendment nor Senator Biden's politics of congressional legislation were ex-
traordinarily thoughtful at all-that both epitomized the reflexive and dema-
gogic politics about which Alexander Hamilton warned when justifying judicial 
review. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469-70 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961); supra note 43. Most lawyers have been indoctrinated injustice Brennan's 
perspective. Upon reflection, one might conclude that there is more to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's position than the lawyer's traditional view allows-at least 
from the perspective of constitutional representation. In this case, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's afrProach was better suited to constitutional representation than jus-
tice Brennan's. In an ironic role reversal, it was the Chief Justice, not Justice 
Brennan, who sought the actual values of "millions and millions of Americans," 
rather than referring acontextually to the framers, constitutional text, or prece-
dent. See supra text accompanying notes 123-29 & 208 (discussing extremist 
speech from perspective of constitutional representation). 
315. See L. FISHER, supra note 60, at 201-05; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI 
(ratified to supersede Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVI (ratified to supersede Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 
U.S. 429 (1895)); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (ratified to supersede Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)); U.S. CONST. amend. XI (ratified to super-
sede Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)). 
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decision-as in the flag controversy-the Court's decision re-
mains vulnerable against a benchmark of constitutional represen-
tation. That the electorate's representatives began, but failed to 
complete, the article V process cannot be taken to validate the 
Court's judgment as having successfully identified a choice the 
electorate would make in constitutional politics. Indeed, if the 
dissenting Justices in Johnson and Eichman had prevailed, there 
might well have been talk of an article V response to restore the 
integrity of the first amendment that would have fared no better 
than did President Bush's failed proposal. Thus, failure to com-
plete article V processes can mean no electoral decision at all, or, 
perhaps, a general reluctance to change constitutional text, rather 
than endorsement of specific decisions the Court might have 
made. 
More common are circumstances in which the electorate 
would not consider, let alone create, a responsive constitutional 
amendment under judicial supremacy, but might consider openly 
and directly responsive legislation under congressional 
supremacy. Such electoral inertia under article V presents the is-
sue this article confronts: Can the Court's decisionmaking under 
judicial supremacy or Congress's openly and directly responsive 
decisionmaking under congressional supremacy-neither of which 
is article V decisionmaking-better approximate the electorate's 
ideal of an extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional deliberation 
that does overcome inertia and does yield decision. Previous 
analysis has suggested that congressional response under con-
gressional supremacy would more likely yield the choices voters 
would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitu-
tional politics than is the ill-guided "interpretive" decisionmaking 
of unaccountable Justices.316 Thus, in general and over time-
when the electorate is entirely inert under article V and even 
when it begins, but fails to complete, decisionmaking under arti-
cle V-congressional supremacy can yield the better approxima-
tion of constitutional representation. 
Is it more important to better approximate constitutional 
representation for that vast body of issues that do not generate the 
sort of intense consensus required to satisfy article V's amend-
ment procedures, or for that small set of exceptional issues that 
might generate such political energy as to overcome the article V 
316. See supra text accompanying notes 239-49. Again, the Biden statute 
was not openly and directly responsive. See supra note 313 and accompanying 
text. 
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barrier to formal constitutional amendment? For me, answering 
this question is relatively easy. Unless there is something special 
about the issues that would generate responsive constitutional 
amendment-so special that having actual constitutional delibera-
tion rather than responsive congressional deliberation is critically 
important-judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy 
should be evaluated for the general rule rather than for the rare 
exception. At least three of the four situations in which the na-
tional electorate has overturned the Court by amending the Con-
stitution-sovereign immunity, federal income taxation, and the 
minimum voting age-would hardly seem to qualify as exceptions 
so special as to supersede the significance of all other constitu-
tional cases combined. And the fourth; slavery, was resolved not 
by extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, but with the 
force of war. Indeed, for this issue, from today's perspective, a 
route toward overturning Scott v. Sandford 'fH 7 easier than either 
war or constitutional amendment probably would seem a better 
option.318 
Some commentators, including Professors Ackerman and 
Amar, have recently addressed the problems of "interpreting" 
the aging Constitution by focusing on the processes for constitu-
tional amendment. Amar wrote: "In considering modes of up-
dating our fundamental law, our choice need not be limited to the 
Article V amendment process versus freewheeling judicial review, 
... for there is a third ... possibility: constitutional amendment 
by direct appeal to, and ratification by, We the People of the 
United States."319 This possibility suggests that formal constitu-
tional deliberation need not be as rare as it has been under article 
317. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
318. The analysis tracks my reasons for suggesting that originalism is a bad 
route to constitutional representation. While originalism, more than other theo-
ries of interpretation, would likely create greater incentive for formal constitu-
tional amendment, it would do so only because the Court's anachronistic 
"interpretations" would increasingly deviate from the choices voters today would 
make if engaged in constitutional politics. See supra notes 149-53 and accompa-
nying text. In general, the better the system approaches constitutional repre-
sentation, the less voters need to consider formal constitutional amendment; 
with successful constitutional representation, the choices voters would make if 
engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics are being made 
through other means. 
319. Amar, supra note 42, at 1044. Akhil Amar has suggested several alter-
natives to article V procedures, including (i) ratification of a congressionally pro-
posed national referendum by a mere majority of the national electorate and 
(ii) proposal and ratification by majorities of national conventions. See id. at 
1044-45 & 1066. Bruce Ackerman also has suggested a modified process for 
formal constitutional amendment. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1182. 
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V. If so, then I have proposed a false tension between congres-
sional supremacy versus judicial supremacy as the general rule, 
and formal constitutional amendment as the rare exception. 
Yet to provide for electoral rejection of unpopular Supreme 
Court decisions by facilitating the amendment of constitutional 
text could produce a Constitution that looks more like a 
hodgepodge of conflicting principles and policies than a declara-
tion of aspirations for political self-constraint. Indeed, many were 
concerned that President Bush's flag amendment would dilute the 
symbolic function of the first amendment: at risk was the power 
of simple and general commands, issued in an authoritative voice, 
to induce popular consideration of, and respect for, principle. 
Ironically, with an increase in formal constitu.tional politics that 
tinkers with constitutional text toward overturning the Court's 
decisions, the Constitution could become less a device of political 
self-constraint to influence popular consideration of contempo-
rary issues, and more a diary of momentary political debates. 
Thus, in evaluating congressional supremacy versus easier consti-
tutional amendment as a popular check on judicial review, voters 
must determine whether the goals of political self-constraint are 
better served by relegating the resolution of specific issues to ju-
dicial opinions and responsive congressional statutes, 320 or by 
elevating the resolution of so many more specific controversies to 
the status of constitutional text itself. 321 
11. Brown v. Board of Education 3 22 
Brown presents the ultimate challenge to any theory of consti-
tutionalism and judicial review. Indeed, my arguments sug-
gesting the superiority of congressional supremacy for a majority 
among the national electorate today beg questions about 
320. Cf R. NAGEL, supra note 21, at 128-31 (doctrinal formulae employed 
by courts to resolve constitutional cases obscure relevant values and lack intui-
tive appeal). 
321. Choosing the best route toward constitutional amendment depends in 
large part on confronting this article's fundamental question: Why constitu-
tional supremacy rather than statutory supremacy? See supra text accompanying 
notes 23-59 & 137-48. Why have a two-track process for lawmaking? Only by 
answering this question can one determine how each track should work. (This 
choice also depends significantly on factors that determine a pre-formal, ad hoc 
rule of recognition. See supra note 45.) Furthermore, as I have su·ggested 
throughout this article, whether voters leave the aging Constitution intact, cre-
ate new provisions pursuant to article V, or create new provisions by other pro-
cedures, they still must decide on the best available interpretive regime-judicial 
supremacy, congressional supremacy, or some other alternative. 
322. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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whether, and hbw, issues of racial segregation might have been 
differently resolved if the Supreme Court had not enjoyed the 
powers of judicial supremacy. 
From the perspective of voters today, Brown would most un-
dermine congressional supremacy if each of the following three 
propositions is true. First, Congress (and the President), repre-
senting the will of the national electorate in 19 54, would have re-
versed the Court's decision by statute. Second, a majority among 
the national electorate in 1991 oppose racial segregation and sup-
port Brown. Third, Brown, as enforced through judicial 
supremacy, was necessary for this evolution in national attitudes 
about racial discrimination. 
If each of these conditions is true, Brown challenges more 
than congressional supremacy as a route to constitutional repre-
sentation; it challenges the notion of constitutional representa-
tion itself. If each condition is true, it may be that the Court's 
constitutional "interpretations" should reflect policies that a ma-
jority of the contemporary electorate would reject even in ex-
traordinarily thoughtful politics (the first condition), but that a 
future generation would embrace (the second and third 
conditions). 
Deriving from Brown this modified "interpretive" ideal, and a 
concomitant support for judicial supremacy,323 is problematic for 
several reasons. First, racial segregation in public education 
might still have been successfully invalidated under a regime of 
323. This "interpretive" ideal could not be vindicated under congressional 
supremacy. It is threatened even by the specter of Supreme Court decisions 
being overturned by article V constitutional politics. Alexander Bickel seemed 
attracted to this ideal of "interpretation." Referring to Brown, he said, "the 
Court's principles are required to gain assent, not necessarily to have it." A. 
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 251 (emphasis added). John Ely has criticized this no-
tion on several grounds. First, the Supreme Court is not particularly qualified to 
predict "progress." See J. ELY, supra note 253, at 69-70. Second, to govern the 
present by the values of the future is as undemocratic as governing the present 
by the values of the past. See id. at 70. Ely's second criticism, however, does not 
give Bickel his due. The matter as I have stated it and, I believe, as Bickel con-
ceived it, is not simply one of "predicting" progress, but of making progress, 
where progress is defined from the future's perspective. The present must de-
cide not whether it wishes to suffer in being governed by values that will prevail 
in the future, but whether it wishes to suffer in creating a society for which the 
future will be thankful. Nevertheless, Ely's first criticism is applicable to this 
"interpretive" ideal of making progress: The Court seems not particularly well-
suited to identify those issues and choices that a future generation would em-
brace, but that would be rejected by the present generation even in extraordina-
rily thoughtful constitutional politics. 
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congressional supremacy.324 The Court might have waited for a 
President who could be relied upon to veto any resolution325 
Congress might have enacted restoring state discretion to segre-
gate. 326 Indeed, Brown itself might have survived under congres-
sional supremacy. Congress might not have passed a resolution 
overturning the Court's decision; even if Congress did act, Presi-
dent Eisenhower might have exercised his veto authority.327 
Second, political activity between 1954 and 1964 yielded 
profound changes in the national electorate's attitudes about 
race. By 1964, Congress not only was an ally of Brown; it had 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which some feared the Court 
would invalidate for going too far in prohibiting racist policies and 
practices. 328 While it is possible that such political change would 
not have occurred but for Brown and judicial supremacy, the radi-
324. See, e.g., R. NAGEL, ;upra note 21, at 5 (Brown reflected dominant na-
tional culture). 
325. It is perhaps significant that John F. Kennedy was elected President 
while expressing sympathy with Brown's principle of desegregation during the 
campaign of 1960. See A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 268. 
326. If so, Brown would have been delayed at least seven years. While the 
delay would have been problematic, actual desegregation had to await real 
changes in attitudes. Cf Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 191-200 (1973) 
(Denver district maintained segregated schools 19 years after Brown); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5-13 (1971) (North Carolina 
school board had not desegregated schools 17 years after Brown); Green v. 
County School Bd., 391U.S.430, 432-38 (1968) (Virginia county had not deseg-
regated schools 14 years after Brown). 
327. The Eisenhower administration did file an amicus brief advocating 
that the "separate but equal" doctrine be overruled and systems of segregated 
public schools be invalidated. See L. FISHER, supra note 60, at 18. There were 
strong reasons other than racial morality for dismantling America's racial 
apartheid. "America could not fight world communism and appeal to dark-
skinned peoples in foreign lands if it maintained racial segregation in its own 
school system. The executive branch made the Court mindful of these reali-
ties." Id. ; see also Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
61, 117-19 ( 1988) (Truman and Eisenhower administrations used desegregation 
issue in Cold War competition with Soviet Union for Third World influence). 
Eisenhower was far less enthusiastic about Brown when speaking to domestic 
audiences. See A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 265. His justification for supporting 
the Court's subsequent affirmations of Brown rested more on judicial supremacy 
than on his agreement with the decision. See id. at 266; cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) (unanimously affirming Brown and stressing duty of state 
officials to uphold interpretation of fourteenth amendment). Nevertheless, judi-
cial supremacy allowed Eisenhower to have his cake and eat it too. If he had to 
choose between one or the other under congressional supremacy, he might well 
have exercised statesmanlike leadership. Cf Amar, supra note 42, at 1101 (irre-
sponsibility results when responsibility is not imposed); Thayer, supra note 60, at 
155-56 (given more responsibility, institutions can act more responsibly). 
328. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 159 (Attorney General Kennedy 
expressing fear that Court would invalidate antidiscrimination legislation passed 
under § 5 of fourteenth amendment). 
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cal change in political orthodoxy during just one decade suggests 
that forces of social change were already present and could not 
long have been forestalled.329 Brown was as much a product of 
these forces as it was a catalyst. While judicial supremacy might 
have stifled some resistance, pro-Brown political activity would 
have continued even if Congress had exercised the powers of "in-
terpretive" supremacy to overturn Brown. Protracted politics, at 
least as much as the Court's injunctions, changed attitudes so 
considerably in the decade after 1954. 330 
Finally, even if all three conditions of this Brown scenario are 
true, voters today should not necessarily adopt the modified "in-
terpretive" ideal. Perhaps there are no Brown-like issues331 left in 
American politics. 332 Even if voters think there might be such is-
sues, 333 a majority might not be willing to sacrifice the discretion 
329. Under congressional supremacy, the Brown scenario might have 
played out like this: By 1964 Congress could have enacted legislation repealing 
its repudiation of Brown, or broadened the Civil Rights Act with provisions gov-
erning school desegregation. Alternatively, the Court might have decided an-
other case like Brown, presenting the constitutional challenge to Congress once 
again. For a similar analysis of Roe, see supra notes 298-303 and accompanying 
text. 
330. While the Court's opinion would no longer have been an authoritative 
basis for injunctive force, its moral force would have remained as political capi-
tal, perhaps inspiration, for those opposed to segregation. They could then 
have struggled against segregation with equal, and perhaps greater, force. Cf 
Chang, supra note IO, at 880-85 (Supreme Court opinions are force for political 
influence). 
331. By this I mean judicial determinations that a majority among the na-
tional electorate would reject in constitutional politics today, but that a future 
generation would embrace. See supra text preceding note 323. 
332. Abortion might be such an issue, but one wonders whether the Brown-
like disposition would conform to Roe or instead create national policy to protect 
a fetus from abortion. See supra note 30 I. 
333. There is at least one sense in which Brown was the last issue of its type. 
If overturned under congressional supremacy, Brown would have fallen to a coa-
lition of Southern Democrats and Northern conservatives-precisely the coali-
tion that the Radical Republicans feared in endeavoring to perpetuate their 
extraordinary political advantage through the fourteenth amendment. So 
viewed, Brown is the last great episode of the Civil War. In this context, constitu-
tional supremacy and judicial supremacy are employed not to promote concerns 
for political self-constraint, but to deny one's opponents a right to shape public 
policy. If judicial supremacy was necessary for the fall of Southern segregation, 
Brown suggests that the Northern electorate's majority was able to perpetuate a 
temporary political advantage on this issue. Does this suggest the desirability of 
judicial supremacy for those who wish to perpetuate a temporary political advan-
tage? The answer is still unambiguously "no" from the perspective of the na-
tional electorate's majority. See supra text accompanying notes 183-91. From the 
perspective of the Northern electorate's majority, the answer depends on two pro-
positions. First, Brown's resolution could not have been attained without judicial 
supremacy. Second, benefits gained from Brown's resolution through judicial 
supremacy are worth more than losses incurred when opponents manage to 
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to pursue present concerns-such as, ironically, affirmative action 
programs334-in order to give future generations the satisfaction 
of a moral development for issues that might have Brown's sta-
tus.335 If so, the modified version of constitutional representation 
should be rejected, and, with it, judicial supremacy as well. 
Brown remains troubling.336 But it is only from Brown, and 
the possibility of future cases like it, that a majority among voters 
today should find a significant challenge to an "interpretive" ideal 
of constitutional representation and its implementation through 
benefit from judicial supremacy. The first proposition is questionable. See supra 
text accompanying notes 322-30. The second must be viewed in the light of 
each individual's value scheme. Nevertheless, in making that judgment, it might 
be helpful for Brown's proponents to consider the present Court's decisions se-
verely restricting local discretion to pursue affirmative action programs. See, e.g., 
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 (1989) (restricting 
local discretion to set aside percentage of public contracts for minority business 
enterprises); Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-84 (1986) (re-
stricting local discretion to adopt affirmative action program in lay off provision 
of collective bargaining agreement); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 307-10 ( 1978) (restricting state discretion to adopt affirmative action pro-
gram in university admissions policies). 
334. See supra note 333. For a critical examination of the Court's recent 
conservative judicial activism in restricting legislative discretion to adopt affirm-
ative action programs, see generally Chang, supra note 190. 
335. As Professor Seidman has suggested with respect to Brown itself, "It is 
not obvious to everyone that Brown ... was worth the cost of Lochner, Korematsu, 
and Plessy." Seidman, supra note 22, at 1577 (footnotes omitted). This point is 
more powerful as applied to issues that might have Brown's status. 
336. The busing remedy might have been more vulnerable under congres-
sional supremacy than Brown itself. Busing was widely unpopular and affected 
both Northern and Southern communities. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. 
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 452-54 (1979) (Ohio); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (North Carolina). Congress might well have 
acted to prohibit busing as a remedy for judicially-determined violations. Once 
Brown and the evil of purposeful segregation are accepted, however, it easily 
follows that some remedy for past transgression is required. Whether a remedy is 
required, and for what, presents the moral concern. Whether busing is the best 
remedy is not so much a moral issue as a practical one. Remedies other than 
busing are available and are arguably superior. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 280-88 (1977) (upholding order for remedial educational programs 
and funding); cf. Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the Constitutional Right of 
Equal Educational opportunity and an Appropriate Remedial Process, 63 B. U. L. REV. 1, 
38-45 (1983) (advocating educational programs tailored to needs of students to 
supplement or replace busing). Indeed, there is a growing movement within the 
black community advocating schools designed expressly for black males to re-
dress a pattern of disproportionate failure and underachievement. See Kantro-
witz & Springen, Milwaukee Plans Two Schools/or Blacks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 1990, 
at 67. Given the continuing debate about how best to cure the effects of pur-
poseful racial segregation, a continuing dialogue between the Court and Con-
gress under congressional supremacy could have been more productive than the 
judicially crafted approach that may become extinct as more courts find that past 
violations have been "cured." See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 
111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). 
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congressional supremacy. I am inclined to view Brown as unique. 
The issue of racial equality has not only a special moral status in 
American society, but also the unique history of having spawned a 
civil war. At any rate, however troublesome one case is for any 
given theory of constitutionalism, it is, perhaps, more trouble-
some to construct a theory of constitutionalism around one 
case.337 For now, one might simply conclude that even if con-
gressional supremacy is not the best approach for the extreme 
exception, it seems best tailored for the general rule. 
3. The Benchmark: Other Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 
The foregoing has suggested that congressional supremacy 
better serves the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representa-
tion than does judicial supremacy. Because many concerned with 
judicial review might reject the notion of constitutional represen-
tation-that constitutional law should reflect decisions the electo-
rate today would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful 
consitutional politics-this section will examine the implications 
of congressional supremacy for traditionally prominent theories 
of constitutional interpretation. 
a. Originalism 
At first glance one might suppose that judicial supremacy 
would better achieve originalist interpretation, because judges 
are arguably better suited than legislators for identifying and act-
ing upon the original understandings of constitutional provi-
sions. 338 But the Court's performance over two centuries reveals 
that judicial supremacy cannot ensure originalist interpretation, if 
only because so few judges have embraced originalism as their 
benchmark.339 Furthermore, as I have previously suggested, 
originalism is properly rejected, at least from the electorate's per-
spective today.340 Thus, however better judicial supremacy might 
be toward achieving originalist review should be irrelevant in de-
termining whether judicial supremacy or congressional 
supremacy is the better "interpretive" regime from the perspec-
tive of voters today. 
337. See R. NAGEL, supra note 21, at 4. 
338. See PERRY I, supra note 7, at 16-17; Brest, supra note 10, al 82, 103. 
339. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 33, at 411-18 (acknowledging that most 
constitutional decisions are nonoriginalist); R. BORK, supra note 150, at 155-59 
(same); Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional A<ijudication, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 
723, 727 (1988) (same). 
340. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53. 
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b. Conventional Morality 
Conventional morality envisions judicial review more as the 
creation of national common law than as an interpretation of con-
stitutional law.341 Congressional supremacy can serve an "inter-
pretive" ideal of conventional morality better than judicial 
supremacy for two reasons. First, to the extent that congressional 
supremacy mitigates the pressures for judicial deference, proce-
dures for making public policy can more vigilantly ensure that lo-
cal policies are not out of step with national values and that old 
policies are not out of step with contemporary values.342 Second, 
under congressional supremacy, when the Court erroneously 
strikes down state or national policies based on putative norms 
that offend the national electorate's morality, Congress could re-
spond with legislation that does reflect national consensus. 
Under judicial supremacy, a court decision out of step with con-
ventional morality is insulated from revision. Thus, as a legisla-
ture's statute supersedes a common law court's precedent, 
congressional supremacy makes sense for a theory of "constitu-
tional" interpretation that seeks conventional morality.343 
c. "Living" Principle 
"Living" principle seeks a coherent vindication of moral 
principles arguably rooted in constitutional history.344 As with 
originalism, one might suppose that judicial supremacy can serve 
"living" principle better than can congressional supremacy. Con-
gressional supremacy empowers the electorate's representatives 
to compromise principle by "correcting" judicial decisions that 
have pursued the coherent implications of certain values farther 
than voters can tolerate. 
Yet, for several reasons, constitutional moralists can con-
clude that congressional supremacy need not substantially under-
mine the extent to which judicial review serves their ends, or even 
that congressional supremacy might promote their ends. First, 
"living" principle is controversial as a method of constitutional 
interpretation and, therefore, is imperfectly served even under ju-
34 l. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
342. For an examination of such questions framed as issues of common law, 
rather than constitutional law, see generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 72. 
343. For the suggestion that conventional morality is deficient as a theory 
of constitutional interpretation, precisely because it would transform the na-
tion's constitutional law into a national common law, see supra text accompany-
ing note 159. 
344. See supra text accompanying notes 160-68. 
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dicial supremacy. While Ronald Dworkin and Michael Perry have 
their own preferred principles, Richard Posner and Richard Ep-
stein have theirs.345 Thurgood Marshall must compete with Wil-
liam Rehnquist. 
Second, while "principle" can be compromised by active and 
affirmative policymaking-such as the statutes that Congress 
might enact in response to Supreme Court decisions that stray 
too far from the national electorate's perspective-it also can be 
compromised by legislative inertia and inattention. To the extent 
that congressional supremacy mitigates the incentives for judicial 
deference, the characteristics of courts that enable them to pro-
mote principle-their greater vigilance and more coherent rea-
soning-can promote judicial review as "living" principle. Thus, 
under congressional supremacy, Roe might have been changed by 
Congress, but Hardwick might have been decided differently by 
the Court. 
Third, principle "lives" less meaningfully if it grows without 
electoral impetus and acceptance. Under congressional 
supremacy, policies that some voters dislike, but that survive Con-
gress's opportunity to review and reverse, can be more effectively 
vindicated because they would be more clearly rooted in 
majoritarian values and choices than they would be under judicial 
supremacy. Indeed, one might question the benefit of public pol-
icy that reflects the philosopher's preferred "principle" when the 
majority resents this "morality" as illegitimately imposed from 
without. 346 
d. Liberal Republicanism 
Congressional supremacy can serve liberal republicanism 
better than can judicial supremacy. Under congressional 
Id. 
345. See Graglia, supra note 186, at 67. Professor Graglia notes: 
Dworkin and Epstein are equally enthusiastic about judicial interven-
tion in the political process; they differ only in that Dworkin would have 
the Supreme Court enact Rawls' egalitarian program because it is re-
quired by natural law and therefore the Constitution, whereas Epstein 
would have the Court enact Robert Nozick's libertarian program on a 
similar basis. 
346. See Michelman II, supra note 42, at 1504 ("(T]he distinctive promise of 
political freedom remains the possibility of genuine collective action, an entire 
community consciously and jointly shaping its policy, its way of life.") (quoting 
Pitkin.justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 PoL. THEORY 327, 344-45 (1981)); 
Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1548 (republican conception of individual autonomy 
involves "selection rather than implementation of ends"); id. at 154 7-48 (repub-
lican conception of political freedom values "collective self-determination"). 
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supremacy, judicial Teview would help to simulate the extraordi-
nary vigilance and thoughtfulness of constitutional politics, and 
would stimulate the electorate-at-large, as represented in Con-
gress, to deliberate authoritatively about issues otherwise left ne-
glected. Referring to Cass Sunstein's four characteristics of 
liberal republicanism,347 one can conclude that congressional 
supremacy could promote (i) more political deliberation among 
(ii) more equal political actors, (iii) leading to more agreement 
underlying public policy, (iv) all in a stronger atmosphere of par-
ticipatory citizenship. In contrast, judicial supremacy promotes a 
sense of alienation from public policy and undermines electoral 
responsibility for making constitutional law.348 
While constitutional representation-choices the electorate 
would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful politics-
seems an ideal description of the substantive policies that would 
emerge from true liberal republicanism, 349 congressional 
supremacy seems an ideal mechanism (or, at least, one better 
than judicial supremacy) for achieving the processes of liberal re-
publican policymaking. This should hardly be surprising, as there 
is much of liberal republicanism in the idea of political self-con-
straint. 350 To the extent that constitutional representation serves 
the electorate's ideals of political self-constraint better than other 
"interpretive" theories, and to the extent that congressional 
supremacy serves constitutional representation better than judi-
cial supremacy, advocates of liberal republicanism should find 
their concerns better served by congressional supremacy as well. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has questioned the merits of judicial supremacy 
347. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1547-58 (discussing republican concep-
tions of politics in terms of these four characteristics); supra text accompanying 
notes 169-73. 
348. The ideal of constitutional representation toward concerns for polit-
ical self-constraint seriously undermines Professor Nagel's effort to reestablish 
electoral responsibility for constitutional law through more pervasive judicial 
deference. See generally R. NAGEL, supra note 21. While deference might make 
governing law more electorally rooted, it does nothing to make it more thought-
ful. In contrast, congressional supremacy retains the distinction between ex-
traordinary constitutional decisionmaking and ordinary policymaking by 
recognizing an essential role for judicial review while giving the electorate ulti-
mate responsibility for evaluating and making constitutional law. See supra text 
accompanying notes 266-67 & 287-88 (judicial deference can thwart electoral 
vigilance). 
349. See supra text accompanying notes 169-73. 
350. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43. 
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from the perspective of the American voter. From this perspec-
tive, the article examined whether the political processes that the 
electorate must satisfy to supersede an interpretation of constitu-
tional text by the Supreme Court should be the same processes 
that the electorate must satisfy to create constitutional text. By 
examining why voters might wish to make policy by creating 
supreme constitutional texts rather than by enacting ordinary 
congressional legislation, the article sought to develop ideal views 
of how such constitutional provisions should be "interpreted," 
and to determine how welljudicial supremacy serves these "inter-
pretive" ideals. 
The common denominator of all motives for creating 
supreme constitutional texts (other than to overturn a Supreme 
Court decision) is a relationship to public decisionmaking in con-
stitutional politics better than one's relationship to public deci-
sionmaking in everyday politics-better through extraordinary 
power,351 extraordinary thoughtfulness,352 or extraordinary vigi-
lance.353 Voters who have created supreme constitutional texts 
hope to perpetuate the extraordinary aspect of their constitu-
tional politics after having returned to everyday politics; they 
hope that policy will continue to reflect choices they would make if 
still engaged in constitutional politics. Similarly, voters who rely 
on aging constitutional texts hope to attain the extraordinary as-
pect of public decisionmaking they would enjoy if they created 
supreme constitutional provisions of their own.354 In short, vot-
ers seek constitutional representation. 
For a majority among voters today, only the goal of ex-
traordinary thoughfulness through political self-constraint is rele-
vant in choosing between judicial supremacy and congressional 
35 l. People who create constitutional provisions to deny their opponents' 
ability to shape public policy in Congress seek to exploit extraordinary but tem-
porary political power-a competitive advantage that they will not enjoy to-
morrow. See supra text accompanying notes 23-35. 
352. People who create constitutional provisions to secure the benefits of 
political self-constraint seek to exploit extraordinary but temporary thoughtful-
ness and devotion to public policy-a public-oriented thoughtfulness that will be 
overwhelmed by their more pressing private concerns tomorrow. See supra text 
accompanying notes 36-43. 
353. People who create constitutional provisions to ensure optimal legisla-
tive accountability seek to exploit an extraordinary but temporary level of direct 
control over public policy-a vigilance that will be relinquished to representative 
functionaries who will make day-to-day governmental decisions while enjoying 
opportunities to serve their own ends rather than those of their employers. See 
supra text accompanying notes 44-55. 
354. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48. 
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supremacy as a route to constitutional representation.355 For 
these voters, judicial supremacy is the less productive device. Ju-
dicial supremacy protects judicial decisionmaking no more likely 
to reach correct "interpretive" results than a coin toss, and it pro-
motes a measure of paralytic deference that leaves the products of 
everyday politics unchallenged in too many contexts. Judicial re-
view supplemented by congressional supremacy, on the other 
hand, could encourage decisionmaking processes more thought-
ful than everyday politics,356 more vigilant than everyday poli-
tics,357 and more accountable than naked judicial review.358 
These processes, better than policymaking under judicial 
supremacy, simulate the extraordinarily thoughtful politics that 
constitutionalism seeks to perpetuate. 
Yet judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy are not 
the only options. Voters might consider, for example, 
(i) retaining judicial supremacy and abandoning life-tenure;359 
355. See supra text accompanying notes 215-17. 
356. See supra text accompanying notes 245-47, 268-72 & 288-89. 
357. See supra text preceding note 245; text accompanying notes 247, 268-
72 & 286-88. 
358. See supra text accompanying notes 242-44, 268-72 & 289-92. 
359. Defining an "interpretive" ideal for a Justice's performance can be em-
ployed toward defining the judicial term of office: "during good Behaviour." 
See U.S. CONST. art. III. That the term so often is called "life-tenure" suggests 
an absence of criteria by which to evaluate judicial performance successfully. See 
sources cited supra note 22. James Madison suggested that there is, indeed, a 
relationship between electoral accountability and good behavior: "[A republi-
can] government ... derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great 
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during 
pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior." THE FEDERALIST No. 
39, at 241 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). It should not seem too odd to 
link a definition of "good behavior"-of ideal "interpretive" behavior-to the 
electorate. Constitutional representation maintains the essence of popular sov-
ereignty and constitutionalism by asking for the choices the national electorate 
would make if engaged in constitutional politics. 
Life-tenure has been a point of focus for those concerned about judicial 
accountability. See supra note 22. My analysis of congressional supremacy sug-
gests, however, that life-tenure, and the personal security for a judge that goes 
along with it, can be a constructive force toward constitutional representation. 
See supra note 245 and accompanying text. To the extent that the choices voters 
would make in constitutional politics are different from the choices made in eve-
ryday politics, voters would want some part of the "interpretive" process to be 
capable of making decisions different from those made by elected representa-
tives. Independent judicial review provides an element of extraordinary 
thoughtfulness that legislative politics often lacks. To subject judges to the pres-
sures of re-election would undermine the possibilities for the dialogic tension 
(between court and legislature) from which congressional supremacy can ap-
proximate choices the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily 
thoughtful constitutional politics. See Grodin, supra note 22, at 1980 (former 
California justice admitting that concern for retention election might have af-
fected his decisions on bench); Seidman, supra note 22, at 1585-87, 1599-1600 
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(ii) adopting congressional supremacy while requiring a super-
majority within Congress to override a Court decision;360 
(iii) adopting congressional supremacy while requiring Congress 
to wait one year (or two, or more) before it can enact responsive 
legislation;361 (iv) determining whether Congress's structure truly 
does provide optimal legislative accountability;362 (v) exercising 
Congress's authority to curtail federal court jurisdiction;363 or 
(judges will behave differently depending on whether appointed for life-tenure, 
appointed but subject to removal, or elected); cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 
35, at 883 (noting that independent judiciary may use statutory interpretation to 
enforce "contracts" between legislators and interest groups). 
360. Cf Amar, supra note 42, at 1079-85 (ordinary congressional processes 
inadequately majoritarian). 
361. This option would discourage a heated rush to judgment and create 
an opportunity for extended reflection and debate-as in constitutional politics 
itself. At the same time, however, it would extend the period during which a 
possibly erroneous judicial decision retains its status as governing law. 
362. See supra note 284. 
363. Michael Perry has justified a relatively creative, "noninterpretive" ju-
dicial review as consistent with electorally accountable policymaking, based on 
Congress' power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion. See PERRY I, supra note 7, at 128. This solution is problematic for several 
reasons. First, if Congress does restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction in re-
sponse to unpopular judicial decisions, it will have eliminated judicial review 
altogether in future political disputes about relevant issues. While Perry's dem-
ocratic safety-valve would silence the Court's voice in certain contexts, congres-
sional supremacy retains judicial review-and with it, the Court's constructive 
role in promoting the extraordinary vigilance and extraordinary thoughtfulness 
to which voters would aspire in making constitutional choices for political self-
constraint. Cf id. at 157-59 (valuing Court's ability in prison reform litigation to 
raise otherwise ignored issues for public scrutiny, while advocating congres-
sional power to "enact legislation withdrawing [such cases] from the federal 
courts['] jurisdiction"). Second, given these high stakes of eliminating judicial 
review altogether for certain issues, it is hardly clear that Congress would readily 
choose to exercise its exceptions clause power. Thus, the Court's judgments 
would remain intact, even when unpopular, and even when Congress might 
choose to reverse specific decisions given a regime of congressional supremacy. 
Thus, Perry must explain why this particular balance of popular control over 
judicial intervention is the optimal route toward his ideal of the national commu-
nity's moral development. Why is article V, or other formal procedures for con-
stitutional amendment, an inadequate popular control to legitimize 
noninterpretive review, while congressional supremacy promotes excessive pop-
ular control, and the article III exceptions power is just right? See id. at 127, 133-
35. Third, Perry still embraces originalist review as plainly valid, and not subject 
to the control of Congress under its article III power. Id. at 133. Aside from the 
problems of identifying originalist limits on "noninterpretive" review, see supra 
notes 152 & 237, there remain the basic problems that (i) the framers' prefer-
ences are not necessarily those that voters today would choose if engaged in ex-
traordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics; and (ii) courts are not infallible 
in identifying what those preferences are. Perry later retreated from his commit-
ment to electorally accountable policymaking and more unambivalently em-
braced noninterpretive review. See PERRY II, supra note 7, at 164 (premise that 
accountable policymaking is a value prior to all others was mistaken). It seems 
to me that Perry has moved in the wrong direction. At least for questions about 
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(vi) determining whether article V provides the best procedures 
for constitutional amendment.364 
A search for the best "interpretive" regime, rather than the 
less imperfect of just two options, would be an inquiry well worth 
pursuing.365 Any other option, I suggest, should be evaluated by 
subjecting it to the same analysis this article has applied to judi-
cial supremacy and congressional supremacy. Those concerned 
about the proper relationships among constitutionalism, majori-
tarianism, and judicial review should consider how well any "in-
terpretative" regime can approach an ideal of constitutional 
representation: identifying the decisions that voters today would 
make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional 
politics.366 
the nature of the governmental system, choices must (somehow) be attributable 
to the electorate-at-large. Such is my task in taking the perspective of voters 
comprising the national electorate today. 
364. As previously noted, Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar have ques-
tioned the merits of article V procedures for constitutional amendment. See 
supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
365. For example, when Pennsylvania's electorate was creating a constitu-
tion after the Declaration of Independence, some proposed "that at the expira-
tion of every seven ... years a Provincial Jury shall be elected, to inquire if any 
inroads have been made in the Constitution, and to have power to remove 
them." See G. Wooo, supra note 42, at 232 (emphasis in original) (quoting pam-
phlets circulated at that time). Pennsylvania was one of the more radically egali-
tarian and majoritarian states during the revolutionary period. Id. at 226-37. 
This proposal eventually was adopted. Id. at 339. 
366. If one remains uncomfortable with constitutional representation and 
congressional supremacy, it could be that one is uncomfortable with the idea of 
constitutional democracy. See Michelman II, supra note 42, at 1508-IO. Ifa major-
ity of the electorate would reject constitutional representation and congressional 
supremacy, however, then the premise with which this article began-that justifi-
cations for judicial supremacy depend on justifications for constitutional 
supremacy-must be reexamined. See supra text accompanying notes 322-35 
(discussion of Brown). If, from the perspective of a national majority, justifica-
tions for constitutional supremacy depend on justifications for judicial 
supremacy, rather than the other way around, then the processes of judicial deci-
sionmaking must be viewed as the primary good and the processes by which 
constitutional provisions are created are at best merely an imperfect way to pro-
vide judges with the vaguest sort of guidance; at worst, they are a withering 
governmental appendage. Such a version of constitutionalism not only would 
suggest that the electorate distrusts itself so much that it seeks Platonic guardi-
ans, but also that through two centuries of practice, the practical and normative 
relationships between constitutional texts and judicial review have been 
reversed. 

